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Introduction: War, Society and the State 
Historians tend to discuss the state as a series of static or inert 
monolithic institutions.' This book, concentrating upon Queensland in 
the years 1938 to 1948, will show that the state, and particularly its 
bureaucracy,^ is highly flexible, responding to new crises with alacrity 
and resolve; expansive and experimental, it is not monolithic but 
possesses complex and contradictory elements. Writing in 1982, the 
Sydney History Labour Group in the introduction to an edited 
collection of essays lament the lack of attention that the concept of 
the state has received from Australian historians.^ Whilst concurring 
with the broad parameters of this estimation, however, Kevin Fewster 
contends that: 
Even if few Australian historians have explicitly incorporated 
concepts of the state in their scheme of things, the impact of the 
institution is implicit in much that they write.^  
Desley Deacon agrees that: 
For people who supposedly have a 'characteristic talent for 
bureaucracy', Australians have paid little scholarly attention to the 
state... We have many studies of the development of parties and 
classes, but almost none that examine the construction of the state 
and its relationships to other parts of the political and social 
system.* 
Extending these analyses, Alistair Davidson in a provocative article 
entitled "An Invisible State" goes so far as to maintain that: 
Until 1975 there was an absence which was not seen in the even 
richer literature on Australian history. There was no history of the 
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Australian state. This absence was aU the more remarkable 
because of the degree to which the state ... had been present in 
the rest of Australian life - a fact which commentators and 
historians have usually noted cursorily as they passed on to their 
muttons.* 
This is not to assert that any conceptual notion or analysis of the 
state was altogether absent. For, given the unique nature of the 
British settlement of the continent as a gaol controlled by the military 
and navy with a civil polity evolving slowly and unevenly, the state 
assumed a far more intrusive and controlling role than it did in the 
contemporary metropolitan society. Rather, Australian historians have 
impUcitly described and charted the developments of various forms of 
the state apparatus and related issues (the granting of separation; the 
creation of political institutions; the role of the judiciary; the nature of 
state intervention when the dubious allegiance to consensual modes 
breaks down such as in major strikes; the provision of welfare). 
Being predominantly groimded in an empiricist historiographical 
tradition, tihey have not sought to ponder the broader questions 
involved in understanding the nature of the state and its powers, 
leaving these refined and often theoretical debates to political and 
legal theorists. Yet historians should not be singled out for criticism 
for their lack of theoretical rigour in an intellectual vacuum. As 
David Held remarks "... the nature of the State is hard to grasp. This 
may seem peculiar for something so pervasive in public and private 
life, but it is this pervasiveness that m^es it difficult to understand".' 
As Gordon L. Clark and Michael Dear confirm in State Apparatus. 
Structures of Language and Legitimacy (1984): 
The literamre on the state is highly diverse and often confusing. 
It seems that almost every discipline and every ideological 
persuasion has attempted to develop its own theory of the state.*" 
Theorists from Marx, Gramsci, Althusser, Poulantzas have been 
preoccupied with understanding the abstract structural and ideological 
nature of power whilst authors like Miliband, Jessop and Offe have 
been concerned with developing taxonomies of the state's apparams 
The fimdamental weakness of both approaches, at least when 
considermg the disciphne of history, is the assumption that the state is 
a series of institutions.' William de Maria contends furthermore that 
"... the State is die crystaUisation of cultural, racial and nationalistic 
themes that in past eras have joined in a specific way to set rh 
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society on its specific themes. These state themes are aU-powerful 
and easily eclipse government and bureaucratic authority ... nations 
will go to war for these themes. They do not necessarily go to war 
for their governments".'" 
Taken at face value the proposition that the state's apparatus is 
flexible could appear self-evident; for the nature of modem mass 
warfare inherently demands flexibility from traditional restraints 
concerning the demarcation of status between the civilian and the 
military; the limits of executive authority and independent action; the 
dubious sanctity of the individual's liberty. Liberal rhetoric about the 
separation of powers in the Westminster system and the right of the 
individual to uphold dissenting, albeit unpopular, opinions wiU be 
regarded as inappropriate, indeed dangerous, luxuries in a society 
experiencing total war. Kathleen Burk in her introductory essay in 
the collection entitled War and the State. The Transformation of 
British Government, 1914-19 (1982) comments that: 
The First World War caused striking changes in the organisation 
and procedures of British government... [I]t is probable that few of 
the changes would have happened during this period had it not 
been for the war... Yet the precedent had been set. The 
interventionist ministries were consciously chosen as models when 
controls were once more needed in the Second World War, and at 
that time, controls survived the war for a much longer period." 
Extending this analysis, Neil Stammers in his provocative 
monograph, Civil Liberties in Britain during the Second World War 
(1983) contends that both political democratic theorists, and in their 
wake, historians have been reluctant to study comprehensively 
government and the political process during periods of crisis. He 
argues that: 
This omission is symptomatic, for war and crisis are seen as 
aberrations in the history and the development of democracy and 
study has therefore concentrated on the 'normal' - periods of 
relative peace and stability.'^ 
Yet during the Second World War and the period immediately 
following, serious debate was conducted over the nature of power and 
the consequences of enlarged executive rule which operated to the 
detriment of parliamentary authority and autonomy. British liberal 
legal commentators, most notably John Eaves, Hugh Molson, Maurice 
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Hankey, Arthur Keith, Harold D. LassweU, Marguerite A. Sieghart, Sir 
W. Ivor Jennings and the Americans, Clinton L. Rossiter and Paul U. 
Rava, were concerned that the executive was assuming unprecedented 
powers." Being predominantly experts in constitutional or 
administrative law they identified a regrettable tendency towards 
totalitarianism, in this case the almost unrestricted power of the 
executive. They were not, except for Lasswell and Rossiter, political 
theorists, hence the narrow range of their concerns and argurnents. 
Despite the limitations imposed both by the adherence to liberal 
ideology and the specifically empirical nature of their enquiries, these 
authors tell us much about the extension of power in total war; the 
increasing tendency to centralise decision making in a small coterie -
in this case the executive wing of government - and the process of 
severely circumscribing individual liberty. 
Studies such as Paul Hasluck's monumental Australia in the War 
of 1939-45: The Government arui the People in two volumes, which 
by virtue of its comprehensiveness, clarity of argument and sound 
research must be regarded as the classic text in the broad area of the 
nation at war, does deal with the nature and operation of the state. 
Yet, given its status as the domestic contribution within the official 
history of Australia at war from 1939 to 1945, a certain blandness 
pervades the discourse. Hasluck is circumspect and conclusions must 
often be drawn inferentially. No doubt his status as an aspiring, and 
later, successful Liberal parliamentarian during the period of the 
books' long research, gestation and production contributed such a 
seemingly bland impartiality. Never does Hasluck allow a personal 
opinion to intmde or cloud his judgment. This may ultimately, in 
retrospect, be seen as a limitation; for the extension of executive 
power and the almost totalitarian thoroughness of the national security 
regulations needs far more critical and stringent appraisal and analysis. 
Hasluck's inclusion of the general topic of internment and the 
prosecution of communist dissidents as appendices rather than his 
incorporating them into the text graphically displays the tendency to 
cast the dissident figuratively as an outsider. These two areas, which 
provide a good deal of the substantive argument of this study, rather 
than bemg discrete units that can be regarded as aberrations, instead 
reveal die nature of those processes operating in a society under 
crisis. 
The odier general book. All In! Australia During the Second 
World War (1983) by Michael McKeman only deals tangentially with 
the issues of state power and their extension during total war. Whilst 
acknowledging that McKeman's intention is to provide a well written 
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and illustrated popular text that is not confmed by the rigours of 
excessive documentation and detailed analysis, one must also register 
he does ignore central questions. The title in itself reveals the 
imderlying premises upon which the argument is grounded. Rather 
like Arthur Marwick in Britain in the Century of Total War. War, 
Peace and Social Change 1900-1967 (1968), McKeman regards the 
Second World War as a levelling process where hardship and 
tribulation was democratically distributed throughout an unequal 
society. Thus the questions of the curtailment of civil liberties for 
those deemed security risks, whether political, ethnic or sexual, 
disrupts the pattern elaborated upon the theme of "equality of 
sacrifice". William de Maria in "From Battlefield to Breadline" 
extends this theme. He argues that policy formulation in World War 
n there was a noticeable and "active denigration of class and factional 
divisions and support for 'all hands on deck' policy. Solidarity was 
deemed to be important to the successful prosecution of the war". 
Yet this interpretation runs counter to his other contention that the 
state reflects all the ethnic nationalistic themes and tensions.'" 
The two other substantive studies of the AustraUan homefront 
during the Second World War are concerned with the American 
presence. John Hammond Moore's Oversexed, Overpaid and Over 
Here. Americans in Australia 1941-1945 (1981) suffers from the 
author's unfamiliarity with Australian history and society as well as 
an excessive concentration upon the diversity among the American 
forces here. E. Daniel Potts and Annette Potts' superbly researched 
study Yanks Down Under, 1941-45. The American Impact on Australia 
(1985) relies too heavily upon description and the density of their 
argument often obscures the general patterns. Unlike McKeman's 
account, both of these books have conflict and accommodation at the 
centre of their discussions. Given that the conflict is between 
American service personnel - ultimately a foreign force - and 
Australians, this in no way challenges the view of a nation united. 
In this regard, study of Australian society during World War U 
has taken quite a divergent path from analyses of the impact of the 
Great War. At the outset it should be acknowledged that, outside of 
the special privilege of access accorded to Hasluck as the official war 
historian, the main body of documents have only recently been 
available for scholarly research. The handicap may not however 
reside in access to sources but in the perceptions of and the 
conceptualisation of historical problems presented by both cataclysmic 
periods. Scholarly studies by authors such as Marilyn Lake, Raymond 
Evans, Denis Murphy, Ian Tumer, Kevin Fewster, Verity Burgmann, 
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Frank Cain and Alan Gilbert all stress the turmoil, conflict and deep 
divisions that Austrahan society experienced in World War I. 
Five main areas of conflict can be identified during the years 1914 
to 1922, the year the War Precautions Act was revoked: first the 
campaigns around the conscription referenda in 1916 and 1917 which 
led to a fundamental spht in the Labor Party and its loss of office till 
1929; secondly, the prosecution of dissidents, in particular the trial 
and conviction of twelve members of the Industrial Workers of the 
World in 1916; thirdly, the issue of censorship and propaganda; 
fourthly, industrial turmoil over wages, conditions and a drastic 
reduction in the real standard of living and lastly ideological battles 
between Empire loyalists and various groups of pacifists, socialists, 
bolsheviks and anti-war campaigners. 
Even the most superficial exammation of such issues in the 
Second World War reveals a different scenario. Conscription did not 
rip the Labor Party or Australian society apart. Under the provisions 
of the Defence Act of 1909 compulsory military service within 
Australian territory for males of proscribed age was allowed. Given 
the immediacy of the threat posed by Japan in early 1942 and the 
technicality that Papua and New Guinea were Australian territories, 
conscription never presented a major issue. The anti-war movement 
was small, but without the issue of conscription and the immediacy of 
military operations after 1942, it was destined to remain an unpopular 
minority movement. The ban on the Communist and Nazi parties 
drew little criticism; though the communists' disavowal of Australian 
commitment to the British war effort until the USSR entered the war 
m June 1941 provoked intense antagonism. Their position of 
influence in key unions, as this study wiU demonstrate, encouraged 
both the Queensland and federal governments to mobilise against 
them. There was no real equivalent of the Industrial Workers of the 
World and the small numbers and circumstances under which the 
communists were gaoled never roused widespread protest about 
arbitrary or cormpt use of power. 
Lasfly, the cost of living issue which ran through the increasing 
war weariness in the Great War was later kept under partial control 
by the universal use of rationing. Likewise, profiteering was 
controUed more effectively, though by no means entirely, by the 
provisions of the national security regulations. This is not to suggest 
that workers gladly accepted burdens and sacrifices. Studies on the 
operation of the WEB, the Manpower authority and industrial 
disputation all too clearly demonstrate the discrepancy between the 
rhetoric of equality of sacrifice and the realities of die burdens placed 
Introduction 
upon the working class. 
The focus of this study revolves around the manner in which the 
state perceived, contained and instimtionalised those deemed to be 
impediments to the effective prosecution of the war or threats, in the 
case of the Black Americans, to the fundamental ideological and 
social premises upon which Australian society depended. As this 
study is primarily concemed with States' rights and the tensions 
engendered between the Commonwealth and the State of Queensland, 
as outiined in Chapter 1, certain nationally based broad issues like 
conscription, censorship, the operation of the Manpower authority have 
been omitted, though diey provide insightful testimony to the tendency 
towards hegemonic and arbitrary control in war. These issues require 
a separate study in themselves. 
Rather, this monograph falls into three basic subdivisions: first, 
die contaiiunent of the ethnic alien. Chapter 2 will deal with 
processes of internment to isolate the "enemy within the gates" whilst 
chapter 3 is concemed with the elaborate interlocking systems of 
segregation initiated to contain the Black American GIs spatially and 
symbolically. The control of sexuality, the use of the national 
security regulations against women suspected of contracting venereal 
diseases and the extension of the candidates incarcerated in the lock 
hospitals, forms the basis of chapter 4. Lastly, attention wiU focus 
upon the surveillance and suppression of communists, or those 
perceived as communists and "fellow travellers", from 1940 to 1948. 
The empirical data wiU focus upon Queensland. This is not due 
to mere provincial partiality. Queensland historically is the ideal 
society to smdy in order to understand those repressive forces 
operating during periods of intense crisis and perceived threats to the 
body politic. First, Queensland became the base from which die 
Allied forces launched the Pacific offensives from 1942 onwards. 
Over one million American personnel passed through the northem 
State. Secondly, Queensland had a long and enduring history of 
isolating, incarcerating and institutionalising those deemed deviant. 
Only the criteria changed according to die particular emergency. 
Thirdly, Queensland governments, regardless of political allegiance, 
have shown a marked tendency towards firm insistence upon the 
inviolability of State's rights. Queensland is not alone in this regard. 
This brought them into conflict with both die Menzies and, most 
particularly the Curtin, governments over the delegation of powers in 
war. The Commonwealth wanted to centralise power, a process 
fiercely resisted by the States in general and Queensland most 
specifically. 
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Rather than identifying a clearly efficient delegation of powers, 
tills study shows the confusion, duplication, intense territoriality of 
various agencies with constitutional and political problems arising over 
the uneven demarcation between Commonwealth and State; between 
civil and military jurisdiction and between Australian and American 
military authority. Under the guise of patriotism and the immediacy 
of the emergency, botii die Commonwealth and die Queensland 
governments extended their powers. In particular, policing functions, 
which were deemed necessary to monitor the ethnic alien, the sexually 
active woman and the radical trade unionist can be seen at a premium 
during times of war. Yet, as the Sydney Labour History Group 
conclude: 
The history of the state is the history of the confrontation with 
capitalist, patriarchal, racial and familial power relations in 
Australian society. It has been a process of many contradictions 
and continual change.'^ 
This study examines and elaborates tiiese processes, in war-time and 
its aftermath. 
Managing the Emergency: 
The Designation and Delegation of 
Powers 1938-48 
Total war in die twentieth century has presented die state with an 
unparalleled crisis as well as opportunity to enlarge and to consolidate 
its functions, operations and powers. Speaking in Febmary 1942, 
Prime Minister John Curtin asserted diat "We are at a stage in our 
history when the stmggle for survival as a nation overrides every 
odier consideration."' Referring specifically to the Uniform Tax 
proposals in 1942, Treasurer Ben Chifley further added that "... 
[d]uring the serious crisis through which the nation is now passing, 
every benefit which one section of the nation has over another must 
be surrendered in the interests of total war... National rights must take 
precedence over all State rights."^ Constitutional and administrative 
difficulties in Australia arose over die delegation of powers; for, 
aldiough die nation's political leaders at both a State and federal level 
recognised and responded to the grave emergency which involvement 
in the war presented, no single or unified solution was apparent. 
World War Two witnessed an increasing centralisation of power 
and control in the hands of the federal government, a process that had 
begun in the Great War. Coterminously with a strident assertion of 
States' rights and sovereign autonomy, these dual systems produced 
conflicts that ran counter to the effective prosecution of the war effort 
on the homefront. The Queensland government, though often engaged 
in protracted conflict with the Commonwealth over what its leaders 
perceived as a violation of State autonomy, at the same time 
manipulated war-time federal controls in order to centralise and 
expand its own powers, particularly in the area of policing functions. 
Ambiguity initially arose in the fundamental domain of 
constitutional law because the constitution of the Commonwealth does 
not contain provisions relating to general emergency powers. These 
are primarily embodied in various State statutes and constitutions.^ At 
its most general interpretation, as Lord Dunedin in 1931 commented 
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that "... a state of emergency is something that does not pernut aiiy 
exact legal defmition: it connotes a state of matters calling for drastic 
action".* The problem in Australia went far beyond which particular 
natural or civil catastrophe should be designated a "state of 
emergency". At the outset the problems of which instrumentality 
should devise and control the remedies for this "drastic action 
presented a grave constitutional crisis not easily demarcated or 
resolved. The States in wartime sought to retain their powers from 
the incursions of the expanding federal government. 
H.P. Lee identifies die three arenas of emergency: "war-time", 
"peace-time" and "civil emergencies". These might variously include 
war, famine, earthquake, flood and die collapse of civil government.^  
The American constitutional theorist, Clinton L. Rossiter in his classic 
text, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in Modern 
Democracies, first published in 1948, cites war, rebellion and 
economic depression as the "three crises of modem democracies". He 
demonstrates how, in Great Britain, for mstance, the Emergency 
Powers Act of 1920, which extended the powers of die war-time 
Defence of the Realm Act, was passed specifically "to forestall a 
general strike".* Later it became the basis for war-time regulation and 
restriction. Likewise, in Queensland, wide powers were used by 
various Labor and conservative governments to break militant 
industrial action, for instance, in the 1912 general strike, the railway 
strikes of 1927 and 1948, and the meat workers' strike of 1946, the 
pastoral strike of 1956, the Mt Isa dispute in 1965 and the power 
industry strike of 1985. 
But war does not represent a lunited series of events defined by 
time, place and participants as a strike usually does. Radier, a society 
involved in total war is pushed to its very limit in order to ensure 
mere survival. In reviewing procedures in Britain, Neil Stammers 
demonstrates diat die concept of "war-time" in itself is far too vague 
and problematical. Rather what should be addressed are die questions 
of specific and urgent crisis in war-time such as imminent invasion 
and why governments are reluctant to relinquish dieir emergency 
powers when the crisis abates. He concludes: 
Even after die military crisis had passed, in mid 1940 die 
contmumg stmctural consensus enabled die government to retain 
die powers diat had been taken in spite of pariiamentarv 
opposition. In dus context Parliament does not appear to have 
acted as a check on die executive in so far as die making of and 
retention of regulations, was concemed.'' ' 
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Rossiter likewise concluded that "no form of government can 
survive that excludes dictatorships when the life of the nation is at 
stake".* Hence the normal checks and balances upheld in liberal 
parliamentary democracies in peace-time are dangerous luxuries in 
times of total war. The distinction that Rossiter makes is between 
constitutional and totalitarian dictatorships. He argues that: 
The outstanding institution of constitutional dictatorship of a 
legislative nature is the delegation of legislative powers. What 
this amounts to is a voluntary transfer of law-making authority 
fi-om the nation's representative assembly to the nation's 
executive.' 
Yet this transition is problematical. In both Britain and Australia 
this process was fraught with conflict in both the parliamentary arena 
and in public discourse. In Australia the question was far more 
complex; for, not only was the Commonwealth government, especially 
after December 1941, virtually attempting to mle by decree under the 
provisions of the wide-ranging national security regulations but the 
States of Queensland and Victoria passed their own emergency 
legislation in 1940 and 1939 respectively. These could variously 
ensure totalitarian executive government at two levels for the duration 
of a crisis such as foreign invasion. Rossiter concludes that "States' 
rights present distinct barriers to effective crisis action, and in great 
emergency, they will be broken down".'" Yet, Australian data would 
suggest that this is not a foregone, even an easy, process. The States 
do not relinquish their autonomy and competing systems of 
Commonwealth and State jurisdiction and instrumentalities interact, 
often with friction and inefficiency. 
Total war, or indeed any involvement in a declared war in 
twentieth century Australia, came under the auspices of the broadly 
defined defence powers embodied in the Australian constitution. As 
Justice Isaacs pronoimced in a landmark decision in 1916: 
It [the defence powers] is the ultima ratio of the nation. The 
defence power... passing into action becomes the pivot of the 
Constitution, because it is the bulwark of the State (sic). Its limits 
then are bounded only by the requirements of self-preservation." 
This flexible defence power is embodied in Section 51 which allows 
diat: 
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The Parliament shall, subject to diis Constitution, have power to 
make laws for die peace, order, and good government ot the 
Conunonwealdi widi respect to: (vi) The naval and military 
defence of the Commonwealth and die several States, and the 
control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the 
Commonwealth. 
Various legal commentators such as H.P. Lee, Colin Howard and 
Geoffrey Sawer have emphasised the elasticity inherent in the defence 
powers to deal with national emergencies such as the threat of 
invasion.'^ Lee continues that, unlike other powers in Section 51: 
The defence power is remarkable, in that its scope is not static. 
Its variable nature can be likened to the mercury column of a 
diermometer. As the conditions of war become more intense, the 
scope of die defence powers increases. As die war emergency 
cools down the scope... similarly contracts.'^ 
Though, on the surface, the passing of the National Security Bill in 
1939-40 and die implementation of extensive and comprehensive 
regulations, which ranged over and controlled every aspect of national 
life, would seem to have settied any ambiguity over jurisdiction of 
State and Commonwealth governments, this was not the case. The 
States, particularly Queensland and Victoria, clung tenaciously to tiieir 
own autonomy and aggressively defined their spheres of action and 
authority in order to deal with possible emergencies. 
Australia was not alone in implementing such drastic legislation. 
The Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts 1939 and 1940, which operated 
in the United Kingdom and colonies with special imperial defence 
provisions for New Zealand, Australia, Burma, India and Soutiiem 
Rhodesia, gave almost unlimited and unrestricted powers.'* Sir 
Samuel Hoare, in the debates in die House of Commons when he 
proposed the Bill, commented that its powers were "very wide, very 
drastic and very comprehensive"; but he was convinced they would be 
appUed witii "moderation, toleration and common sense". Stammers, 
m criticising the haste widi which such powers allowing virtual 
dictatorship by the Executive were granted, adds: 
Thus, after some fifteen years of preparation, die government 
could say, and die House of Commons could accept, diat die 
circumstances were so urgent diat die Bill would not be properly 
considered by Pariiament. A few amendments were proposed 
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during the committee stage, but those put to a vote were defeated 
and the Bill emerged from both Houses unscathed.'^ 
Coinciding with the Nazi offensive through Westem Europe in 
May 1940, further amendments were made to this Act which 
considerably restricted Britons' civil liberties.'* Rossiter, writing from 
die perspective of 1948, believed that: 
One of the most impressive features of the British government of 
die recent war was the scmpulous and consistent regard for the 
civil liberties of the people throughout die conflict.'^  
He does however admit that "perhaps the worst blot... was die 
wholesale internment of enemy aliens over eighteen in the dark days 
of May 1940"." In Canada, as Robert H. Keyserlingk notes: 
Sensitive to the alarms of war and the pressures of an aroused 
public opinion, the federal cabinet suspended civil rights in Canada 
under the 1927 War Measures Act on 1 September 1939, nine 
days before Canada went to war. This state of apprehended war 
permitted the govemment to legislate secret orders-in-council and 
to determine whose liberties would be retained or removed." 
The Australian War Book, prepared by the Defence department 
and based on the British model, initially laid down the foundations for 
the preparation for war. H. Duncan Hall, writing in 1943, stated diat 
"...[t]he closely guarded British War Book... was taken from its safe 
and opened in Whitehall just before Mimich, in September 1938". He 
adds that "similar War Books were opened at the same time in 
Ottawa, Canberta, Wellington, Pretoria, and Delhi".^ As Paul 
Hasluck comments: 
The book was only intelligible if it was accepted that, when the 
United Kingdom was at war, Australia would not remain neutral, 
although the control of the nature and extent of Australian 
participation in warlike activities would be wholly a matter for the 
Australian government.^' 
Thus, the Australian War Book must be understood within the 
context of imperial strategies. It gave, however, due regard to (but 
did not defme) the intemal process of cooperation between the States 
and the Conrnionwealdi, and fully recognised the necessity to create 
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new instrumentalities to cope widi die unforeseen demands made by 
modem technological warfare involving die entire civilian population 
and not simply an expanded army, airforce and navy. The expMision 
of die functions of existing civil departments was envisaged, though 
the specific features this process would take were not described. 
Basic demarcations were made between the preparation for muitary 
defence such as constmction of camps, transport routes and 
communication networks, surveillance procedures, the provision of 
medical care, the control of munitions, coastal shipping and facilities. 
Civil audiority was designated in the areas of air raid precautions, 
evacuation, the protection of property, particularly vital defence plants 
and utilities, and the expansion of the fire brigades. Hasluck 
concludes that "[t]here was scarcely a chapter in the War Book which 
did not require State cooperation or assistance at some point".^ 
Yet, by this bland pronouncement, Hasluck overlooks die vital 
areas of dispute between the Commonwealth and the States. 
Queensland, as the potential "invasion front-line" State, in particular, 
was most aggressive in its reluctance to transfer overriding control 
and bureaucratic management to the federal govemment. Police 
Commissioner P.J. Carroll in a conference of representatives of all 
Essential Services held in Brisbane on 17 April 1939 alerted the 
possibility of further demarcation disputes. He stated that: 
The Defence Department will be so busily engaged in repelling 
the enemy to make any attempt to safeguard the property widiin 
this State. The result is the civil power is now called upon to 
protect the whole property of the State and that onus is on die 
Police Force.^ 
Queensland had no intention of relinquishing powers to die 
Conunonwealdi. Rather bodi politicians and leading public servants 
like Police Commissioner Carroll and Sir Raphael Cilento, die director 
general of Health and Medical Services, saw die war as an 
opportunity to expand dieir domain particularly in the vital area of 
policing. 
In line widi die parameters laid down in die War Book, 
negotiations between Commonwealdi and State Ministers did however 
begm in 1935 when plans were made for air raid precautions.^ 
Queensland implemented its own coordinated plans in mid 1939 when 
die Central Air Raid Precautions Committee was formed Headed bv 
die under secretary for Healdi and Home Affairs, other members 
included die director general for Healtii and Medical Services die 
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commissioner of police, the coordinator general of Pubhc Works, the 
Lord Mayor of Brisbane and senior representative of the Defence 
department and the Chief Secretary's office. Committees, usually 
comprising the mayor, or shire councillor, a senior police officer and 
the govemment medical officer were inaugurated in the larger coastal 
towns. Their activities were centrally administered in Brisbane.^ The 
Air Raid Wardens Act of 1939 gave the police commissioner authority 
to appoint wardens who would be employees of the State govemment 
and subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.^ 
Other concems were apparent in the planning for a war that 
seemed inevitable. The delegates to a 1936 Australia-wide conference 
on defence and planning recommended diat a transport conference was 
urgendy needed to consider the question of a uniform railway gauge. 
This did not eventuate.^' The premiers' conference of 1938 revived 
the issue and expanded concems into areas such as die location of 
vital war industrial plants and public utilities; procedures formulated 
to assist the operation of essential police, hospital and other 
emergency services; the provision of food and other essential 
commodities as well as govemment links with munition production. 
Hasluck concludes that these discussions in September had not 
"produced any substantial results". Yet, a month later prompted by 
"political improvisation [rather] than of considered planning". Cabinet 
decided that these schedules were a priority.^ 
On 19 October 1938 Dr Earle Page, the acting leader of the 
House of Representatives, stated that an extra-ordinary premiers' 
conference was to be established to consider the problems involved in 
"defence and development".^' Prime Minister Joseph Lyons asked 
these delegates to recommend and order a list of priorities detailing 
diose works that could be implemented by State mstrumentalities. 
Held in conjunction with the Loans Council, die premiers showed 
littie enthusiasm for what seemed to be a peripheral matter compared 
to die fmstrating business of allocating funds. Hasluck contends that 
diey regarded with hostility these proposals as an attempt by die 
Commonwealth to direct and coerce the fmances of the various 
States.^ " Defence of the Commonwealdi in the final analysis for diem 
meant the constitutional and political defence of their own State 
priorities, autonomy and authority. 
Widiin ten days of this 1938 Loans Council meeting. Premier 
William Forgan Smith initiated a State Transport Bill. Supposedly 
acting on the 1936 recommendations of the report of the royal 
commission on transport, led by Justice William Rood Webb, the 
premier moved to "co-ordinate state transport". In the debate on the 
16 War on the Homefront 
first reading, Forgan Smidi asked for increased powers for die 
Transport Board to deal widi disasters such as flood, tires ana 
cyclones,^' aldiough die recommendations of the royal commission naa 
been specifically concemed widi efficiency and protection ot die btate 
utilities against die financial incursions of private motor travel. 
Forgan Smith further contended that: 
It also gives diat authority necessary widi regard to rnaking 
provision for defence... It is obviously necessary in a condition of 
grave national emergency - which we all hope will never arise -
to have power, not only to mobilise all our railways systems but 
also aU our road transports... Of course, that power is contained in 
the Constitution of Queensland itself. The usual method adopted 
is for the Premier of the day to take such action as he thinks 
necessary to deal with any situation, and his actions are validated 
afterwards if it is required... I repeat that at a time when die 
nation's interests are involved, personal interests must always be 
swept aside.^' 
His concluding sentiment in this long speech gave forebodings of an 
almost total and arbitrary disregard for civil liberties, in areas such as 
internment, that would emerge in the war crisis. The main dmist of 
his argument pointed to a spirited defence by die Queensland 
govemment to preserve its own autonomy. 
Section 22 of the Transport Bill contained die exact provisions of 
the conservative Moore government's Railway Strike and Public Safety 
Preservation Act of 1931 which, as leader of the opposition, Forgan 
Smidi had then denoimced as an attempt to destroy all liberty 
generally and the union movement specifically. Passionately he asked 
the 1931 parliament: 
... one would imagine diat a state of revolution existed in 
Queensland. The powers diat die Govemment apparentiy desire to 
invoke are powers diat die Govemment would only ask for during 
a period of serious revolution or during a period when die countty 
was at war and die people are in a State of Siege.'* 
When he became premier in 1932, Forgan Smidi repealed diis act 
which was pertmentiy defended by its initiators on die grounds diat 
die McCormack Labor govemment in 1927 had behaved widi greater 
severity to sttiking railway workers.^' As Brian Carroll shows fection 
22 of Forgan Smidi's 1938 bill become notorious in die suppression 
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of industrial strikes or civil protest. It was successively employed by 
Labor Premiers Haidon and Gair in the 1946 meat workers' strike, the 
1948 railway strike and die 1956 shearers' strike and by Country 
Party Premier Bjelke-Petersen in the Springbok mgby union tour in 
1971.'* Further, clauses of die 1938 Racing BiU, seemingly 
inexplicably, conformed to the provisions of the British Official 
Secrets ActF Certairdy too, as chapter 6 wiU demonstrate. Labor 
governments in Queensland have been prepared as readily as 
conservative administrations, to employ drastic state intervention to 
quell industrial and political militancy. 
Five months before the actual declaration of war in Europe, 
Queensland's secretary of Health and Home Affairs, Ned Hanlon had 
devised detailed plans to maintain public order in die eventuality of a 
"war emergency". This was in response to the conference of 
Commonwealth and State ministers on defence and development held 
in March 1939 which sought: 
... [T]he cooperation of the State governments, and the compilation 
of schemes by their authorities... [which] were integral parts of the 
national preparation for defence.'* 
Hanlon moved specifically to augment the powers, functions and 
numbers of die civil police in order to defend Queenslanders' lives 
and property. In a report to the premier in April 1939, Haidon 
stressed diat "...[a]s the War Book indicates. The Police Force will be 
a very important instmmentality in time of war emergency, as it is in 
times of peace". Other issues canvassed were air raid precautions, 
evacuation procedures, d-affic control and a survey of the extent of 
arms and ammunition held by "private persons particularly 
foreigners"." 
On 21 and 22 June 1939 the sole meeting of the National Council, 
a body which might have established the preliminary apparatus for 
cooperation in the event of war, convened for discussion between 
federal and State ministers. Without even an agendum, no resolutions 
or plans of action were forthcoming. Rather, the usual negotiating 
mechanism of the Loans Council continued to be used as the most 
important negotiating and coordinating body between the States and 
the federal government.*" Events overseas overtook the operations of 
this nebulous informal body and it never reconvened. Yet, by its own 
inaction and impotence it allowed State premiers to continue to assert 
die supremacy of State's rights and autonomy. 
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In conveying die formal declaration of war on 5 September 1939 
to die Queensland parliament, Forgan Smidi demonstrated a noticeaoie 
lack of patriotic fervour. Radier, he saw die event as an occasion to 
reiterate State's rights. He confidentiy maintained diat: 
The powers of die Commonwealdi are limited to a certain degree.„ 
Up to diis date, we are operating under Commonwealdi laws and 
certain regulations under Commonwealth laws. We also have 
reserve powers in certain statutes to enforce those powers if we, at 
any time, require to do so.*' 
Hanlon continued stressing the State's overriding supremacy: 
The Commonwealth has the task of preventing and combating 
enemy attack, and the obligation placed upon the State (sic) of a 
civU govemment is to maintain the activities of the community 
during die emergency and provide as far as possible for the safety 
and care of the civilian population and protection of property. 
The function of the State govemment and the instrumentalities 
created by the State is that protection and care of the civilian 
population.*^ 
This issue was not simply confined to Queensland. For, in 
Victoria, the only other Australian State to pass its ovra emergency 
powers legislation that provided effectively for executive govemment 
by decree. Premier A.A. Dunstan's ministerial statement on die 
declaration of war gave notice of his priorities: 
The Govemment is, of course, particularly desirous of co-operating 
in every possible way witii die Commonwealth Govemment. At 
the same time, diere are certain obligations resting upon die State 
Govemment which we propose to discharge by way of legislation 
of an emergency character.*' 
Labor leader, John Cain pledged his support on diis vital issue of 
principle to die conservative govemment and went so far to pledge 
"support widiout conditions". He concluded: 
The best way to avoid dissension (sic) is to recognise our duty is 
to all sections of diis conununity, and that no particular sections -
... should be permitted to exploit eidier die Govemment or their 
fellow citizens in this crisis.** 
Managing the Emergency 19 
The platitudes of regret concerning the nation at war merged 
imperceptibly into a discussion on granting die Executive Council 
almost unlimited powers. Unlike Queensland, bipartisan unanimity 
reigned. 
The following day in Canberra Prime Minister Robert Menzies 
presented the National Security Bill to parliament. Unlike Forgan 
Smith and Hanlon, who sought to maintain State sovereignty to the 
seeming exclusion of wider claims, Menzies framed his concems with 
an apparent moderation and an acknowledgement of the dilenuna of 
engaging in war and, at the same time, preserving the principles of 
freedom and civil liberty. Whilst not referring to the delegation of 
powers, Menzies confined his remarks to general broad principles: 
... whatever may the extent of the power that may be taken to 
govern, direct and to control by regulation, there must be as littie 
interference with individual rights as is consistent with concerted 
national effort... There is no intention on the part of die 
Govemment to use these powers when they are granted... in any 
other way dian to promote the security of Australia. 
He added that: 
I hope diat, when the time comes for me to cease to exercise the 
powers, I shall be able to say that they were exercised firmly, 
definitely and promptiy but widiout intolerance and widi due 
respect for the interests of minorities.*^ 
Events overtook these high moral declarations. As hostilities became 
entrenched and the war escalated from limited involvement aiding the 
British effort on distant battie zones, to an immediate direct threat of 
invasion which prompted hitherto unprecedented centralisation and 
authoritarian measures to deal with die crisis, civil liberties were 
stringentiy, if imevenly, curtailed. As later chapters will demonstrate, 
Australian society became obsessively intent upon identifying and 
punishing diose perceived to be potentially undermining national 
security, the war effort or morale: Enemy aliens, communists, 
members of the Australia First Movement or women sexually involved 
with Allied servicemen were all placed under scmtiny and often 
incarcerated. Citing the British experience. Stammers concludes that: 
Wartime governments made extensive use of covert or informal 
strategies to restrict civil liberties and attempt to manipulate public 
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opinion. But diese strategies were rarely based on die possible 
use of emergency powers. They relied on die^ abihty ot 
govemment to intervene in more discreet, subtie ways. 
In Australia, state intervention was direct, pubUc and lacking even 
a pretence of subtlety. Maurice Blackbum, die radical Labor member 
for Bourke, and a life long opponent of totalitarianism, even in its 
war-time guise as the agent of national preservation and security, gave 
the most trenchant criticism of the 1939 National Security Bill. 
Conceding that the original intentions were Uberal, he asked his 
parliamentary colleagues whether this legislation could continue for 
the duration of hostilities given "...[t]he nervous tension to which die 
community and Ministers will be subjected". He specifically referred 
to die power to prohibit public meetings and thereby prevent free 
speech and the power to conduct trials in closed proceedings. He 
believed these provisions contained a dangerous potentiality to destroy 
fundamental civil liberties. Blackbum pointed out the paradox diat 
was inherent in the process of fighting against repression and 
totalitarianism by introducing measures which would severely limit 
basic constitutional and common law fi-eedoms.*^ He imsuccessfiilly 
introduced a private member's Bill to ensure that regulations 
promulgated under the Defence Act, Supply and Development Act and 
The National Registration Act should have to pass through parliament 
rather than come into effect after being gazetted.** 
Hasluck comments that in the first six months of the war, critics 
of die National Security Act "could still only attack die existence of 
the powers and not dieir use". Specifically, he cites action taken by 
die Queensland govemment under die Transport Act of 1938 (which 
he mistakenly calls die State Traffic Act) to ban public addresses by 
communists. This move was instigated to prevent "public disorder" 
when soldiers clashed with communists who, at this time, did not 
support die allied war effort and opposed Australia's involvement in 
anodier imperialist venttire.*' This issue did not subside; for in late 
October 1940 anodier series of serious disttirbances in Brisbane 
empted when members of die Second AIF fought communists who 
attempted to voice tiieir opposition to die war publicly Tim 
Moroney, die State secretary for die Australian Railway Union wrote 
to Forgan Smith diat his members were worried diat, not only' was a 
repressive State law used, but Major Jackson had audiorised his 
mihtary pohce to arrest both military personnel and civilians He 
continued that: 
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This indicates a desire that die control of civilian life should be 
subject to Army authority; and Army control and influence of 
civilian affairs is generally a preliminary step towards the 
Establishment of Dictatorship. 
Forgan Smith bmsquely dismissed these criticisms and concem for 
civil liberties, by stating that "Major Jackson is not a State Public 
Servant and is therefore not subject to my control or interrogation".™ 
Despite the passing of the National Security Act (1939-40) imder 
which the Commonwealdi govemment would ultimately direct and 
control all measures to ensure continued "national security and 
national safety"'' die Queensland govemment made extensive plans to 
determine, manage and command all local procedures. To effect diis 
policy, a Public Safety Act was passed in November 1940, based on 
legislation in New Zealand, Great Britain and Victoria.'^ An analysis 
of the Victorian precedent is useful for it can throw light upon the 
rationale behmd the introduction of such measures at the local level. 
The National Security (Emergency Powers) Bill was introduced 
into the Victorian Legislative Assembly on 5 September 1939. Sir 
Stanley Argyle the member for Toorak, argued that: 
A democracy finds itself in considerable difficulty in keeping pace 
with rapid action so frequently necessary to meet emergencies as 
they arise. The ordinary life of the community is disorganised. 
He reiterated that the Commonwealth govemment was entmsted with 
"die main responsibilities of die defence of die nation". The State 
govemment should try to ensure that "as far as we can, we must 
endeavour to carry out our normal activities".'' This line of argument 
was hardly convincing considering the enormous powers that were 
being sought. He admitted later in the extended debate diat "...[i]n 
plain language, that means that the Executive Council has absolute 
power". Opposition Leader Cain tentatively queried whether die 
govemment should be entitied to so many powers." Premier Duns tan 
argued that these were permissable since these emergency powers 
would be limited to three months' duration, aldiough these could be 
extended if a crisis continued. 
The question of States' rights featured prominentiy in the lengthy 
debate. T.D. Oldham, the member for Boroondara, expressing a 
centralist position unusual in State politics, proferred diat: 
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... at die moment, on account of die national crisis widi which it 
is faced, and by reason of its powers, die Commonwealdi should 
abrogate ahnost every law of die State ParUaments, and 1 am sure 
diat state of tilings will eventuaUy be accepted by die citizens of 
diis community as marking die correct differentiation between die 
powers of die State Parliaments and diose of die Federal 
Parliament.^' 
Two central questions emerged which were later repeated in 
Queensland: die delegation of powers between tiie Commonwealth 
and State parliaments and the preservation of common law rights to 
curb untrammelled power by the executive. Fundamental questions 
Premier A.A. Dunstan chose to ignore or to trivialise. 
In August 1940 the Victorian govemment asked parliament for an 
extension of the National Security (Emergency Powers) Act which had 
not been proclaimed. Premier Dunstan maintained that this measure 
was to "carry into effect... any powers or duties delegated to the State 
of Victoria in the Commonwealth of Australia, or taking any measures 
complimentary to, or necessary to unplement, steps by the 
Commonwealth of Australia in relation to National Security"." He 
attempted to diffuse the potentially explosive issue of delegation of 
powers and State autonomy by acknowledging that "Commonwealth 
regulations at aU times supersede those of the State". The short 
debate, rather than continuing with this important constitutional issue, 
went off onto an irrelevant tangent about fair rent legislation to aid 
working class tenants." 
In the second reading of the Bill, Argyle with the support of odier 
members from all sides of the Assembly, stated his confidence in the 
scmpulous manner in which this unprecedented Act had been 
administered. The Labor member for Clifton Hill, H. Cremean 
expressed his satisfaction in the arrangements that, whilst possessing 
great power, ensured "safeguards diat are not included in the 
corresponding legislation in odier States or die Commonwealdi".'' In 
Queensland no such unanimity of purpose or resolve was evident in 
Parhament; for die proposal diere caused botii a furore in parliament 
and in die community, particulariy in die tt-ade union movement 
In die mitial reading of die Bill on 12 November 1940 its 
proposer. Home Secretary Hanlon assured parliament that it " is 
entirely an emergency measure and does not come into operation until 
die civihan population is direatened"." The raison d'etre for such an 
extt-eme measure was to ensure essential services in die event of 
mvasion. Yet as former Country Party Premier A.E. Moore correcdy 
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pointed out its provisions would entirely eliminate habeas corpus and 
destroy an individual's fundamental rights by denying the right of 
judicial appeal.*" Hanlon framed his argument within the parameters 
of the hazy delegation of powers between the Commonwealth and the 
States. In his introductory preamble, Hanlon reassured his colleagues 
that the Commonwealth had placed "... very important responsibiUties 
and duties in the event of enemy attack upon this country" upon the 
shoulders of the State government.*' 
A cmcial element in his line of reasoning revealed the Queensland 
government's perception of the limits of delegation of powers. 
Hanlon continued: 
The situation in Australia is complicated by the fact that the States 
as well as the Commonwealth are sovereign governments, and, 
although the National Security Act gives very wide powers to the 
Commonwealth, there is die possibility that the sovereign rights of 
the States may in some way interfere with the exercise of powers 
of the Commonwealth Govemment, and consequently the 
Commonwealth proposes, if necessary, to delegate certain powers 
under die National Security Act to either State Governments or to 
individual State Governments to overcome the difficulty of 
constitutional limitation.*^ 
Given the comprehensiveness of the national security regulations 
Moore asked what "was omitted from the Commonwealth National 
Security Act... to call for the introduction of this BiU as a 
supplementary measure"?*' Likewise, at a Labor-in-politics convention 
held in Febmary 1941, F.J. Waters, former Labor member for Kelvin 
Grove, "... deplored many imdemocratic principles contained in the 
Public Safety Act". Premier Forgan Smith defended it before the 
industrial and organisational wing of the Labor movement: 
Public interest was supreme over individual interest. The powers 
would not be used unless in the public interest. It has yet to be 
proclaimed and it is to be hoped it would not be necessary to do 
so.** 
He further defended the legislation publicly. In die Sunday Mail of 7 
December 1941 he declared diat "[t]his Act is intended for the 
efficient conduct of the State under grave war conditions, and for the 
protection of its people". He never chose to explore the ramifications 
that were inherentiy contained in mle-by-decree of an executive no 
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longer scmtmised or even accountable to eitiier pariiament or die 
judiciary. 
The most detailed proposals concerning die intention and contents 
of die Act lie in an undated memorandum from Hanlon to the 
premier. Leaving all military, air and naval defence solely to die 
Commonwealdi, a Committee of PubUc Safety, consisting of die 
premier, the treasurer, the secretary for Health and Home Affairs, the 
minister for Transport and the commissioners of poUce and electricity 
would direct all executive and administrative functions in Queensland, 
without resort to parliament, for the duration of a presumably 
extended emergency. Unlike previous "state of emergency" legislation 
which was intended to cope with specific and limited events like a 
strike or a natural disaster, the scope of the Public Safety Act was 
unlimited.*' Its provisions were intended, as Forgan Smith averted, 
"... to deal expeditiously, effectively and in die public interest widi 
any situation that may arise".** Its significance lay therefore in die 
breadth of activities it proported to cover. TTie functions and 
audiority of the civil police could be augmented to such a degree that 
a virtual dictatorship might ensue. 
This enabling Bill would not come into force until the govemor-
in-Council proclaimed a state of emergency m the specific advent of 
an invasion. In such an eventuality, all those traditional checks and 
balances inherent in the separation of judicial and executive functions 
would disappear for the duration of the crisis. The Committee of 
PubUc Safety, a title reminiscent of the worst excesses of the French 
Revolution, would effectively mle by decree. The audiority of 
independent judicial review to monitor and restrain the discretionary 
powers of administrative officials would be nuUified. 
The AustraUan CouncU of Civil Liberties campaigned vigorously 
against both die Queensland and Victorian Acts which were seen as 
containing die tangible potentiaUty for dictatorship.*^ The Queensland 
trade union movement waged a determined campaign against die 
Public Safety Act. A pamphlet issued by die Queensland branch of 
die Australian Railway Union - an organisation diat held no 
tendemess for die parUamentary Labor Party diat had persecuted its 
members in the 1925 and 1927 strikes - boldly declared "Democracy 
is in danger. Fascism Comes to Queensland". WeU attended protest 
meetings were conducted in Brisbane, Maryborough, Bundaberg, 
TownsviUe, Mackay and Rockhampton. The poUce made detailed 
reports on die major speakers and die content of tiieir declarations ** 
In a lengdiy article in the Courier Mail of 15 November 1940 tiie 
Leader of die Opposition, E.B. Maher criticised the Bill for' not 
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containing "the safeguards that could reasonably be demanded under a 
democratic system of govemment". Maher systematically compared 
the provisions, with diose of the Victoria (Country Party) National 
Security (Emergency Powers) Act of 1939 (sic) and convincingly 
demonstrated how more repressive was the Queensland Act. 
On die understanding that the Public Safety Act was only to be 
invoked on invasion, the Queensland govemment continued in 1941 to 
make plans for the civil defence of the State. These aUowed wide 
ranging discretionary administrative powers, particularly to the police. 
Witii the implementation of the National Security Act, it was conceded 
that the Commonwealth should assume primary responsibiUty for 
national defence. This cmcial "Report upon the establishment and 
operations of the general organisations for the civil defence of 
Queensland" stated that State instrumentaUties particularly the poUce, 
local audiority, hospital, fire and ambulance services needed to 
expand. SpecificaUy, the report noted: 
There wiU also be the functions of the police in war emergency 
[operating] in a much greater and more onerous degree. War 
Emergency adds many new duties; as upon the Police Force faUs, 
to a large extent, the enforcing of the Commonwealth war 
emergency legislation. The police force has to work in complete 
Uaison with the miUtary service and other Commonwealth 
Services.*' 
Despite its previous avowal to proclaim die Public Safety Act only 
in the advent of a direct enemy invasion. Cabinet proclaimed the Act 
on 12 December 1941, five days after the bombing of Pearl Harbour. 
Forgan Smidi declared that it was necessary to set the machinery in 
motion "if a crisis occurred". Furthermore, any one who committed 
offenses under the Firearms Licence Act, the Criminal Code on the 
Vagrants and Gaming Act could be artested without a warrant and any 
person who obstmcted officers authorised under the Public Safety Act 
could be also arrested without a warrant and fined £100. The Act 
provided indemnity against the council and its commissioners and no 
claim for damages or compensation could be made.™ Yet it would 
not seem diat those provisions were actuaUy implemented; for die 
national security regulations took precedent over State legislation. 
Moreover the Queensland govemment shrewdly twisted die 
Commonwealth's overriding supremacy to make regulations in order 
to conduct total war to benefit the process of augmentation of its own 
local instmmentalities. Rather than diminishing State autonomy. 
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paradoxicaUy die war presented an opporttmity to expand its powers, 
particularly in die vital area of poUcing. The National Security Act, 
Section 13, already aUowed State civU poUce to make artests without 
specific charges being laid. The Public Safety Act also contamed 
diese provisions. Prime Minister Curtin advised Forgan Smitii diat 
this power: 
... is an exceptional one, and should only be exercised in cases of 
such seriousness that it appears highly desirable in the interests of 
die community that the person should be immediately deprived of 
his liberty, or in cases where diere is reason to believe diat die 
person would also disappear if not arrested.^' 
An important memorandum of 21 January 1943 by the commissioner 
of police pointed out to aU district inspectors that: 
... these are not powers to be exercised except in a case of gravest 
necessity... to emphasise in the strongest possible manner diat it 
was never intended for practical purposes that diese arbitrary 
powers should be exercised in trivial matters. 
CartoU specificaUy referred to instances such as sabotage in essential 
services or enemy agents "acting suspiciously" as justifying tiiis 
extreme power.^ ^ 
Uidike the Commonwealth govemment which had to estabUsh 
entirely new departments like Munitions, Post War Reconstmction, 
War Organisation of Industry and the Manpower Authority in order to 
mobiUse and direct the material and human resources of the nation 
engaged in total war, the Queensland govemment expanded functions 
within the existing administrative framework. The poUce in particular 
augmented their power often in cooperation with Commonwealdi civil 
and military organisations. In TownsviUe, for example, the Civil 
Defence Organisation in May 1941 consisted of three major 
components - die essential services segment (consisting of 
representatives from die Railway, Harbours and Marine, Works and 
Water, Electricity and Gas, die Post Master General, and Sewerage, 
Roads and Bridges instrumentaUties); social services (consisting of an 
inspector of police and die govemment medical officer to oversee die 
operation of poUce, fire wardens, hospitals, ambulances, all public 
healdi faciUties and pubUc transport); die engineering division 
(comprising die city engineers and officers who would be in charge of 
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the demoUtion of unexploded bombs, decontamination units, the 
provision of food, shelter, and accommodation)." 
This caused intemal problems within the already depleted police 
force operating with a rapidly aging persoimel stmcture. An estimated 
twelve per cent of policemen enlisted in the Second AIF, mostly from 
the lower ranks.'* State police were required for entirely new duties 
in order to monitor new regulations in the areas of munitions, price, 
rationing, rent control, and increased responsibility in security, 
surveiUance and traffic control. To counter these problems, 
suggestions were made to establish an "auxiliary poUce force". 
Anticipating the nature of stretched personnel resources in the advent 
of war. Home Secretary Hanlon in April 1939 assured the premier 
that "these private squads wiU be under police control and vested widi 
police powers".^' Unlike the use of "special constables" who were 
swom in during major industrial strikes to deal specificaUy widi 
sdikers, this proposed force would carry out normal police duties as 
weU as those connected with war-time emergencies. A meeting of the 
powerful Air Raid Precautions Committee where these poUce 
auxiliaries were deployed was disappointed that only eighteen 
volunteers had presented themselves by early June 1939. The police 
commissioner particularly wanted retumed servicemen from the Great 
War, because of their famiUarity with weapons and their readiness to 
conttol dissidents as they demonstrated in the Red Flag Riots in 
March and April 1919 in Brisbane.'* Instead diey preferred to join 
the Diggers Reserve diat operated outside State govemment control. 
The 1941 Report on the Establishment and Operation of the 
several organisations for civil defence called again for more poUce 
auxUiaries. Two particular duties were cited as needing urgent 
attention - first, as volunteers in factories, especially munition plants, 
to stop sabotage and secondly as senior air raid wardens. No cases 
of sabotage that resulted in criminal prosecution and imprisonment 
however eventuated. A special branch police report of 19 June 1942, 
however, identified problems that arose even widi employing speciaUy 
favoured retumed servicemen. Since many workers at the defence 
plant m the Northem Territory had abandoned their employment after 
the Japanese bombing of Darwin in Febmary, jobs m vital industries 
were "pegged" under the national security regulations. Workers could 
no longer resign or be dismissed. This had resulted in vandalism and 
evidence was cited from the CharleviUe aerodrome. The report 
concluded that there was considerable friction between the older 
retumed servicemen and "... [t]he younger men who are only there for 
what tiiey can get out of it, such as dodging work"." 
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The delegation of audiority between military and civd police was 
anodier area diat demanded urgent attention. Several exanaples 
iUustrate die areas of conflict and problems of administration. First, 
in die area of internment on enemy aliens, as chapter 3 wiU 
demonstrate in far more detaU, clear-cut designations were instihited. 
The civil poUce were charged widi numerous duties concemed widi 
the surveillance of enemy aUens and dissidents. They gathered local 
intelUgence information, frequentiy uicorrect, naive or prejudiced since 
the low level of educational attainments of most poUce often 
prevented an understanding of die complex political aUegiances of die 
Italian community, in particular. "Anarchism", "communism", 
"fascism" were all regarded as foreign subversive doctrines unsuitable 
for the Australian arena of public discourse and personal allegiance. 
The inspector of police at TownsviUe in April 1940 in his Ust of 
Italians who should be interned in die event of war widi Italy 
described AUio C. as a "Strong Communist" who also possessed 
"fascist ideas". Local constables' reports were even more naive and 
iU-informed.™ Yet, despite these limitations, poUce were required to 
make decisions about whether a naturaUsed British subject of enemy 
alien origin or parentage was "loyal" to the British Empire. Local 
police reports were sent to district inspectors, then to the 
commissioner's office and then to the Commonwealth Investigation 
Bureau, (the security section of the Attorney-General's department) or 
to the mUitary inteUigence section of Victoria Barracks in Brisbane. 
The cumbersome procedures entailed in internment iUustrate die 
problems inherent in the delegation of civil and miUtary police powers 
in war-time. The civil police would take a person, for whom die 
Army had obtained a detention order, into custody before die Army 
assiuned authority in the procedure. This meant tiiat detainees could 
be kept in Stewart Creek prison near TownsviUe in substandard 
conditions for months without ever appearing before a magistrate. A 
group of namralised Germans from the TownsviUe district were 
detained in diis prison in early 1942. Police Commissioner Cartoll 
admitted this gaol was over crowded due to the use of prison 
facilities for security incarceration. The intemees later complained to 
Mr Justice Macrossan, tiie official visitor to the Gaytiiome internment 
camp in Brisbane. Others sent to Loveday camp in South Australia 
complained to die Swiss consul who contacted the Army, die 
organisation in charge of long-term detention and internment. As Col. 
F.H. Sharpe of Victoria Barracks argued, the State department of 
Justice had to investigate the charges about prison conditions whUst 
die Army had to coordinate investigations widi the poUce 
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commissioner who acted on advice from the department of Justice. 
He added: 
This Headquarter is naturaUy concemed that ground should have 
been provided for these complaints and that had these matters 
remained within the province of this Headquarters, action would 
have been taken to prevent any possibility of a recurtence of the 
conditions complained of. 
Even more annoying, as he tried to unravel the lines of 
communication and determine which instrumentality had audiority in 
specified domains, was the decision to pass responsibility for 
internment from the Army to the federal Attomey-General's security 
service on 26 June 1942. He concluded: 
No doubt die Security Service will take any necessary action to 
ensure that there is no ground for complaint of the above nature 
in future." 
The armed services had attempted to forestaU administrative 
problems that devolved from the inefficient system whereby no one 
body oversaw aU procedures and incarceration. The whole operation 
of jurisdiction was imponderably complicated with the presence of 
three branches of the AustraUan services along witii diose of the 
United States. Most American bases were situated in Queensland and 
with a ground staff of 90,000 in Brisbane and surrounding areas like 
Ipswich and Redbank in 1942 alone, confusion might have occurted. 
i i TownsviUe, as soon as the American forces established operation. 
Colonel North, the commander of the Uth and 7th Brigades, recaUed: 
A special building in town where American and Australian Army, 
Airforce and Naval Provosts aU assembled and worked from one 
establishment. If a disturbance [occurted]... all went out - each to 
handle its own men.*" 
In small scale altercations these procedures worked effectively. In 
die confusion of a major riot, which also involved large numbers of 
civilians, strain was placed upon even the most efficient system of 
cooperation and demarcation of spheres and authority. In the Battle 
of Brisbane which raged over the three nights of 26, 27, and 28 
November 1942 confusion of action and propose was apparent. An 
analysis of the build up, explosion and resolution of these intense 
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patterns of conflict between Australian servicemen and civilian and 
United States' military and naval forces which left one Austrahan 
service-man dead, eleven soldiers and one civiUan injured is beyond 
die scope of tiiis discussion. The court of enquiry, headed by Lieut-
Col. G.R. Hammer, Commanding Officer of 2/2 Australian Hy 
Regiment, took extensive evidence in December 1942. In particular, 
its report questioned the effectiveness of action pursued by die various 
branches of the military police. 
The court of enquiry concluded diat on tiie first evening, "the 
action taken by [AustraUan] Military PoUce in tiie initial stages was 
indecisive, and therefore, ineffectual". A combined effort of 
Australian military police, picquet and civil police was needed to 
disperse the crowd. Other evidence suggested that the arrival of die 
fire brigade helped dampen die enthusiasm of riotous AustraUan 
civilians. On the second evening the action by police was more 
coordinated, although "groups of disturbing element were aUowed to 
go unapprehended". In conclusion, the court of enquiry condemned 
the "lack of understanding between Australian military police and civil 
police, in diat both appeared to be waiting for the odier to act". 
Even more alarming, it continued that "... [t]here is evidence that the 
RAN Shore Patrol was not only indifferent, but that one member was 
among the inciting element of die disturbance on 26 November".*' 
US Brigadier General S.J. Chamberlain, general headquarters of 
the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) in reporting to Major-General 
F.W. Barryman, die deputy chief of die general staff, allied land 
forces was equally unimpressed by the lack of definition for 
responsibiUty. He did however centre his remarks upon "the lack of 
decisive action by and the inadequacy and inefficiency of AustraUan 
MPs in clearing die area".*^ Major-General Barryman added in a 
latter report that: 
The Provost Marshal's view is diat diere was a marked difference 
of opinion as to how die sittiation such as occurred should be 
handled. American Provosts are inclined to mediods which are 
not favoured by die civil police autiiorities in die handling of a 
crowd... Mr CarroU has impressed tiiis view on die American 
Provost at conference held during and since die disturbances." 
In odier arenas when tensions were low and civil and mUitary 
police were not faced widi die extraordinary demands that a riot 
places upon diem to ensure order, designation of spheres of mfluence 
could proceed smooddy, even acknowledging diose special difficuUies 
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that arose out of extensive United States presence on Australian soil. 
In Febmary 1943 a conference was held in Brisbane in order to 
anticipate die problems of jurisdiction and extent of power between 
different civil and military organisations in North Queensland. Under 
the auspices of the security service, representatives of the federal 
shipping department, the Queensland Public Service board, the 
railways, die Australian and American armies as weU as 
Commissioner CartoU met to discuss "the maintenance of order" and 
die operation of Regulation 32 of the National Security (General) Act 
which could requisition private property for military use. Captain 
Bock of the security service was pleased to aimounce the smoodi-
operation of policies in other areas. Road blocks at Jaffa and 
Ravenshoe had been controUed by a US Provost Corps which reported 
any breaches or irregularities to the civilian police.** 
With north Queensland the cmcial staging post for the SWPA 
offensive. Major General Thomas Blamey had wanted the defmed 
districts to be placed under martial law. Given die large numbers of 
civilians who had already been evacuated to southern districts, it had 
not been anticipated diat opposition would prevent such a drastic 
measure when Australia had not been invaded. Later, in August 
1943, Blamey, successfuUy requested the War Cabinet approve the 
complete censorship of aU mails, telegraphs and telephones "from 
specified areas of special significance in North Queensland". The 
director general of the Post Master General's office reported that: 
Sir Thomas proposes in the national interest to ensure the absolute 
secrecy of aUied mUitary activities and preparations in defmed 
areas in North Queensland. MiUtary Authorities had been alarmed 
by the extent and comprehensiveness of leaks by civilians about 
military operations on the Atherton Tableland. Blamey concluded 
that 'this leakage of information valuable to the enemy is worse 
than anticipated'. 
The whole area from Ingham north to Cooktown was then subject to 
the national security (emergency control) regulations which could 
monitor and direct all commimication, travel and residence in the 
stipulated area.*' Before 1943 thorough censorship of mail and 
telegraphs had been restricted to communists and enemy aliens or 
naturalised British subjects of enemy alien origin deemed to have 
questionable loyalties to Britain.** 
In conclusion, three separate areas that required specific 
designation of spheres of authority and action can be identified: first. 
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die constimtional question of State and Commonwealdi rights widi 
respect to jurisdiction in war-time; secondly, die complex mteraction 
between die AUied and Australian armed services and lastiy Uiose ot 
die CivU and mUitary poUce. Queensland, in its tenacity to preserve 
State autonomy and rights, inti-oduced a series of measures, ostensibly 
to ensure public safety and civU defence, which could have effectively 
resisted die incursions of die Commonwealdi's national security 
regulations. IronicaUy, diose federal regulations, rather dian 
diminishing State powers, aUowed a process, as subsequent chapters 
will demonstrate, whereby powers were centralised specificaUy in 
diree departments: Police, Healtii and Home Affairs and die 
Premier's. With the direatened invasion of United States troops in 
Queensland, which came to be the premier staging ground for die 
aUied offensives in the south west Pacific, new policies and new 
problems about delegations of powers arose. Rather than a 
constitutional dispute between Commonwealth and State, these now 
devolved around questions of civil and miUtary jurisdiction. 
II 
The Enemy Within? 
The Process of Internment of Enemy 
Aliens, 1939-45 
with Helen Taylor 
Internment chaUenges the fundamental precepts upon which the entire 
system of British justice and law enforcement in peacetime is based. 
Unlike arrest for a criminal offence where a warrant is issued on a 
specified charge, uitemment aUows an individual to be taken into 
custody seemingly arbitrarily for an indefinite period without 
presentation before a court. The attempt to balance national security 
and individual liberty during war is an onerous undertaking in any 
democratic society undergoing the traumas involved in a modem 
technological war. As Robert H. Keyserlingk avers "wartime is a 
particularly prolific time for distorting political reality as immense 
new pressures suddenly bear down upon people and their political 
leaders".' 
Distortion is manifested most specificaUy in the arena of 
aUegiance. Ethnic minorities can be swiftly transformed from ideal, 
law-abiding citizens to sinister fifth columnists and potential saboteurs, 
"agents within the gate", as Keyserlingk terms them. For the 
mobiUsation process involves not simply the recmitment and 
transportation of troops to distant battle zones, but equaUy, rapid and 
radical intemal organisation, botii stmctural and ideological. The 
identification, targeting and containment of those groups in the 
community, who are perceived as threats to the security, morale and 
the physical, moral and ideological weU-being and cohesiveness of die 
society under external threat, is a dominant function of the modem 
state during war. The alien, particularly those espousing (or attributed 
as espousing) 'foreign' ideologies like fascism, communism or 
anarchism, represents the embodiment of aU these fears. Thus the 
process involved in the containment of the enemy alien and those of 
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enemy aUen origins and parentage involve both die most arbitrary, 
comprehensive and severe procedures. . . 
In analysing the internment of Japanese Canadians in Bntish 
Columbia in 1941 and 1942, W. Peter Ward maintains diat: 
... if die expulsion was a direct resuU of wartime stress, it was 
also the consequence of strained race relations... Since the late 
1850s west-coast society had been divided by a deep racial cleavage and, 
over the years, only limited integration had occurred in patterns of work, 
residential accommodation, and social contact.^ 
Community arrxiety wiU be most severe and prolonged, and as a 
consequence those institutionalised measures to restrain and nuUify the 
threatening alien presence, in societies where racism, with aU its 
irrational modes of perception and action, is deeply embedded. Like 
British Columbia, Queensland contamed distinct ethnic communities: 
some, lUce the Japanese, had never been integrated; some, like the 
Italians had been tolerated in die sugar districts on the north east 
coast, die fmit-growing areas of die granite belt and die tobacco 
district of the Atherton tableland whilst the Germans had been 
portrayed variously as "Huns" during the Great War and ideal citizens 
during peace-time. Responses to the different ethnic groups and die 
severity and comprehensiveness of their incarceration was not uniform 
but corresponded with the degree to which they supposedly threatened 
the Australian war effort. 
In Queensland, the fears, which prompted the federal govemment 
to identify, monitor and intern diose of enemy alien origin or status in 
1939, were more pronounced than in other areas of die 
Commonwealth. The concentration of enemy aliens resident in those 
very districts most potentiaUy liable to invasion added new dimensions 
to the sense of isolation and insecurity in die north. These direats 
possessed dierefore botii an extemal focus from Japanese miUtary and 
naval aggression and most cmciaUy an insidious, intemal dimension in 
die form of communities whose loyalty to die British and AustraUan 
war effort was called mto question. 
Paul Hasluck argues that die internment of enemy aliens was one 
of die^"most unportant measures taken during die first six mondis of 
war..." The War Book, prepared by die department of Defence and 
modeUed closely on its British counterpart, had akeady indicated those 
issues and procedures which were regarded as potentiaUy significant 
m die event of declared war.* It laid down diat die interrmient of 
resident enemy aliens should be restricted to "die narrowest limits 
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consistent with pubUc safety and public sentiment".' Yet, as Maurice 
Blackbum observed in the House of Representatives debate on the 
pervasive National Security BiU in 1939: 
I should say that the most important thing is diat the people of 
diis country shaU believe that in this stmggle they are preserving 
as much of their freedom, a much of their constitutional rights as 
can possibly be preserved for diem; that those rights are not taken 
from them; that they are not losing those rights in the stmggle 
which this nation is waging.* 
This dilemma, which involved the reconciliation of the demands of 
national security with the preservation of the individual's civil liberties 
(which theoreticaUy constitute the haUmark of the British legal 
system), was no more clearly iUustrated than in the question of policy 
directives towards enemy aliens and those of enemy alien origin or 
parentage. Australia was not alone in this difficult reconciliation. A 
report from the Austialian director general of security in 1941 
indicated that the British govemment was also experiencing 
"considerable difficulties... in devising some suitable means of 
reconciling the claims of individuals with national security". 
In September 1939 Prime Minister Menzies had assured parliament 
diat his govemment had no intention of persuing a policy of general 
internment of aU enemy aliens. Rather, it would be concemed only 
to intem persons specificaUy "engaging in subversive activities". ' 
What might constitute "subversive activity" was however iU-defined, 
tiius aUowing for considerable flexibility in interpretation and 
emphasis. EspeciaUy in 1942, this contained policy was not adhered 
to; for panic engendered by fears of a imminent invasion extended the 
parameters of potential "disloyalty". 
Considerable flexibility in interpretation and emphasis emerged -
aU too often responding to the progress of distant battles in Egypt and 
France or, more potently, the rapid advance of the Japanese into the 
Pacific sphere of Australian control, rather than from a fair and just 
examination of a particular case. In another cmcial document that 
articqlated general internment policy Lieutenant Colonel James 
Chapman of the MUitary Board, Southem Command in July 1941 
averted that: 
... power may be defined as the authority to restrict or detain 
persons as a precaution - any measure in war-time [is necessary 
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against a person]... whose loyaUy to die cause for which we are at 
war, is reasonably suspect.* 
The fundamental difference between "loyalty" - a powerful, if 
intangible sentiment of patriotism - and sedition, sabotage, treason, 
aiding and abetting the enemy is immense. The latter constitute die 
most serious offenses against die state, particularly in war-time; 
whereas "disloyalty" is not a legaUy but sociaUy and cultiiraUy 
defined offence. In official procedures the hazy concept of 
"disloyalty" was aU too readUy and tragicaUy confused wifli 
"subversive activities". In Queensland in World War Two no one was 
artested for treason, sabotage, or sedition, though several thousands 
were detauied in internment camps in the interests of security or 
because their "loyalty" to the British empire was questioned. 
WiUiam Mackay, the director general of Security in Canberra, 
argued that: 
The aim and sole justification of aU restrictions upon individual 
liberty is to prevent injury to the war effort of the country, not to 
punish the individual. In short the object is preventative radier 
than punitive... The sole ground... is that the individual, if left 
unrestricted, might prejudice the successful defence of this country 
against the enemy. The second principle is that individual liberty 
is to be restricted ordy if there is a real'^  danger that die individual 
will act in a way that prejudices the war effort... FuU internment 
being reserved where die possibility of injury to the nation is 
undeniable.' 
Mackay's statement therefore articulated the broad policy directives 
laid down in die War Book and initiaUy foUowed by the Menzies' 
govemment. The acttial manner in which diese were subsequentiy 
interpreted and readjusted reflected tiiose changes in die wider society 
as Australia faced a direct impending crisis in late 1941. 
Lieutenant Colonel Sydney Whittington, die chief of military 
mteUigence for Soudiem Command, infonned die Aliens Tribunal 
hearing number 3 in Febmary 1941 that: 
Uitemment is not a punishment; we merely deprive an enemy alien 
of his Uberty, odierwise he is treated exactiy as an ordinary 
mdividual... Uitemment is just an ordinary form of restraint'° 
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This myopic statement totally overlooked the central issue and 
minimised the impact of this process of arbitrary incarceration of the 
particular individuals involved. 
Rather more reaUsticaUy, Paster J.J, Stolz, the president of the 
United EvangeUcal Ludieran Church of Australia (UELCA), protesting 
over the detention of his frequentiy AustraUan-bom clergy, identified a 
key contention: 
... without a hearing in an open court; without even being told the 
charge laid against them; without permitting their lawyer to know 
the accusation raised against them they were deprived of their 
liberty." 
Several questions present themselves - on what grounds was any 
individual intemed? Who decided? Was internment simply a 
deprivation of liberty and did this constitute de facto imprisonment? 
In whose interests did this selection occur? The issue of the 
internment of enemy aUens and naturaUsed British subjects of enemy 
aUen origin in Queensland (where more foreigners were proportionaUy 
resident) throws light on these important dUemmas. 
Some senior public officials, especiaUy those in Queensland, did 
not altogether subscribe to these broad principles articulated by 
Mackay. Rather, their interpretation of the parameters of "subversive 
activity" was so wide-ranging that the category of potential candidate 
for internment was considerably enlarged. Police Commissioner 
CartoU, writing in March 1941, to Inspector R.F.W. Wake, deputy 
director of Security, stationed at Northem Command offices in 
Brisbane, stated initiaUy that "... [r]ecommendations involving 
deprivation of liberty are not made lightiy". NominaUy adhering to 
the letter of die War Book diat incarceration was not "made against 
die interests of die individual", CartoU believed, however, the guiding 
principles should involve first, the interests of the British empire; 
secondly, the preservation of the Commonwealth war effort and lastly, 
it was to "ensure peace and harmony in die particular locality, thus 
providing for intemal seciuity..."'^ The vigour and relentiessness with 
which pubUc officials in Queensland pursued enemy aliens was in 
sharp contrast to the moderation, partiality and sound judgement that 
die Commonwealth supposedly demanded. 
Certairdy, it differed in both degree and emphasis from the 
MiUtary Board's "Principles to be observed with internment", 
composed in September 1939. Referring particularly to NSDAP 
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(Nazi) and fascist party members in Australia as prime candidates for 
internment, die MiUtary Board's policy further directed diat: 
... enemy aliens of mUitary age, or any other persons who are 
rationaUy suspected of being likely to act in a manner prejudicial 
to die pubUc safety or die defence of tiie Conunoriwealtii, or as 
being likely to cause disaffection, are regarded as suitable subjects 
for internment on the outbreak of war." 
Rexibility and vagueness in die category of "likely to cause 
disaffection" could, moreover, sustain broad mterpretation, and, as die 
war continued, became increasingly important in the identification and 
incarceration of disaffected enemy aliens. In particular, Lutheran 
pastors were regarded with acute suspicion. 
Specific regulations were promulgated under the National Security 
Act (1939-40) to implement these internment procedures. National 
security (general) regulations, statutory mle no. 87 of 1939, regulation 
26 (amendment 40 in 1941) provided the legal provision for detention 
in a general form. National security (alien's control) regulations, 
statutory mle number 88 of 1939, regulation 20 (amendment 59 of 
1941) applied specifically to enemy aliens. In November 1940 enemy 
aUens were permitted to lodge appeals against detention and 
internment with the Aliens Tribunal.'* Women and children were not 
to be intemed, except in unusual circumstances. In the case of the 
Japanese, aU residents were to be taken into custody. These 
regulations assumed therefore that ordy European male enemy ahens 
were in way politicaUy active, women being concemed only with their 
narrow domestic responsibUities. 
In September 1939 the minister for Defence recommended that die 
State police prepare lists of potential suspects. "The principle to be 
observed with internment", the handbook which laid down procedures, 
reiterated diat die civil police force should be scmpulous in dieir 
investigations, stressing that: 
... instmctions have been issued that the suspected person is not to 
be intemed, unless his being at large constitutes a potential danger 
to die public safety or die defence of die Commonwealth." 
In Queensland, the police had aUeady begun investigating potential 
alien saboteurs before tiie official declaration of war. In April 1939 
Home Secretary Hanlon had ordered die police to check die location 
and extent of arms and anmiunition in the possession of private 
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citizens, "particularly foreigners".'* Later, under alien control 
(prohibited possession order) of regulation 22 of the national security 
(alien control) regulation, enemy aliens and naturalised British subjects 
were forbidden to possess firearms, transmitters, more than four 
gaUons of petrol or any inflammable liquid, cameras, and motor 
vehicles except under strictly regulated and defined conditions." In 
die process of these investigations, the police were not only able to 
monitor and assess the attitudes of enemy aliens and naturaUsed 
British subjects of enemy origin but to ascertain who to disarm in 
order to prevent possible acts of sabotage. With the Italian 
community along the sugar coast of Queensland, this occurred aknost 
inunediately after Italy entered the war in June 1940.'* 
Whilst instmcting the civil police to assess the "loyalty" of enemy 
aliens, the MUitary Board was alert to the potential hazards involved 
in diis devolution of power. In July 1941 Lieutenant Colonel James 
Chapman of the Military Board wrote that it was often difficult for 
die civil police to obtain detailed written reports because citizens 
feared intimidation, in terms of both personal safety and economic 
retaliation, in areas like the sugar districts where large numbers of 
enemy aliens were concentrated and influential. Chapman 
acknowledged that: 
... The military authorities should never seek to usurp the function 
of the civil police authorities in a country not under martial law, 
even if the motive is entirely laudable, i.e. to lend the police a 
hand in difficult circumstances. Every effort must always be made 
to check any tendency to assist the police in carrying out their 
normal duties merely with the object of enlisting the wiUing co-
operation of the poUce in retam, on what may be described as a 
"quid pro quo". 
Difficulty arose because, although the military was ultimately 
responsible for the escort and protracted detention of intemees, the 
civU police were responsible for the initial determination and 
apprehension of suspected persons. Chapman visualised a very real 
"gross misuse of the power entmsted to the military authorities" if die 
police exceeded their instmctions and recommended the internment of 
enemy aliens and naturalised British subjects of enemy origin for 
reasons other than those of national security. Three specific situations 
could arise where this "gross misuse" could be paramount. First, 
unwartanted internment could prove an effective form of economic 
retaliation; secondly, its widespread application could operate as a 
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means of obtaining civU order and diirdly, it would relieve die^ police 
of die task of monitoring die activities of "'undesirables' (viz: 
suspected criminals or trouble makers)"." 
Though Chapman's assessment of internment procedures refers to 
die problems of die delegation of powers between the civil poUce and 
miUtary authority, die process was more compUcated. Whilst the civU 
police did gadier local inteUigence information, die Commonwealdi 
Investigation Bureau, a section of tiie federal Attorney General's 
department also maintained local inteUigence gatiierers. Iri peace-time 
information flowed between die poUce and the CIB; in war-time 
surveiUance reports were sent to die intelUgence interpreters or 
subversive sections of miUtary inteUigence. Dossiers on mtemees 
reveals a complicated series of pattems of information coUation and 
decision making, resting ultimately upon die military intelUgence unit 
of die Army. 
With die declaration of war in September 1939 the security forces 
implemented their first objective - to take known nazis and "Friends 
of the Third Reich" (a fraternal organisation for Germans and 
Austrians who were naturaUsed British subjects), into custody. Nazis 
and their sympathisers had been "under notice", to use die parlance of 
military security, since the arrive of Dr Rudolf Asmis, the German 
Consul in 1932. A comprehensive intelUgence report, forwarded to 
Southem Command in March 1940 summarised the combined 
knowledge of those federal and State agencies concemed with security 
- there were 918 German and Austrian nationals resident in 
Queensland, concentrated in distinct communities in the soudi east 
comer. In September 1939 there were an estimated 500 pro nazi 
sympathisers who were "regarded widi suspicion", with 150 "under die 
stiictest surveiUance". By December seventy of diem had been 
interned.^ Unfortunately more dian ninety per cent of the crucial 
security file on "pro nazi activity in pre-war Queensland" is closed to 
scmtuiy by academic researchers and no more specific details can be 
provided, except diose diat can be obtained from specific intemee's 
and organisations' dossiers. 
hi die initial Ust prepared by die CIB in August 1939 seventeen 
persons of Gennan origm had been targeted for immediate detention 
on die outbreak of hostiUties.'' The arrival of Count Felix von 
Luckner, who was assumed to be an emissary of die Gennan 
govemment, on two goodwUl visits to Queensland in June and August 
1938, was a key event which aUowed die CIB to gatiier an immense 
range of (later) incriminating information. A military inteUigence 
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report prepared in September 1938 beUeved the Count's visit was 
important, as his mission was deUberately, if subtiy: 
... to arouse among aU persons of German origin, a sense of their 
unity with die (New Germany), with one another and with the rest 
of the German race.^ 
Another military intelUgence report commented that: 
In closely knit German communities it is not always easy to get 
evidence of what is going on; but the visit of Count von Luckner 
brought a good deal to bare on the real sentiments of the people.^ 
WhUst acknowledging that it was difficult for police or military 
intelUgence officers to gather data in the ethnic communities, it can 
be readily shown that, particularly the civil police who often lacked 
even a basic primary school standard education and minimal political 
sophistication, could not discem the political aUegiances of Italians in 
particular. Certain individual Italians at Ingham were variously 
described as "fascist" or "communist" interchangeably, as if all 
"foreign" ideologies were the same.^ * Their existence outside of 
mainstream AustraUan poUtical parties and processes rendered them 
vulnerable to damaging, if inaccurate, appraisals of their beliefs and 
intentions. 
Despite their ideological confusion, the security forces were 
initiaUy most concemed with active Nazis and "Friends of the Third 
Reich". Their next priority was to collate information on enemy 
aUens of mUitary age and those who had served in the German or 
Austrian armies or German navy in the Great War. Arthur Piepjohn 
had fled Danzig in 1935, working as a merchant seaman before he 
jumped ship in Sydney in 1938. Working as a miU hand in the 
North Eton miU at Mackay he had written articles in the Mackay 
Mercury exposing national socialism in Germany. He was irate at his 
internment in Tatura internment camp in northem central Victoria in 
May 1940." Franz Ruff was apprehended in Halifax as he had 
formerly served as a junior officer in the German Imperial Army, 
diough no curtent evidence could be produced diat he was in any way 
curtentiy "disloyal".^ 
The experience of these two men who had escaped Germany and 
then foimd themselves intemed with Nazis reveals a central weakness 
in the whole intemment policy and process in Australia. Some 
individuals were intemed as security risks on purely political grounds 
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given dieir membership of die Nazi party or Fascist party and dieir 
affiUated associations. Yet tiie national security (aUens conti-ol) 
regulations demanded diat any male enemy aUens, regardless of 
political persuasion, could be detained. This meant tiie Austiians and 
Germans sent from Britain in tiie 55 Dunera, most of whorn had fled 
persecution as Jews, were iiutiaUy intemed, untU mobiUsed into 
Labour corps or later into die AustraUan MiUtary Forces.^' German 
and Austrian Jewish refugees, who had arrived in AustraUa in die 
later 1930s but had not yet been naturaUsed, were also intemed, 
mosdy at Tatura camp in Victoria. Barbara Winter, in her sttidy of 
German POWs despatched by die British Army to AustraUa for die 
duration of hostUities, argues tiiat Tatura Camp number 1 contained a 
hard core of Nazis who caUed tiiemselves "Reichsteue" or "loyaUsts"." 
German and Austrian Jews, staunch anti-Nazis, communists and Nazis 
were aU in the same camp, as die Australian Army classified inmates 
according to nationaUty not reUgion or political affiliation. Likewise 
at Loveday camp in Soutii AustraUa tension between Italian anarchists, 
communists and fascists often empted into violence. 
By November 1940 some 2387 (1726 ItaUans and 661 Gemians) 
out of 22,314 recent arrivals from Germany and Italy had been 
intemed from aU over the Commonwealth. 
Table 1: Intemees in Australia at 31 October 1940 
NSW VIC QLD SA WA TOTAL 
Enemy Aliens 595 167 328 118 951 2159 
AlUed Aliens 9 1 2 5 - 17 
NBS 114 9 55 16 17 211 
Total 718 177 385 139 968 2387 
Source: Noel W. Laimedy, Aliens Control in Australia 1939-46. 
There were at die time some 45,000 persons of enemy birth in 
Australia. At diis time, die largest single concentration of intemees 
were enemy alien Italians from Westem AustraUa. In late 1941 die 
total number incarcerated diroughout AustraUa had only faUen to 
2,231.^' Later, as the face of hostiUties overseas altered with die 
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end7 of Japan into the global conflict, emphasis moved swiftly to the 
nordi-east coast of Queensland. 
When Italy entered die war in June 1940, die concentration of 
ItaUans in particular regions, rather dian the overall ethruc composition 
of Queensland, could have presented particular problems. As 
Raymond Evans has argued, the twin spectres of suspected 
"disloyalty" from persons of enemy origin and radical politics had 
loomed large in Queenslahd in the Great War and its cataclysmic 
aftermath.'" PubUc and official hysteria concerning die potential threat 
to the allied war effort from resident enemy aliens and namraUsed 
British subjects of enemy aUen origin repeated itself with escalating 
intensity and fervour as the war progressed. 
Until die entry of Japan into die global conflict in December 
1941, official scmtiny in Queensland was focused mostly on active 
nazis, fascists and selected enemy aliens, particularly those men of 
miUtary age who had arrived in Australia since 1933. But from that 
date onwards new targets were isolated and contained. 
Table 2: Enemy Aliens Registered in Australia, 31 December 1942 
Nationality State Total for 
Commonwealth 
QLD NSW VIC SA WA TAS Total 
Albanian 
Austrian 
Bulgarian 
Finnish 
German 
Hungarian 
Italian 
Japanese 
Rumanian 
Thailander 
292 
38 
15 
211 
225 
5 
1,445 
5 
13 
1 
28 
1.323 
28 
186 
1,951 
370 
3,322 
6 
119 
1 
500 
940 
34 
122 
1,920 
198 
4,352 
12 
85 
1 
18 
58 
122 
56 
298 
22 
1,073 
-
-
_ 
248 
-
93 
59 
260 
8 
2,132 
5 
8 
3 
-
28 
-
5 
39 
5 
24 
-
2 
_ 
1086 
2387 
292 
639 
4693 
608 
12348 
28 
227 
6 
2,250 7,334 8,164 1,647 2,816 103 22,314 
Source: Noel W. Lamidey, Aliens Control in Australia 1939-46, p.6. 
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In die first instance on 8 December 1941, 110 Japanese residents of 
Thursday Island were placed "under guard" to await luggers to take 
diem to an intemment camp. Two days later, 366 men, twenty six 
women and twenty two children of Japanese birtii or parentage mostiy 
from Thursday Island, TownsviUe, Cairns, Mackay and Brisbane had 
been taken into custody." In May 1941 die War Cabinet had 
approved die amended "Uitenunent policy for Japanese" prepared by 
die Army, whereby aU Japanese males over sixteen (except consular 
officials) were to be intemed immediately at the outbreak of 
hostilities. AusU-alia would also accept and incarcerate Japanese from 
die British Pacific islands and from New Caledonia.'^ Policy on diis 
matter had been determined in Cabinet in July 1941 when an annexe 
was inserted into die "PoUcy laid down in the Conunonwealdi War 
Book". Unlike die Italians and Germans whose political affiliations 
might be readily, if often inaccurately, ascertained, the Japanese did 
not have an equivalent to the national socialist or fascist parties. 
Furthermore, it was asserted that the "strong national sentiments on 
the part of the Japanese would lead to acts of sabotage"." In 
Febmary 1939 Inspector Wake had reported in a "general overview" 
assessment that diere were 754 Japanese in Queensland, by August 
1940 tills number had dropped to 666 and had fallen further to 543 
by November, leading to die conclusion that many had fled home as 
they had been forewarned about intendmg hostilities.'* 
The Truth newspaper of 14 December 1941 congratulated various 
agencies on the alacrity of their actions: 
With utmost speed and efficiency, officers in the Commonwealth 
Investigation Branch, MiUtary InteUigence and the State police co-
operated in a Queensland-wide round-up of Japanese nationals, 
hundreds of whom are lodged in intemment camps within a few 
hours of the declaration of war with Japan. 
Rarely, especiaUy in war-time when censorship was strict, did die 
public even leam of these bureaucratic procedures and the mediods of 
cooperation between State and Federal agencies and between civil and 
miUtary audiority. Only with the gravest emergency and die fear of 
mvasion that gripped botii the community and its officials did such 
procedures gain public knowledge. 
In a post-war assessment in November 1945 by Northem 
Command, military mteUigence stressed that the federal govemment 
had, in its estimation, acted judiciously in apprehending and 
incarcerating the Japanese on a community basis. Various "well 
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trained and disciplined laymen who had operated in other parts of the 
Pacific" - mostiy using tiie cover of humble laundrymen and market 
gardeners - had been active in gatiiering geographic and inteUigence 
information about Queensland prior to 1939." Yet a police report 
from Caims written on 15 December 1941, during intense community 
anxiety, reported that Japanese "... aliens have never been heard to 
express any anti-British sentiments"." The local police clearly felt 
diat diese often elderly men, who had arrived before die introduction 
of the Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 were not 
security risks and were certairdy not spies as military inteUigence and 
die CIB aUeged. 
The surveiUance and assessment of die Italians, particularly those 
in the strategicaUy vulnerable areas of die nortii east coast was far 
more complicated tiian the processes operating witii respect to die 
Japanese who were incarcerated solely as an ethnic group. Various 
factors operated widi regard to the intemment of the Italians. Some 
Italians, like the Russians m World War One in Queensland, were 
rigorously investigated by the local police and recommended as 
suitable cases for uitemment or deportation, not so much because of a 
potential capacity for sabotage, but rather for their radical political 
adherences. In March 1942, Police Commissioner CarroU expressed 
his unfeigned delight that the Italian Beniamino M. "a well known 
Communist" had been intemed, after aUeging he had been assaulted 
by die poUce. CartoU continued: "I am satisfied diat M... is in his 
right place, and it is confidently hoped he wiU be kept in intemment 
for the duration of the war".'' No evidence whatsoever was presented 
that the intemee posed a threat to national security. Rather, his status 
as an enemy aUen coupled with his political beliefs made him doubly 
suspect as potentially, though not specificaUy, subversive. The 
Queensland police, reflecting the broad ideological commitment of the 
conservative State Labor govemment, was ultimately to prove far 
more antagonistic to Italians like Beniamino M. with communist and 
anarchist beliefs than those who were operdy fascist. 
Both Diane Menghetti and Gianfranco Cresciani argue that the 
majority of Italians ui north Queensland were anti-fascist.'* In 1926 
Lega Anti-Fascista was launched in both Sydney and Melbourne 
whilst the Comitato Anti-Fascisto deU' Herbert River was formed soon 
after." Ross Fitzgerald further argues that from die early 1920s 
waves of anti-fascist ItaUans entered Australia, most residing, in 
particular agricultural areas of northeastem Queensland. Furthermore: 
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Among Queensland's etiinic groups, Italians were politicaUy die 
most complex. From 1935 on, especiaUy in north Queensland, a 
number of Italian immigrants participated in die anti-fascist 
popular front which comprised communists, anarchists and 
syndicaUsts.*" 
Notwidistanding die diversity of ideology, by die mid 1930s die 
communists had displaced the anarchists as die vanguard of the anti-
fascist movement in north Queensland.*' In July 1939 a weU attended 
anti-fascist conference was held in TownsviUe, with the Innisfail 
Italian delegates comprising its most notable participants.*^ 
Given the size of the ItaUan community in Queensland (4,483 in 
1933 though this had dropped to 2,966 m late 1939),*' divided 
ideological conunitments and perspectives can be discemed. In 1937 
a fascist raUy was held in Babinda** which appeared to operate as die 
centre of fascism and ItaUan patriotism in the State. Menghetti 
aUeges that fascist raUies were held there as late as 1943.*' Irmisfail 
on die odier hand, contained the most active and vociferous anti-
fascist contingent. The fascist consul resident there was forced to 
leave at the insistence of miUtant left wing cane cutters and farmers.*' 
Throughout die 1920s and 1930s the Italians in Queensland were 
subjected to a consistentiy high degree of raciaUy inspired antagonism 
as well as poUtical suspicion. In 1925 a royal conunission, headed by 
Thomas Ferry, the under secretary of the Chief Secretary's Office, 
was established to investigate "the social and economic effect of 
increase in number of aUens in north Queensland". This report 
expressed serious reservations about the nature of newly arrived 
Soudiem Europeans, particularly those from southem Italy and Sicily 
who were congregating in the sugar districts.*' Throughout die 1920s 
and 1930s campaigns were mounted in the press that Italians were 
held in thraU to secret "gangster" organisations. On 15 December 
1939 tiie Courier Mail in an article headlined "Black Hand tertorists 
in Ingham" gave die impression that die Italian commimities were 
kept in perpetual fear with their houses bombed and their lives 
endangered. This type of reporting did nothing to convince Anglo-
Australians diat Italians were acceptable residents. 
Adherence to nineteenth cenmry doctrines of immutable racial 
characteristics had not diminished to any degree. Whilst praising the 
supposed good racial stock of die northem Italians, Commissioner 
Ferry stated that: 
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The admission of races that can never make good Australian 
citizens ordy widens the breach between the AustraUan and the 
better type of foreigner. It doubles the difficulties of assimilation, 
and results in the creation of racial organisations and breeds racial 
hatreds that should not exist.*' 
In particular. Ferry feared that these ItaUans would organise into 
"aUen groups... aU anti-British in sympathy and outiook".*' A 
vehement anti foreigner campaign in the press can be detected from 
1936. In August 1936 a sUght disturbance in the refreshment rooms 
of the Innisfail railway station was portrayed in the north Queensland 
press as "foreigners attacking Britishers".'" Nearly one year later a 
lead article in Smith's Weekly of 31 July 1937 alleged Italians were 
sending over £1 miUion "home to Italy". On 10 Febmary 1938 the 
(Brisbane) Telegraph warned diat, whilst 8,578 British immigrants had 
arrived in 1937, so too had 5,684 "aliens" of whom 1982 were ItaUan 
and 1,179 were Greek. The (Brisbane) Telegraph of 1 September 
1937 claimed the "buming question in north Queensland" was the 
presence of SicUians and Calabrians whose "mixed blood... makes 
diem more alien to the Australian mode of thought than the pure 
blooded Tuscans, Lombardese, Piedmontese and other central and 
northem ItaUans". Canon Garland, the President of the New Settlers 
League, registered his alarm tiiat "AustraUa was losing her British 
element"." This theme later assumed an urgency that reverberated 
diroughout Queensland after Italy entered the war in 1940. 
In August 1941 the director of mUitary inteUigence presented a 
"Report on ItaUans in North Queensland" in which he maintained that 
"most complaints" and "tensions" in Ingham, TuUy and Caims were 
inspired by "the type of ItaUan there is die least agreeable 'Soudiem' 
(i.e. Southem Italy) class".'^ This cmcial report endorsed Ferry's 
spurious racial categorisation. Taking this schema one step further, it 
then attributed innate political and ideological characteristics which 
were regarded as either openly detrimental to the Australian war effort 
or as constituting an alien unincorporated element. Mr Justice Reed's 
judicial enquiry on ItaUan intemees conducted in November 1943 
fiirtiier endorsed the dichotomy between northem and southem 
Italians. He stated that "... [g]eneraUy speaking the physical 
characteristics are different, and there appears to be a marked contrast 
in mental caUbre"." Whilst admitting that many Italians had fled 
fascism, his report concluded that southem ItaUans' lack of education 
and poor understanding of EngUsh rendered diem unsuitable 
migrants.'* 
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Bodi die Ferry and Reed reports mirrored many of die fears and 
preoccupations of die wider Queensland population. Italians were 
suspect because of tiieir inferted lower "racial" ongms and tiieir 
supposed inability to assimUate into die Anglo-Austt-alian community. 
Yet when Italians did take out British citizenship, hostility contmued 
to be vented towards tiiem. hi 1940, Police Commissioner CartoU 
wrote tiiat tiiere was "much antagonism to foreigners especiaUy 
Italians in Uigham and TuUy". Furthennore, he revealed tiiat it was 
generally acknowledged locally tiiat Italians became nattiralised 
"merely for business purposes"." The dual nature of irtational racism 
can be clearly discemed in tiiese responses. The minority group is 
castigated by the host society whether it conforms to or rejects 
dominant cultural pattems. 
Hostility was not simply confined to die Italians' ethnic and 
national origins. In 1937 tiie Protestant Labor Party was founded, and 
expressed its specific opposition to ItaUan cathoUcs.'* Odier 
organisations, lUce the Empire Protestant Defence League in Tully 
were particularly active in promoting hatred of the cathoUc ItaUan 
cane cutters among Australian Workers Union members." 
What now appears surprising in retrospect, given these long 
standing sectarian, ethnic and political hostUities towards ItaUans, is 
that the federal govemment did not target die entire ItaUan community 
until March 1942 when invasion by the Japanese appeared imminent." 
The raid on the Fascist Club in Brisbane on 15 June 1940 when 
supposedly "tiiousands of rifles, 80,0(X) rounds of ammunition and 
16,(KX) sheUs of gelignite were confiscated" was a specificaUy political 
raid not one directed against the general Italian community." The 
Communist Party of AustraUa (CPA) was also raided diat day 
although as chapter 5 wiU demonstrate, attention was solely focused 
upon the Anglo-Celtic radicals. Though three times as many Italians 
as Germans were initiaUy intemed throughout the Commonwealth, this 
reflected recent immigration and broad demographic pattems. As both 
Menghetti and Cresciani confirm, many Italians, were communist in 
sympathy if not specificaUy party members. Moreover, the national 
security (subversive associations) regulations aUowed for the 
comprehensive investigation, and m some cases, intemment of 
communists and members of affiliated or fratemal organisations. 
Predominately, however, ItaUans were mtemed because of their 
nationality or enemy alien birth rather than on purely political 
grounds. Though an increasing proportion of Italians were intemed, 
usuaUy temporarily, after June 1940, it was not until early 1942 that 
concerted manoeuvres were instigated against them. 
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Police Commissioner CarroU, writing to Justice Philp of the 
Queensland Supreme Court on 18 December 1941 forcefully expressed 
the view that "We need more vigilance with enemy aliens who... we 
aUowed to roam at large at the present time of grave national peril".*" 
f^ orth Queensland, at that time, contained the largest proportion of 
enemy aliens and, most particularly, naturalised British subjects of 
enemy origin in the Commonwealth. It was not simply their numbers 
tiiat caused concem but their location in the north east coast. 
Table 3: Number of Enemy Aliens and NBS* of Enemy Birth, 1941 in Queensland 
Enemy Aliens NBS of Enemy Alien Origin 
1,798 
43 
5.559 
IS 
Germans 
Austrians 
ItaUans 
Albanians 
Finns 
Rumanians 
Hungarians 
Japanese 
536 
Si 
3,156 
434 
sifi 
14 
6 
587 
Total 5,395 7,457 12,852 
* Naturalised British Subject 
Fearing direct invasion by the Japanese, Queensland appeared 
particularly vulnerable, a condition exacerbated by these regional 
concentrations of enemy aliens. Home Secretary Hardon in an 
important memorandum to Premier Forgan Smith in January 1942 
stated that pressure needed to be brought to bare on the federal 
govemment to place "tighter controls" over this potential fifth column. 
Hanlon continued: 
I have taken up witii the General Officer commandmg die first 
military district over a lengthy period..., both verbally and in 
writing, with a view to a firmer intemment policy, particularly in 
relation to aliens; but, as pointed out, I always fmd myself up 
against the proposition of having to prove a strict case against an 
50 War on the Homefront 
aUen, and practical experience has shown tiiis is ahnost impossible 
in an aUen community.*' 
Almost a year previously Police Commissioner CartoU had also 
written to Inspector Wake on a sunilar matter. CartoU was not as 
scmpulous as Hanlon in observing legal convention, beUeving tiiat 
"die poUce... should not proceed witii internments to tiie same degree 
of particularity and preciseness required m criminal jurisdiction"." 
AUowing for die vagueness and legal impreciseness of the general 
term "danger to national security", CartoU constantiy urged "strong 
action" against potential enemies or tiieir agents. He remarked to die 
conference of poUce conmiissioners and inteUigence sections of die 
fighting services, held on 20 March 1942, tiiat Queensland intemees 
"are notiiing but tiie scum of tiie earth"." Openly critical of die 
federal Labor government's poUcy, CartoU maintained tiiat "secur[ing] 
intemal security is a State matter" and therefore the police should be 
aUowed far more power to detain enemy aliens.** UncharacteristicaUy, 
given his scmpulous attention to detail that is evidenced in die 
dossiers he compiled. Inspector Wake of Northem Command took die 
most extreme view at die meeting, by declaring that he wanted "... all 
enemy aliens intemed as they were a real menace to the Army".*' 
Not only did senior officials like Wake and Carroll emphasise die 
necessity for increasing intemment procedures and facilities, tiiey 
strongly condemned provisions for appeal. In November 1940 the 
national security (alien control) regulations provided for appeals 
through the aliens tribunal. Wake and CartoU botii maintained diat 
these provisions were legitunate in peace-time but potentially 
irresponsible during the war emergency.** Arguing that such 
concessions were "a legal formulation drawn up by legal men in the 
Commonwealth Service to give their confreres outside the opportunity 
to get additional work", Wake further fumed agamst the difficulties 
for stretched Army resources and personnel to "shift large numbers of 
aliens at any one tune".*' Home Secretary Hanlon partiaUy concuned 
by stressing the necessity for "at least temporary incarceration..." in 
order to ensure "die preservation of Intemal Security...".*' 
Public pressure was increasingly applied to further augment 
intemment procedures in the early montiis of 1942, when invasion 
fears were most real and immediate. A weU attended public meeting 
in Brisbane in March unrealisticaUy caUed for the immediate 
intemment of all enemy aUens in north Queensland.*' The nortiiem 
district of the Retumed Soldiers and Sailors Imperial League (RSL) 
also tiiat montii had urged the immediate incarceration of naturaUsed 
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British subjects of enemy origin, who were regarded as potentiaUy 
more subversive because tiiey are "able to cloak... their activities 
under... their naturaUsation".'" The Sunday Australian of 8 Febmary 
1942 hystericaUy claimed that there were "far too many foreigners in 
the north" and declared that the whole north section of the State 
should be placed under immediate martial law. The Sunday Sun and 
Guardian of the same date, warning that the Italians at Ingham aU 
had guns, pleaded for "action before it is too late".'' Yet, as Sub-
Inspector Harman of Caims revealed: 
The police worked lUce niggers, big job inteming ItaUans. No 
trouble. There was not one instance of sabotage except an 
attempted one by one mental case to sabotage a bridge. An 
AustraUan. Yugoslavs, ItaUans, Albanians, Austrians etc. gave no 
trouble - odd fascist here and there, but no attempts at sabotage.'^ 
Mr Justice Reed in his 1943 report on intemees believed that the vast 
majority of ItaUans "have no real poUtical outiook or opinions at 
aU"." Even during the war, albeit m the later stages, the federal 
minister for Shippmg and Supply, admitted that: 
The overwheUning majority of Italians want to be safeguarded m 
their wiUingness to show loyalty to AustraUa, their adopted 
country, free from any interference of Fascist as weU as 
Commimist or other racial associations.'* 
Hannan's considered appraisal made in 1949 mirtored die reality but 
in 1942, bodi the pubUc and officials alike responded with instinctive 
haste and irtational alarm to the perceived threat of simultaneous 
extemal invasion and potential intemal sabotage. 
Reaching a peak of 5,643 intemees in mid 1942, by the end of 
die year there were ordy 1,0(X) persons incarcerated. W.B. Simpson, 
die director general of Security in Canberta, commented m early 1943 
tiiat there was an unfortunate unreliabUity in curtent intemment 
figures." Presumably, in this number most were Japanese given the 
dUigence with which the miUtary incarcerated Japanese nationals. 
Odier groups had also been targeted for special consideration in early 
1942. Inspector Wake was particularly concemed about the presence 
of Russian fascists at Biloela in central Queensland. He argued in 
late January 1942 that tiiey were potential saboteurs as pressure could 
be brought upon them because the Russian communities at Harbin 
were now under direct enemy control.'* The "Russian Nationalist 
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Revolutionary Party" was regarded as being particularly anti-Semitic, 
anti-British and pro-Nazi. A military security inteUigence report in 
October 1941, argued that although the Firms had no links with ItaUan 
fascists or German nazis m Austi-alia, tiiey did contain a subgroup of 
Swedish-speaking Fuins who actuaUy supported nazi principles and 
were fiercely anti-Soviet. The report from interpreter section of 
military inteUigence of Febmary 1942 tiiat caused tiieir incarceration 
regarded diem as "very patriotic over die Russo-Finnish war of 1939-
40"; but presumably because of tiieir residence in TuUy, Ingham and 
Mt Isa tiiey were now regarded as potential fifth colunmists." By 
May 1942, twenty five Russians had been intemed, along witii eighty 
five Finns, and seventy eight Albanians." 
Under die national security (general) regulations, number 26, die 
Army had power to detain naturalised British subjects and British 
bom citizens like members of tiie "AusU-alia First Movement". They 
constituted the final category of persons detained, after nazis, fascists 
and enemy aliens of recent arrival or military age. Writing to 
General Whiteland in June 1940 (a cmcial period in die operation of 
the war for it signaUed the fall of France and die high point of axis 
power), the commandant of the fourth miUtary district identified 
"disloyal AustraUan Germans" as key security risks. Though as 
dossiers indicate, the Lutheran pastors were actuaUy taken into 
custody in 1942 and 1943. Two interrelated problems present 
themselves. First, as W.J. Mackay, the director general of security 
declared: 
... it may possibly be shown that naturalisation has been obtained 
as a mere cloak. In a word, aU the circumstances of a particular 
case have to be weighed carefuUy.'" 
Given the geographic position of Germans on the Darling Downs, in 
the Bundaberg and Brisbane Valley districts, tiiey were never to be 
subject to the same widespread detention lUce die ItaUans on the north 
east sugar coast. 
Secondly, there was the vexing problem in security agencies' 
perception of the Lutheran pastors who held great authority in tiieir 
parishes. This did not apply to priests in the sugar districts. They 
were predommately Irish-Australians, loyal to the war effort and 
though vehemently anti-communists, were not fascist in sympathy or 
mclination. The Lutiieran clergy were often, on the other hand, 
highly poUtical. As a security report on one pastor remarked: 
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... since the outbreak of the war the German communities are 
Uving in compact groups, and do not fraternise to any great extent 
with the British section of the population.*' 
Table 4: Enemy Alien Intemees in Australia, April 1942*™ 
German 
EA 
German 
NBS** 
Italian 
EA 
Italian 
NBS 
Japanese 
Other EA 
Other 
Total 
m 
f 
m 
f 
m 
f 
m 
f 
m 
f 
Northem 
Command 
402 
1 
81 
1,680 
2 
206 
611 
.35 
m 
42 
3,081 
Southem 
Command 
150 
1 
m 
114 
m 
-
a 
7 
400 
Westem 
Command 
39 
1 
I 
341 
m 
i 
622 
Other 
64 
10 
34 
2 
1 
250 
28(+13c) 
16 
418 
Total 
655 
3 
121 
2,411 
4 
290 
861 
16 
65 
4,521 
* These figures do not include POW or persons intemed outside Commonwealth and Territories 
** NBS Naturalised British Subject 
W.J. Mackay declared tiiat: 
... Pastors of the Lutheran Churches are recognised local Nazi 
leaders and, in several cases, there is evidence that their behaviour 
is more in keeping with a Pmssian guardsman than a man of 
God.'^  
Given Mackay's pre-eminence m the field of security and his ability 
to influence federal muiisters it is not surprising that pastors were 
placed under particular scmtiny by the police and local military 
intelUgence agents. FoUowing Mackay's direction, evidence was 
sought for "disloyalty" and potential subversion emanating from the 
pastor's promptings or teachings. In Toowoomba security agents 
believed the Germans there were "... passively disloyal with possible 
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active disloyalty on die part of certain mdividuals and die [entire] 
German population is a potential fiftii column"." 
Several churches had been under surveiUance of the CIB since die 
1930s - die Quakers for tiieir adamant pacifism and die Jehovah's 
Wimesses who refused to recognise King George VI, believmg only 
God was tiieir spirimal monarch, and more importantiy, later totaUy 
abstaining from aidmg die war effort in any manner.'* Quakers and 
Jehovah's Wimess were not however intemed. The UECLA came 
under particular notice; diough, as Margaret Bevege argues, dieir 
journal. The Lutheran Herald stated its aim was to promote Gennan 
culture but emphatically disavowed aU links to nazism, claiming its 
readers were "Australians having no flag but die Union Jack"." The 
Evangelical Ludieran Snyod of Australia (ELSA), which maintained 
nineteen pastors in Queensland, was regarded by the CEB and military 
intelligence as far less dangerous tiian the larger UELCA, although 
"no doubt tiiere is a disloyal element in the Church".** 
Dealing with the intemment of several notable UELCA pastors 
certain pattems emerge. First, Pastors Anton HiUer of Boonah parish 
and E.V.H. Gutenkunst had been under surveiUance since the arrival 
of Dr Asmis; tiieir mail had been intercepted by the postal and 
telegraphic censor within the Post Master General's office, translated 
and then forwarded to interpreter's section of military inteUigence, 
Northem Command m Brisbane. Secondly, they had artanged die 
visit of von Luckner through their parishes. 
The strongest cases assembled by military inteUigence involved 
Hiller and Gutenkunst, despite the fact tiiat Gutenkunst's son was an 
officer in the Second AIF. Though the local police report stated diat 
tiiere was no evidence of Hiller "being anti-British" at die outbreak of 
the war he was kept under intense surveiUance. The security service 
report sent to die subversive section of Northern Command identified 
five factors tiiat ensured his uitemment:- his correspondence in 
German "probably anti-British and apparently pro-Nazi"; von Luckner 
was his guest; he possessed a large cache of nazi propoganda; he was 
associated with a well known Sydney University lecmrer and self-
proclaimed nazi, Dr Neumaim and lastly he subscribed to Die Briicke. 
Evidence at his hearing before die Aliens Tribunal in Gaythome 
intemment camp in March 1942 showed how he had aUowed Dr 
Neumann to make a pro-Nazi speech in his church in June 1939. 
When questioned about his political beliefs he naively stated tiiat "As 
far as tiie Nazi regime is concemed, I have always contended diat it 
may be aU right for diat country but not for Australia". Sent to 
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Tatura camp, HiUer was released in Febmary 1944 a very embittered 
man." 
Together with a commitment to release intemees who were not 
actual members of the nazi or fascist parties or Japanese, the War 
Cabinet in March 1942 decided that refugee aliens, such as those 
from die "Dunera" and some categories of enemy alien should be 
made available for employment to the AUied Works Council. 
Refugee aliens, neutral aliens and aUied nationals were also eligible to 
apply for national service, in some cases in the armed forces.** The 
aliens classification and advisory committee established under the 
auspices of the Attomey General's department recommended in March 
1943 that when the loyalty of "friendly and refugee enemy aliens is 
undoubted they be encouraged to join the armed services".*' Some 
18,5(X) Italian prisoners of war, mostly captured in Libya in 1941, 
were transported to Australia. With the exception of fascist party 
members, most were released for private agriculmral and public works 
programmes in Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and New South 
Wales.'" 
The AUied Works Council had been established in Febmary 1942 
with E.G. Theodore as its chairman to coordinate and implement the 
massive public works and defence instaUations needed to launch aUied 
offensives in the Pacific. The Civilian Constmction Corps, under the 
control of Theodore's business partner, Frank Packer employed a total 
of 53,518 men between Febmary 1942 and June 1942. Most of those 
directed to perform labour were men unfit for or over the age of 
miUtary service. To supplement tiie chronic shortage of able-bodied 
persormel, suggestions had been made to introduce 25,000 workers 
from die Netherlands East Indies for the duration of the war." 
Widiin the Commonwealth, given the competition between the 
Manpower Authorities and die AUied Works Council to control aU 
available labour, moves were made to recmit among registered aliens. 
Therefore most low-risk intemees were released from incarceration in 
order to contribute gauifuUy to die AUied war effort. 
In early 1942 the Civil Alien Corps was established as a section 
of die AUied Works Council.'^ Released intemees and aliens, whether 
of neutral or enemy status, who had been cleared tiirough the security 
procedures of die Aliens Tribunals, could be employed by tiiis body. 
They were to be paid the basic aUowance of die Australian MUitary 
Forces scale and in circumstances tiiat would not contravene 
international conventions. They were therefore precluded from 
workmg on direct defence work such as aerodrome constmction." 
Whilst the Army was required to fumish "adequate security 
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arrangements", Northem Conunand accepted some 1100 fonner 
intemees and otiier aliens who were deployed for ancillary AUied 
Works Council projects from March and April 1942 onwards. In 
Victoria 550 released Queensland intemees worked at die saltworks at 
Underwood and die forestry camp at WerrimilU.'* This entire scheme 
which was hoped would supply vital labour demands was a 
disappointment. Procedures lapsed when C.K. Wagner and E. 
Gmnseitt took their labour conscription cases in late 1942 to die High 
Court. Ui May 1943 their objections were upheld." 
Table 5: Numbers of Enemy Aliens in Queensland on AUied Works Council 1942. 
Disuict Work Number 
Westem Creek 
Monto 
Inglewood 
Ravensboume 
West of Roma 
Clermont 
Protection of State Forests 
Protection of State Forests 
Protection of State Forests 
Road Construction 
Road Construction 
Road Constmction 
240 
100 
60 
180 
120 
400 
Total 1100 
In August 1942, control of enemy aliens and intemees passed from 
the Army to the Attomey General, though the Army remained 
responsible for the acmal incarceration procedures. Two new poUcies 
were adopted. First, refugee, aUied national and "cleared" neutral 
aliens could volunteer for service in the armed forces if they were 
released from reserved civil occupations by die Manpower authority. 
Secondly, those who were not already employed by the Civil Alien 
Corps could be engaged by the Civil Auxiliary Corps for essential, 
but non-defence, works.'* 
The federal director of Security in January 1943 made it clear that 
released enemy aUen intemees should not be aUowed to work for 
private mdividuals but radier in groups which could be supervised. 
He argued for die maximum degree of regimentation within the 
constraints of limited persormel resources. He stated that "I am firmly 
opposed to the principle of allocating mdividual aliens to private 
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employees. Our responsibiUty is security. When these men are 
regimented under the aliens service regulation it is possible to know 
where tiiey are and what they are doing."" Yet, tiiis entire policy of 
enemy alien employment would appear fraught with contradictions. 
On the one hand, captured enemy Italian prisoners of war were 
aUowed to work for farmers without any insistence upon daily 
supervision. On the other hand, resident enemy aliens or nationalised 
British subjects who had been intemed might be released and directed 
by die Manpower authority or die AUied Works Council to labour in 
supervised gangs on road constmction or other public works in remote 
inhospitable regions. Writing to the Attomey General in September 
1944, the director general of Security stated that, after die capitulation 
of Italy in September 1943 new poUcy directives aUowed Italian 
intemees who were incarcerated as "a precautionary measure" to be 
released for work speciaUy in their own State but on "essential" 
labour." 
In April 1943 the War Cabinet re-formed the Civil Aliens Corps 
under the direction of the federal miruster of the Interior with 
remuneration and conditions set by the director general of AUied 
Works." Ordy 1,671 of the 15,601 men eUgible for service were 
assigned. 350 were deployed as maintenance men on the 
Commonwealth Port Augusta-Kalgoorlie and Port Augusta-Alice 
Springs railways."* A further 679 were employed in low security 
areas like the munition's factory at General Motor's Holden defence 
projects. In May 1945, given the poor numbers and the excessive 
adrrunistrative costs it was replaced by the Civil Constmction Corps. 
Most potentiaUy eUgible members were exempted because they were 
akeady employed on essential agricultural or pastoral labour or 
secondary industry. In Febmary 1945 only one per cent of the 
16,701 members of the Civil Constmction Corps were refugees and 
only eight per cent were enemy aliens."" 
In conclusion, cooperation between the civil poUce who gathered 
local information, the Commonwealth Investigation Bureau - a 
precursor of the AustraUan Security IntelUgence Organisation - and 
military intelligence can be readily detected in this sensitive area that 
could potentiaUy affect national security. The delegation of powers 
often proved a difficult task, with the poUce possessing detailed local 
knowledge making assessments on the uidividual level but with policy 
ultimately determined in war-tune by military intelligence agencies. 
These organisational demarcations were further extended by die very 
complex procedures that required the civU poUce to apprehend the 
intemee and the Army to maintain the camps. On this particular 
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issue, die US autiiorities left tiie entire matter of uitemal security to 
tiie Ausu-alians. It may be further argued tiiat tiie partem of 
intemment of enemy aliens and nattiralised British subjects of enemy 
alien origin reveals tiie varying degrees of alarm and insecurity felt in 
AusU-alia. Though initiaUy incarceratmg tiiose of direct security risk 
like members of tiie nazi party and tiieir most vocal supporters, and 
later tiie fascist party, whilst tiie war remained centred extemaUy in 
die Middle East and Europe and where die Commonwealdi's role was 
in an auxiliary capacity, intemment remained low key. The advent of 
total war and the direct tiireat posed by an apparentiy imminent 
invasion by the Japanese in late 1941 and early 1942 led to increasing 
panic and severity towards aU categories of enemy aUens. All 
Japanese were immediately arrested and incarcerated. The Italian 
community in Queensland in particular became the subject of intense 
official scmtiny and public suspicion. Yet by mid 1942, when die 
initial alarm had abated, plans were aUeady underway to utilise die 
labour resources of all forms of enemy alien and non British 
residents. A pragmatic expediency was to triumph over nationalist 
fervour. 
Ill 
The Management of Segregation: Black American 
Servicemen in Queensland 1941-45 
with Helen Taylor 
The deployment of Black American service personnel in Australia 
from December 1941 chaUenged the basic precepts upon which 
Commonwealth legislative and administrative policies were 
constmcted. Commitment to racial homogeneity had, since 1901, 
demonstrated that bipartisan agreement and co-operation, at the 
political level, was possible over such a cardinal policy and practice. 
Certainly, no other issue in Australian politics and society could 
surmount class, gender, regional and sectional interests so unanimously 
as adherence to strict principles of racial exclusiveness.' The crisis of 
imminent invasion and the concomitant dependence and subordination 
to the United States in the early months of 1942 forged new 
imperatives and redirected standard approaches and priorities. The 
Commonwealth government's capitulation to the wider claims and 
powers of American policy directives starkly iUustrates both the 
flexibility and the endurance of Austalian intemal procedures. Having 
been forced to accept the presence of Black GIs, both the 
Commonwealth and Queensland governments negotiated and 
established complex, interlinking pattems of segregation to contain this 
unwanted inclusion in the Allied forces. As chapter one demonstrates, 
in those issues involving the residence, safety and rights of American 
military and naval persormel, intricate pattems that could ensure both 
cooperation and autonomy, were established. 
Aware of Australia's defencelessness and vulnerability, with the 
Second AustraUan Imperial Force stationed in the Middle East from 
1939 to late 1941, many AustraUans had initiaUy regarded their 
Pacific AUies as omnipotent saviours; but the inclusion of Black 
troops among their numbers, particularly in the potential role of 
avenging warriors, brought to the surface AustraUans' ambivalence 
about the nature of their deliverers. On one level, Australian and 
American males engaged in long and bitter dispute over access to 
Australian women who were thus cast as passive instmments of either 
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virtue or pleasure in the male dominions of power (as chapter 4 wiU 
elaborate) But, on anotiier, while Australian men were m overseas 
tiieatres of war, tiie additional dimension of tiiousands of young, 
smartly dressed, affluent, resident Black troops, exacerbated die 
general disquiet. Botii tiie official and public alarm ensured tiiat an 
attempt would be made to prevent Black servicemen associatmg with 
local women. To tiiis end. Black American servicemen m Australia 
were subject to the restrictions of two interiocking systems of 
segregation - die first involved intemal American practices; die second 
was imposed by the Australian civilian authorities. Three broad 
procedures devolved from tiiese systems - tiie first involved 
geographical isolation, tiie second demanded residential zoning and die 
diird ensured recreational segregation. 
At the commencement of the Australian and United States' 
military alliance at die end of 1941, die Australian War Cabinet had 
categoricaUy opposed die inclusion of the Blacks among die AUies' 
forces. This reflected a politicaUy bi-partisan docttine and community 
consensus on die issue of "White Australia". Since the inception of 
tiie Commonwealtii in 1901, tiiis had remained a fundamental 
cornerstone of domestic policy. The exigencies of total war and die 
realities of Australia's subordinate stams m the Pacific AUies' aUiance 
meant the restrictive entry provision was suspended, though never 
repudiated, for the duration of the national crisis. 
Initial reference to this specific dispute over die introduction of 
Black GIs into Australia arose three weeks after Pearl Harbour, 
Charles Brown, the Sydney-based director of the Matson shipping line, 
wrote on 2 January 1942 to General Ely E. Palmer, the US consul, 
requesting information and clarification on Australian attitudes towards 
the possibility of Black American servicemen labouring on AustraUan 
wharves, particularly in the strategically cmcial port of Brisbane. The 
foUowing day a conference was held in Melboume attended by US 
Generals Bames, Brereton and Brett and the Australian chiefs of staff. 
Its aim was to ensure that Australia gained information about die 
proposed despatch of American troops and equipment to its shores.^  
In a memorandum to the secretary of the department of Defence 
Coordination on 7 January 1942, Prime Minister Curtin expressly 
forbade the employment of any American servicemen on Australian 
wharves until such time as aU local civilian supplies became totally 
inadequate.' Clearly Curtin was reluctant to express his more specific 
apprehensions that the US might have aUeady despatched labour 
battalions that contained Black persormel. 
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The departments of the Interior and Labour and National Service 
meanwhile considered the specific requests of the Matson line during 
die early weeks of January. The secretary of the department of 
Labour and National Service firmly rejected die proposition of a 
labour shortage on the Brisbane wharves. In line with current federal 
policy, he stressed that "any suggestion of importing coloured gangs 
from the United States would have disastrous consequences". In a 
memorandum from the Administrative Planning Committee, dated 13 
January 1942, die minister. Senator CoUins, concurred, stating "any 
such proposal is most dangerous".* 
Ulysses Lee, in die official history of the US Army in World War 
Two, comments that: 
AustraUa, with its White Australia Policy, informed the War 
Department through the Australian Embassy [sic] that it would not 
agree to the despatch of Negro troops to Australian territory. This 
was later modified to permit a limited number to enter, with the 
stipulation that they were to be witiidrawn at the end of the 
AustraUan emergency.' 
An examination of the cables that went back and forth between 
Washington and Melboume reveals far more complex and sustained 
negotiations tiian Lee indicates. The Australian War Cabinet was 
alerted to American intentions when the Australian Representative in 
Washington, Richard Casey, cabled on 9 January 1942, that: 
US govemment considering the despatch of ground troops 
principaUy anti-aircraft units to Australia; and in this connection 
diey are anxious to know what would be your reaction to a 
proposal that a proportion of those troops should be coloured 
(negro).* 
The foUowing day Casey cabled Dr H.V. Evatt, the minister for 
Extemal Affairs, tiiat the War department proposed immediately 
sending 2,000 Black troops to Australia.' At the same time as news 
of these proposals was being received, seemingly to pre-empt any 
AustraUan poUcy directives, die AustraUan Advisory War Council, 
entered into negotiations with General Bames. He requested that 
Darwm be placed under military control as tiiere were insufficient 
civilian residents m this remote township to unload heavy equipment.' 
Referring specifically to die issue of Black servicemen, the 
Advisory War Council debated Bames's request on 12 January. As 
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any acceptance chaUenged die foundations of die "White Austt-alia" 
policy, die Advisory War Council advised the War Cabinet to adhere 
to traditional principles.' Ui view of tiieir united and resolute 
determination to assert Australian perspectives, Evatt mformed Casey 
die foUowing day tiiat "We are not prepared to agree to die proposal 
tiiat U.S. troops to be despatched to Australia should be coloured",'" 
At die same time, however, tiie rapid advance of die Japanese tiirough 
tiie Pacific region meant tiiat tiie more narrow and restrictive 
Australian policy directives were inappropriate. On 22 December 
1941, the Pensacola convoy, carrying 4,600 troops needed for the 
Philippines, had to be diverted to Brisbane." Under tiiese urgent 
circumstances, it was entirely unrealistic for tiie United States to 
consult witii AustraUa about whetiier Black troops on board were 
acceptable. Major-General Thomas Hardy, die US assistant Chief of 
Staff in Washington, DC outiined tiie War Department's overall 
policy, stressing that "coloured troops [were to be employed] in all 
overseas tiieatres" at a rate of approximately 10 per cent of tiie total 
force.'^  
On 8 January 1942 General Brett, commander of die United States 
Armed Forces in Australia (USAFIA) had urged Washington to 
despatch two engineer labour battalions to unload equipment in 
Darwin. The War Department was anxious to leam whether Black 
units would be acceptable for such operations as they would in the 
United States. Friction witii the Australian govemment was 
temporarily averted, as General MarshaU informed Brett that a severe 
shipping shortage prevented any unmediate consignment.'^ Whilst the 
Advisory War Council would not have been aware of die cables 
emanating between Brett and MarshaU, it is within this atmosphere 
tiiat negotiations between Australia and its aUy were formed. 
Anxious to reassure the mmister for Extemal Affairs that Black 
troops were a skiUed and disciplined component of the US armed 
forces, tiie director of the American legation in Canberta wrote on 13 
January that: 
The Negro units aU belong to die U.S. Army. They are all 
enlisted personnel and are tramed and disciplined men. The 
intention is to use them in Darwin for tiie heavy labour in 
connection with instaUation of aircraft defences and aerodromes for 
which they are peculiarly fitted.'* 
This stereotypical racist statement which stressed Blacks' physical 
prowess and supposed ability to withstand intense heat and 
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substandard working conditions, reinforced an ideology already 
dominant in Australia. The War Cabinet was faced with a dilemma 
in which contradictory stmctural and ideological factors were 
operating. On the one hand, the segregative practices in the US 
armed forces, endorsed by President Roosevelt in late 1940," ensured 
diat any Black personnel sent overseas would usuaUy be relegated to 
non-combative manual duties. This confirmed the dominant stereotype 
of Blacks as being only capable of arduous menial physical labour. 
On die otiier hand, American segregative practices also meant tiiese 
units would not be in transit to the battle zones of the Pacific but 
actually resident in Australia. Therefore the processes of Blacks' 
reception and acceptance required far more sustained readjustment by 
the Australian community. 
After hearing the US submission about die suitability of Black 
persormel, the secretary of the department of Extemal Affairs correctly 
interpreted these pronouncements as an indication that the War 
Department was about to land these troops very soon. Given, this fait 
accompli, Secretary Hodgson advised die secretary of the department 
of the Interior on 19 January to adopt a more flexible approach than 
previously: 
By the decision of the War Cabinet, no coloured troops frorh the 
U.S. wiU be stationed in Australia. The Commonwealth 
Govemment would have no objection to coloured troops caUing at 
an Australian port en route for destinations outside Australia.'* 
Though harming the residence of Black troops, this statement 
demonstrates a more conciliatory attitude. It did not, however, take 
into consideration the actual deployment of Blacks into non-combative 
operations. Ultimately this policy proved both unfeasible and 
inapplicable. 
The foUowing day, the Advisory War Council, in the light of its 
previous opposition to Black servicemen, performed a volte-face when 
it: 
... decided that [though] the Australian reaction to the despatch of 
Negro troops to Australia would not be favourable, the 
composition of die forces that the U.S. goverrunent might decide 
to despatch to Australia is a matter for that govemment to 
determine. 
It continued: 
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If tiie U.S.A. authorities find it necessary to mclude certain 
coloured labour units or a proportion of coloured troops in tiieir 
forces it is not tiie desire of tiie Commonwealtii Government to 
make any stipulation which might destroy die natiire of die 
organisation of the Army formulation. 
Radier timidly, it concluded that: 
Nevertheless, it is assumed tiiat tiie U.S.A. autiiorities, being aware 
of our views, wiU have regard to AustraUan susceptibiUties in die 
numbers tiiey decide to despatch." 
Bryan D. Bamett suggests tiiat Australia capittilated because its 
"position at this stage of die war left no room for bargaining"." This 
explanation does not take mto account die specific diplomatic 
manoeuvres or shifts in policy. Roger J. BeU conunents: 
Despite its tiieoretical sovereign equality of all mdependent states, 
the influence Australia exerted within die wartime aUiance was 
seriously restricted by its limited miUtary resources and diplomatic 
weight." 
It would appear that Australia was forced by the exigencies of die 
Pacific war front to re-evaluate and modify even basic tenets of 
policy. 
Referring to the British situation, Graham Smitii maintains tiiat 
initiaUy in early 1942 the British govemment did not voice any 
official opinion over the issue of die inclusion of Black troops among 
the American forces bound for Northem Ireland. Segregation was 
regarded "at the very best [as] a source of wonder to local 
mhabitants".^" He continues that the British authorities were forced to 
accept American procedures, despite the inefficiency and increased 
costs of providmg segregated environments. Smith concludes: 
The British govemment, as it saw matters, had to be careful not to 
upset its vital aUy by activity encouraging the breakdown of die 
American segregation policy... On the other hand, to accept the 
American standpoint would be to give offence to British Blacks, to 
the NAACP, the British colonial territories and armies, not to 
mention significant elements of the British electorate.^' 
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Australia experienced no such hesitation or dilemmas when faced with 
die realities of the diplomatic crisis. Rather, it always sought to 
reinforce and extend segregation. 
The first significant contingent of Black troops arrived in 
Melboume in late January, indicting that they had left die USA in 
December, before any consultative procedures had been established. 
A meeting of die War Cabinet on 2 Febmary countermanded a 
decision by the customs officials at die point of entry refusing 
admittance to these troops.^ Ministers argued that the decision made 
by die Advisory War Council on 20 January overrode any normal 
immigration practices. As Bamett notes, this contingent, as weU as 
die Pensacola convoy that landed in Brisbane on 22 December 1941, 
had been destined for the Philippines and had to be re-routed to safer 
areas.^  As events overtook the formulation of policy, Australia was 
forced to accommodate itself to the more urgent reaUties of total war. 
Cooperation with its Pacific partner meant accepting unwillingly, 
albeit temporarily, aU troops despatched by its aUy. On 25 January, 
General Bames informed Washington that Australia no longer had any 
serious objection to any type of American servicemen being posted 
diere. The following day Eisenhower referted the matter to Casey for 
his consideration;^ though clearly this was a matter of diplomatic 
protocol rather than consultation. 
The Australian federal govemment was forced to accede to US 
practices involved in the selection and deployment of American armed 
services in overseas tiieatres of warfare. The inclusion of Black 
American servicemen could have presented both the Australian 
govemment and the people with an opportunity to re-evaluate the 
entire raison d'etre for the "White Australia" policy. However, in the 
years 1942 to 1945, intemal segregative practices were both 
reaffirmed and enlarged. These were not die ordy factors which 
determined Black servicemen's reception within and adjustment to 
AustraUa. Other issues which bore directiy upon this experience 
include US armed forces' policy; domestic American racial attitudes 
and practices and the growing assertiveness on the part of Blacks due 
to tiieir participation in and perception of the war effort. 
US military and naval inteUigence reports sent back to Washington 
demonstrate that the AUies fully appreciated and supported Australia's 
commitment to policies endorsuig and maintaining racial 
exclusiveness. L.D. Causey, the naval attache in Melboume in 1942 
testified to the strengtii and resilience of "the doctrines of racial 
superiority here".^ A report made by die Office of Strategic Services 
in 1943 stated that the Aborigines "have no status in Australian 
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Society and their existence is scarcely recognised".^ General Patrick 
J. Hurley wrote in June 1942 that "I have never seen the racial 
problem brought home so forcibly as it is over here in Queensland".^ 
Since die Americans intended deploying Black troops to the Pacific 
theatre of operations, measures were devised whereby they would be 
both fully utilised for the war effort whilst, at the same time being 
contained in line with intemal Australian practices. Moreover, diis 
dilemma needed urgent resolution; for in the early montiis of 1942 
more Afro-American troops were despatched to Australia than any 
other overseas theatre. 
Table 6: Distribution of Black American Troops, March 1942.^ ' 
District Present En Route Projected 
Australia 
British Isles 
New Caledonia 
Trinidad 
Total 
6,346 
1,376 
2,484 
10,206 
186 
81 
267 
12,887 
12,887 
By August tiiere were 7285 Black Americans in Australia.^' They 
comprised over one third of die resident American depot personnel. 
At tills time tiiere were approximately 90,000 American servicemen in 
Australia eitiier stationed on bases or in transit to New Guinea.^ " 
Three basic procedures were formulated in order to uphold and 
reinforce die tenets of "White Australia". First, a process of 
geographic isolation would ensure tiiat most Black GIs would be 
confined to remote mral districts. Secondly, as Black servicemen 
later became concentrated in urban areas like Brisbane and Ipswich in 
soutiieast Queensland, specific locations were designated by die US 
autiiorities as eitiier exclusively "white" or "coloured" zones. Thirdly, 
racially differentiated pattems of recreation and leisure were devised 
m order to minimise the contact and intimate association between 
white Australian women and Black American troops. 
At die inception of the Pacific military aUiance, the US Army had 
proposed that two Black labour corps be sent to Darwin to unload 
heavy equipment;^' but tiie extensive bombmg of Darwin on 19 
Febmary rendered tiiis plan inoperable. On 27 Febmary tiie 810di 
and Slldi Engineering Aviation Battalion disembarked in Melboume 
to die dismay of die Australian War Cabinet.'' They were foUowed 
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by die 91st and 96di who arrived in TownsviUe in nortii Queensland 
to clear scmb to prepare for an airstrip." As Daryl Mclntyre shows, 
tiiese regiments worked "under primitive conditions" and were kept 
away from die local civilian population. Twenty-five officers and 
1193 'otiier ranks' of tiie 91st Regiment were located near a railway 
siding sixty miles south of TownsviUe. Landing without appropriate 
equipment and transport, they were forced to borrow unsuitable 
machinery from the local sugar-cane farmers. The move to 
TownsviUe in July gave them deserved rest, recreation and more 
chaUenging work." 
In March MacArthur promised tiiat Black troops would be posted 
to remote areas. He wrote to General MarshaU in Washington: 
I wiU do everything possible to prevent friction or resentment on 
die part of the Australian govemment and people with regard to 
the presence of coloured troops... their policy of "White Australia" 
is universally accepted here... however, by utilizmg these troops in 
die front zones away from the great centres of population... I can 
minimize the difficulties involved.^' 
By mid May 1942 there were 3,500 Afro-Americans located in the 
arid region of Cloncurry and Mt. Isa in northwest Queensland in order 
to constmct the road between Tennant Creek in the Northem Territory 
and Mt Isa." Likewise, as Robert HaU has argued, Aborigmes were 
only conscripted into the Australian Military Forces under special 
circumstances: 
As long as they remained out of the public eye and so long as 
they contributed to the defence of a strategicaUy important area 
where other manpower was scarce." 
They could, however, volunteer for active service in the Second AIF. 
Thus, the deployment of Black Americans to remote regions was in 
line with intemal Australian procedures. 
But this was not always possible. J.A. Beasley, the minister for 
Supply and Development, revealed in May 1942 that Black troops 
were engaged in wharf labouring at Glebe in central Sydney. '^ On 
die other hand, as MacArtiiur averred to Prime Minister Curtin m 
September, die United States Army Services of Supply (USASOS) 
which contained many Black members: 
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... had been charged witii tiie responsibility of receipt, storage and 
distribution of U.S. Army supplies, including unloading from 
vessels arriving from the U.S. and tiieir reloading for tt-ans-
shipment when necessary.^' 
Under tiiese circumstances, otiier procedures had to be devised 
whereby Blacks could be kept segregated from die Australian 
community and otiier American service personnel. This necessitated 
tiie imposition of zoning in urban areas, a practice which became 
most formaUsed in Queensland, hi July 1942, MacArtiiur transferted 
his command from Melboume to Brisbane ensuring Queensland's 
status as tiie administrative and organisational base for die entire 
Pacific offensive. Most US servicemen would henceforth be stationed 
in Queensland. It did not augur weU for Black Americans tiiat tiiey 
were predominantly located in the particular State where racial 
attitudes were highly repressive and intemal segregative procedures 
most formalised. 
Table 7: Numbers of Black US Military Personnel in Australia, April 1944.'"' 
District Officers Other Ranks Total 
100 102 
468 484 
998 1,028 
Total 48 1,566 1,614 
At die end of die nineteenth century Queensland had formulated 
segregative legislation which was subsequently the basis of policy 
elsewhere in Australia. Aborigines were confined legaUy to die 
reserves and missions which operated as closed institutions. During 
die 1930s the Queensland Labor govemment had tightened 
discriminatory procedures, thereby confirming that State's reputation as 
tiie most raciaUy exclusivist in tiie Commonwealth.*' 
In Queensland most Black Americans were initiaUy relegated to 
remote areas. By 1944 when they were stationed as base troops in 
highly concentrated urban areas, the second system of segregation was 
employed - the US autiiorities designated certain areas as a eitiier 
"white" or "coloured" in line with segregative practices at home. A 
police Criminal Investigation Branch report from Ipswich in 
September 1942 highlights the procedures and repercussions of this 
Darwin, NT 
TownsviUe & Caims 
(north Queensland) 
Brisbane (Queensland) 
2 
16 
30 
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second level - die system of locaUy defined residential segregation. 
Serious clashes had occurred between die 2,000 Black troops stationed 
at Redbank, an outer Ipswich suburb, and die 1,500 white servicemen 
located in the nearby airforce township of Amberley. The most 
serious fracas had empted in Oxley which was undefined territory. 
At die adjacent centre, Wacol, over 150 Blacks from a chemical unit 
resident there fought with white American troops when tiiey believed 
"dieir territory was invaded".*^ Ipswich's chief inspector suggested 
tiiat die whole Redbank and Goodna districts be strictiy out of bounds 
to aU white military persoimel in order to minimise these near riots. 
In Brisbane, Black servicemen were mostly confmed to the 
dilapidated south and east banks of the river where other non-whites, 
die "Maoris" (probably Pacific islanders), the Chinese and those few 
Aborigines not Uving under the reserve system resided. This area of 
Brisbane contained cheap boarding houses, brothels where some urban 
Aboriginal women worked as prostitutes, in bars and other drinking 
establishments. Street brawls empted when white servicemen, either 
AustraUans or Americans, who had the more salubrious and attractive 
northem and westem areas of the city, "trespassed" onto the other 
side of the river into South Brisbane and WooUoongabba. In 
December 1944, a Black serviceman, Lomzie M. was court martiaUed 
for "being armed with an offensive weapon". When a group of Black 
troops clustered around two white US sailors who were accompanied 
by three white Australian women, a brawl ensued when one of the 
sailors caUed the defendant "a bloody Negro bastard". M. and his 
compatriots retaliated, as "We ... wiU not stand for that". A fortnight 
previously there had been a serious fracas on the comer of Stanley 
and Grey Streets in South Brisbane between a group of AustraUan 
soldiers and Black GIs. US provosts were employed "to quieten the 
crowd" .''^  
E. Daniel Potts and Armette Potts comment that, because Black 
soldiers in service units did not have access to firearms, a situation 
which heightened their sense of intense vulnerability and insecurity, 
diey carried knives or weU-honed razors. As interracial brawls and 
altercations in Brisbane and surrounding districts mounted in intensity 
and increased in frequency by mid 1942, the US Army issued a 
prohibition on guns and knives in city areas. This measure proved 
totally unenforceable and fights resulting in serious injury continued 
unabated.** 
In Queensland Black Americans were subject to highly formalised 
residential, occupational and recreational segregation both within tiie 
US armed services as well as those constmcted by tiieir host 
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community. Confined to die dilapidated areas of AusU-alian towns, 
accorded inferior leisure facilities as weU as being subject to daily 
verbal abuse and humiliations, these servicemen resented die 
discrepancies between tiie rhetoric and die reality of what die AUies 
were fighting to ensure. As one anonymous cortespondent to die 
North Queensland Guardian wrote on 29 January 1943: 
Why must we be relegated to a section of die city (TownsviUe) 
tiiat, even in peace time, respectable citizens don't care to 
frequent? Is it to be constmed tiiat tiie Negro is of such a base 
and degraded character tiiat he is at home and pleased with die 
evils and vile part of civiUzation? 
He furtiier complained that Black troops were rarely invited into 
AustraUans' homes. Mrs Eileen Qumn, die president of die 
TownsviUe Women's Progressive Club, a member of die United 
Associations of Women and close friend of Jean Devanny, the 
prominent communist writer, recalled that she and her husband, unlike 
most TownsviUe residents, frequentiy entertained Black servicemen in 
tiieir home with meals and conversation. Remembering them as 
"tiiorough gentlemen", Mrs Quinn related tiiat tiiey "complained 
bitterly and resented aU that dreadful discrimination".*' Oral testimony 
gathered by E. Daniel Potts and Armette Potts suggests that some 
Black GIs and nurses feU they were less discriminated against in 
Australia than in their homeland. This was a matter of degree, for 
none felt they were equally treated as white Americans in Australia.*' 
Though in some small towns conflict arose between the local 
residents and Black GIs impatient with the limited and boring 
recreation available, diverse pattems were available m die larger 
centres. Australian servicemen did not maintain the rigid lines of 
segregation their American counterparts observed. Fratemisation was 
common. A cmcial report from an Australian Provost Corps sergeant 
in Brisbane dated 16 April 1942 commented adversely on the easy 
relationship between Australian enlisted men and Black servicemen 
who "are getting on a higher plan than is good for the city's safety". 
On the basis of this report, all commanders of units based in 
Queensland sent directives to discourage this fratemisation as "[it] is 
not permitted or tiiought of on the part of American white troops and 
it is undesirable that it should continue on the part of AustraUan 
troops".*' This was taken further. At a conference of the State 
directors of security held on 26 May 1942, the director general 
commented that: 
Management of Segregation 71 
The only \yay to deal widi tiiem [Blacks], according to die 
Americans, is to keep tiiem in their proper place. I think you 
should give consideration to makmg it an offence for any 
Australian member of the Forces to procure for or supply to any 
coloured member of the American forces any liquor. The 
Americans don't want it and they have put die hotels out of 
bounds to the Negroes.*^ 
At the more formal level, interracial tensions in Australia were 
exacerbated by intemal US military procedures. Under national 
security (aUied forces) regulations, mle 302 of 1941: 
Any member of the U.S. forces arrested or detained by police on 
a charge committed against the law of the Commonwealth wiU be 
handed over to the appropriate naval or military court constituted 
in accordance with the law of the U.S.A. 
This poUcy had several important ramifications. First, it placed the 
local police force in an ambiguous position in the event of brawls 
between AUied servicemen. On Anzac Day 1942, a secular but 
sacred day in the Australian calendar of symbolic celebrations, a riot 
occurred in Mt Isa when the police attempted to question a group of 
Black servicemen about a minor robbery. It was aUeged that some 
tiiirty Black US troops were standing outside the Star Theatre "using 
obscene language" whilst the Anzac memorial service was being 
conducted. When approached by the police, a serious argument 
ensued. Constable Stemberg fired his pistol into the air. This 
prompted Australian civilians and some members of the Second AIF 
who were temporarily stationed there to join the fracas. A riot 
ensued with the constable being seriously injured. Some servicemen 
were stabbed. The foUowing day the US Army moved the Black 
troops even further west to the inhospitable tovm of Camooweal.*' In 
diis particular instance, the slender resources of the police force 
without even a motor van or car was insufficient to cope with a 
serious riot. 
Charles Comer, then a young constable stationed in Mt Isa, 
recaUed over forty years later ui his memoirs that: 
... An American Negro began a disturbance [outside the 'Star']... I 
drew my Webley Revolver and holding it by die bartel, I clubbed 
the negro around the head, and when he ran away I levelled the 
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gun at him and fired. I cannot say I hit or missed hun, but I 
cannot recaU seeing tiiat negro again altiiough aU negroes seem 
alike in the darkness. 
Comer was most indignant that, having located die offenders of die 
initial altercation, which undoubtedly escalated because of his 
summary resort to coercion, "die officer in charge of Mount Isa Police 
Station said tiiat tiie Americans were our aUies and to drop the 
investigation".'" 
Certainly it would seem tiiat rather tiian reevaluatmg the logic and 
efficacy of discrimination and segregation, the US autiiorities chose to 
intensify tiiese processes. As tiie US deputy director of security in 
TownsviUe reported in late 1942: 
Having been present at die police station during the period of 
these two disturbances (at Ingham), 1 was able to observe die 
hostile attitude which is being adopted by the American Negroes 
towards the white people. They appear to becommg [sic] 
particularly self-confident and insubordinate which may ultimately 
cause them to become a serious problem." 
Clearly from this analysis, any racial disharmony was the result of 
Blacks not moving and keeping in "their place". Bamett argues dial 
"Southemers in the U.S. Army in Australia were a major 
consideration" in framing both policy directives and establishing 
segregated facilities for Black troops.'^ In this regard, practices 
occurring in Queensland mirrored those prevalent in tiie US. 
Contemporary observers like Florence Murray in her exhaustive survey 
of violence directed against Black servicemen and women in the USA 
showed that many of the most serious incidences occurted in the 
southem States where segregation was most pronounced.'^ Historian 
Harvard Sitkoff further comments that: 
Racial friction, sporadic conflict, and finaUy outright rioting 
became commonplace at nearly every army base in the South, 
many in the North, and even a few in Australia, England, and the 
South Pacific.'* 
This reaction was occurring with increasing frequency in the USA as 
well. Sitkoff, tracing die implications of these processes, contends 
tiiat: 
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The tensions and violence within the miUtary mirrored the 
mushroommg conflict on the homefront... Many whites intensified 
tiieir efforts to keep the Negro "in his place", regardless of the 
changes wrought by the war." 
Solutions, whether in the USA or in Queensland, were to maintain the 
status quo, by reinforcing segregative institutions and practices. 
Another factor which led to an increasingly volatile atmosphere 
was the use of the US miUtary poUce. Australian traditions and 
conventions ensured that the provosts were discreetly and minimaUy 
employed but this approach was scorned by their American ally. In 
November 1942 a serious brawl empted m Stardey Street, South 
Brisbane in which Black American troops threatened other servicemen 
with knives. In the ensuing fight, the local civilian police acted with 
such restraint and adroitness that two policemen were recommended 
for the King's medal for bravery. As the police commissioner later 
confirmed, however, US "service police broke up the fight with 
batons".'* Sitkoff argues tiiat: 
The most chafing practice of the army, however, was its refusal to 
protect Negro servicemen off the post and its use of white military 
poUce to control blacks." 
E. Daniel Potts and Annette Potts confirm this practice operating in 
Australia, arguing that "Negroes received harsher treatment at the 
hands of MPs"." 
It is evident from an examination of die many cases forwarded to 
die Queensland poUce department by die US Provost-MarshaU's 
department that the US military police used an excessive degree of 
violence even during a muior scuffle, let alone a brawl or a riot. 
Jessie Street, in her memoirs of this period in Sydney, wrote that: 
Anotiier very disturbing affair was that some of our members 
(United Associations of Women) who lived near the Showground 
(in 1942), where the camp for Negro troops was situated, reported 
hearing periodic rifle shots m the Negro camps. 
Lady Street and Mrs Ema Keighley, the president of the United 
Associations of Women, requested an interview with tiie camp 
commandant over tiiis issue. Street continued: 
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As soon as he spoke we knew he came from die deep soudi 
where die Ku Klux Klan operates. We told him of die reports we 
heard about shootings in die Showground and that die people 
reporting it feared tiiat tiie Negro soldiers were being shot. He 
did not deny it but said tiiis disciplinary action was necessary to 
prevent tiie Negroes becoming uppish - or uppity - I tiiink was tiie 
term he used." 
The novelist, Ruth Park, tiien a young housebound motiier living in 
Surry HiUs, recalled two separate incidents where Black GIs were shot 
in cold blood by MPs.*° 
Various official sources confirm these aUegations diough they do 
not provide substantive details. The - Queensland State PubUcity 
Centre, obeying instmctions from the federal department of 
Information, on 9 November 1943 ordered tiiat "no broadcast of 
shooting of negro soldiers in Sydney by U.S. provost" be issued. 
Furthermore, it was deemed tiiat reference to racial problems in 
SWPA, riot stories, deaths of Japanese POWs, or any reference to 
"Negro, Black, Coloured" soldiers were officially banned.*' Despite 
extensive research conducted both in AustraUa and the US no more 
information could be obtained about this particular shooting in 
Sydney. Interviews, conducted with either prominent or politically 
active citizens in various areas of Queensland reveal that diey 
believed tiiat US military poUce or shore patrols had, on various 
occasions, shot Black servicemen. Charles Comer recaUed an incident 
in Mt Isa in 1942 where a "coloured soldier" was publicly shot in 
broad daylight by a white MP over some minor infraction of 
discipline.*^ In addition, there is evidence that private citizens also 
shot them. General Hurley remarked that in mid June 1942, in 
TownsviUe, "a Negro's leg was amputated. The records list him as 
having accidentally discharged his gun". But Hurley beUeved that he 
was "shot by a white man who caught him in bed with his wife".**' 
This type of incident highlights one of the key obsessions which 
sustained the continued existence of segregation - white women could 
ordy be partoers of white men. Whilst Black Americans might be 
portrayed as asexual infantile "wild-eyed Al Jolson-like Rastus" in 
service joumals like The Aussies and the Yanks^'' the usual stereotype 
depicted them as hypersexual. As one correspondent in the US War 
department's general staff files in 1943 stated that "You ought to see 
a big buck with his ribbons. You can imagine what a big shot he is 
with the women - their (sic) weak point".*' Various inteUigence 
reports sent back to Washington commented that one of tiie central 
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issues causing dispute between the AUies in AustraUa was the 
question of "white women and colored troops".** As one Office of 
Strategic Services report of June 1942 commented: 
Few Australians wiU acknowledge that their racial problem in the 
presence of our coloured troops in Australia. However, in many 
cases, white girls have associated intunately witii coloured troops, 
and, of course, the effect is very bad.*' 
As Marjorie Halsey pointed out in her book, Colour Blind - A White 
Woman Looks at the Negro published in Sydney in 1947, perceptions 
of Black Americans were constmcted from enduring stereotypes in the 
mass media: 
Spirituals, Big Feet, IrresponsibiUty, Deplorable (in die Anglo-
Saxon view) taste in clothes. Uncle Tom, Aunt Jemima, Rochester, 
Pullman Porters, Inexhaustible Sexuality, coal black Babies and 
Rape.** 
Relegated to segregated locations in the major centres. Blacks 
were also confined to inferior and separate recreational facilities 
where, it was hoped few white women, especiaUy "decent** women 
would enter. InitiaUy in Sydney in 1942 when there were few Black 
troops, aU American servicemen went to the Trocadero dance haU. 
After it was wrecked during an intertacial brawl, the US Provosts 
prevented Blacks from attending dances there. The Booker T. 
Washington club for Blacks was estabUshed in the mndovra area of 
Surry HiUs.*' Dances were held regularly, attended by 200 Black 
troops and women "approved by the police". These functions were 
monitored by the US shore patiol and military police. As US Major 
R. B. RandaU commented in a report to Australian military liaison: 
American coloured soldiers are barred by regulations from the 
greater part of the city, and some location must be reserved for 
them while on leave... If not pestered by street women, whom the 
police authorities have no power to control, even isolated trouble 
would largely cease.'" 
Both military and civilian authorities were caught in a dilemma 
about who would constitute suitable escorts for Black troops. A 
number of possibUities presented themselves. First, clubs for Black 
servicemen would be attended by any Australian women as occurred 
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in die other clubs. In a deputation to tiie police commissioner from 
tiie residents of Darra (an outer working class Brisbane suburb) in 
August 1944, tiiey complained that "die Negroes wanted women 
irrespective of whetiier tiiey were 20 or 60 years of age". The police 
report stated that: 
With few exceptions, tiie Darra residents have encouraged die 
Negroes. This can be proved by die fact that white women and 
giris have attended die dances held by die Negroes at Darta and 
also dances tiiat few males apart from Negroes have attended." 
At the Dr Carver club in South Brisbane, an organisation established 
and maintained by the Red Cross, white women who went to the 
dances were later interrogated by police from the vice squad. The 
canteen staff were likewise subjected to "mdecent questioning".'^ The 
hostility, jealousy, and suspicion with which Australian men received 
any social interaction between American servicemen and Australian 
women was magnified when die American was Black. Dominant 
fantasies of Black virility and insatiable desire to conquer white 
women stood in the way of any reasoned assessment of the actual 
situation. 
Communities were divided over the issue of whether to permit 
Blacks to attend dances which were usually officially portrayed as 
patriotic occasions. In reality, dances were more frequently excuses 
for intense competition between Americans and Australians for the 
attention of Australian women. The ChinchiUa shire council wrote to 
the American Legation in Brisbane in November 1942: 
Unfortunately, some local body has permitted admission to 
dances... and has in other directions lionized the Negro to a degree 
that is not conducive to the future peace of anyone and is 
certainly not in the best interests of the public of die Shire as a 
whole nor of the men... Some view them as our AUies, in die vast 
stmggle for freedom in which we are now engaged. The objective 
should be to find a way out that wiU not create a dismption to the 
happy relationship that has hitherto existed in the Shire.'^ 
The police report alleged that thirty six Blacks in the district were 
"given oppormnity to be too familiar witii local giris and women", 
diough ludicrously the only evidence presented was that Black soldiers 
had given women loUies.'* When Blacks were admitted to dances, 
conflict could empt when Australian women refused to dance with 
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tiiem. In Miles, Queensland in April 1943 a brawl ensued when tiiis 
occurred and Australian servicemen jeeringly told tiiese American 
troops "You're not wanted here"." 
Moves were usually made to ban Blacks from attending regularly 
scheduled dances. At the US Army club in Caims, which harmed 
Blacks and sailors, the local director defended this policy because: 
.;. victorettes [women hostesses] (sic) are not used to dancing with 
Negroes, and at the last two dances, where through a 
misunderstanding, they were admitted, the girls have objected. I 
think we are laying ourselves open to the possibility of very 
unpleasant incidences with other servicemen who are not used to 
seeing coloured men on the dance floor.'* 
Some areas such as Bowen coped with this unprecedented quandary 
by simply harming aU Americans from local dances. In Ingham in 
late 1942 disturbances broke out when Blacks were banned from 
attending dances, even though Ingham was designated an exclusively 
"coloured leave centre". When one irate serviceman declared: "Why 
shouldn't we go to dances witii white people? We are as good, if not 
better, than the white race", an affray foUowed in which two Blacks 
drew their guns, and the provosts used their customary degree of 
violence." 
The second solution, which strove to emulate US policy of 
segregated recreational faciUties, after the supposed failures of 
experiments like those at Miles and ChinchiUa, was to artange 
separate clubs which Aboriginal women could attend. James Curtie, 
an Aborigine, organised a club at die Protestant AUiance Friendly 
Society hall in Red Hill, a working class iimer city Brisbane suburb. 
It was pattonised by Black Americans, Aborigines and a small number 
of white women. Australian men were banned by order of the United 
States military authorities. Biweekly dances were strictly supervised 
inside and guarded outside by the shore patrol and the US military 
poUce as well as by the local civUian police." In May 1943 the 
Doctor Carver club which included a barber shop, pool room, 
cafeteria, bar and dance haU, was opened at 100 Grey Street, Soutii 
Brisbane. The American Red Cross witii extensiive community 
support hoped that this recreational centre would attract Black 
servicemen away from die brothels and pubs of die district. At its 
peak in mid 1944 tiiese respectable facilities serviced up to 5,000 
troops per day." 
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Some apprehension was expressed by the director of Native 
Affairs. He was concemed tiiat this club was predominantiy staffed 
by Aboriginal women from nortii Queensland.*" Presumably, diese 
women, and tiiose involved in cases of stabbing and brawls in die 
brotiiels of Soutii Brisbane, were no longer considered to be under the 
jurisdiction of tiie director of Native Affairs; for the records indicate 
that matter lay witii tiie civUian police. Since racial ideology decreed 
tiiat white women were unsuitable escorts and sexual partners for 
Black men, (though social practice did not mirtor tiiese prescriptions) 
tiie Queensland autiiorities were tiius forced to permit some Aboriginal 
women to be free of some of die more repressive constraints of the 
Aboriginal Preservation and Protection Act of 1939. This occuned 
only under special circumstances. Brisbane, where large numbers of 
Black servicemen were concentrated, provided such a simation. 
In country areas, die local Aboriginal protectors, usually die 
police, did not allow this liberaUsation. One case in Mareeba, on die 
Atherton Tableland, in 1942, suggests the solutions adopted in less 
cosmopoUtan areas of Queensland. George M., a drover who had 
been away from home working for several months, retumed to find 
his young adolescent daughters, Laura and Trixie, had been 
conducting sexual liaisons with American soldiers. Laura was 
pregnant. George M. beat his daughters, berated his wife for her lack 
of supervision and caUed in die local Aboriginal protector. Sergeant 
Miers who admonished the girls and told them to obey their fatiier. 
The commissioner of police in Brisbane recommended that die 
inspector in Caims, the nearest large town, request that die US 
authorities ban their troops from any sexual contact with Aboriginal 
women. Under section 29 (1) (a) of the Aboriginal Preservation and 
Protection Act all sexual liaisons between white men and Aboriginal 
women were prohibited. In August 1943 the US authorities in Caims 
agreed to cooperate on this issue.*' 
Public alarm over sexuality, particularly in the area of intertacial 
liaisons, was clearly expressed in the "Report on Civilian Morale" in 
north Queensland of Febmary 1943 conducted by Professor R.D. 
Wright and Dr Ian Hogbin. They investigated a wide range of 
domestic issues but one key area concemed "the soldier in die city". 
After discussing another area of public alarm, venereal disease, die 
team stated that: 
It is commonly believed in the southem states that tiiere are 
licensed brotiiels m Queensland. This is not so, tiiough tiie poUce 
insist tiiat girls, living in certain houses, who are known to be 
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prostimtes, shaU have regular examinations. In Brisbane, there are 
some twenty of these houses, and in TownsviUe, two or three. 
The American forces have set up several such places, with 
Australian girls, for the use of Negro troops, much to tiie disgust 
of many civilians.'^ 
General Patrick Hurley reported in the previous year that in 
TownsviUe "white and negroes Ime up together in whore houses 
where negroes are accepted". A careful scmtiny of the police 
department records reveals however, that most prostitutes who catered 
for Black Americans in Brisbane were Aborigines rather tiian Anglo-
Australian. Herbert Lazzarini, the federal minister for Home Security 
expressed the widespread sentiment tiiat: 
Brothels for Black Americans... seem to me to be something so 
outrageous to Australian psychology that it is likely to become the 
gravest possible menace to the Australian war effort... the mere 
suggestion that the Americans are allowed to use Australian girls 
to satisfy the lusts of American negroes seems to me to be 
incomprehensible.*^ 
On the other hand, this procedure "protected" respectable white 
women from unwanted glances. One issue that did not elicit any 
pubUc reaction was the high mcidence of homosexuality among Black 
American troops stationed in Australia.** Certairdy any open 
discussion on the subject of homosexuality was sociaUy unacceptable. 
Yet, in the light of the obsessive preoccupation with Blacks 
supposedly contaminating white women, homosexuality could surely 
have been regarded as a means by which decent Australian women 
could remain inviolate. 
Having been forced to accept the presence of Blacks among the 
American forces, the Australian authorities sought to increase 
segregative procedures m order to isolate and contain tiiese 
unwelcome troops. These service personnel were thus confined within 
perimeters designated by two interlocking systems of segregation. 
Relegated intemaUy by the US armed forces into menial capacities, 
tiiey were furtiier contained geographicaUy and sociaUy by AustraUan 
procedures. These involved a complex flexible mteraction between 
different agencies. In the delegation of powers, the civil authorities, 
especiaUy poUce, resented tiie intmsion of the Commonwealth, but 
most particularly, the American military forces. As Inspector Comer 
complained in his memoirs "the AustraUan Govemment and its 
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subsidiaries got on tiieir belUes and groveUed to die Americans., 
The Austt-aUan and US Armies basicaUy decided die function and 
location of troops, especiaUy tiiose engaged in arduous road 
constmction. The State govemment, committed to the doctt-ine of 
racial purity and the maintenance of a reserve system, moriitored die 
informal segregation process involvmg Black GIs. The civil police 
kept tiieir leisure activities in particular under surveiUance that was 
hardly discreet or judicious and ensured that the residential zoning 
program was enforced. 
As Otwin Marenin demonstrates "the police have been wiUing and 
active players in the state's orchestra";** not only reinforcing dominant 
consensual values (in the case of Queensland in the 1940s, racial 
exclusiveness) but, by attaching tiie status of crime to particular 
actions, "thereby [they] confer tiie political action of poUcing into die 
technical application of the law".*' Given the irtational nature of 
community attitudes to Blacks, overlaid as they were with images of 
rampant uncontroUable sexuality, criminal violence and disorder, 
isolation and containment of those in the ambiguous dual role of both 
AUied saviours and dark destroyers was deemed essential. 
Interlocking systems of segregation, in the workplace, in residential 
location and in recreation, ensured that Black American servicemen, 
were confined by die joint forces of American and Queensland racism. 
A complex series of procedures involvmg federal govemment 
negotiations with the US Army; cooperation between the federal and 
Queensland governments; coUaboration between AustraUan civil and 
military police and die US shore patrol and provosts ensured die 
maintenance of a rigid form of discrimmation. At a time of peril 
when human and material resources were strained to their limits, 
dominant racial ideologies demanded an elaborate and ultimately 
wasteful system. 
IV 
The Policing of Morals: 
State Intervention into Public Health 1937-45 
with Helen Taylor 
From 1942 to 1945 Australia was subject to a severe and prolonged 
moral panic. It began in July 1942 when public apprehension about 
die pervasiveness of venereal disease was aroused. SexuaUy 
transmitted diseases, it was argued, potentiaUy jeopardised die health 
and performance of Australian and AUied servicemen and undermined 
die moral fibre of the Australian people. Pronouncements from 
politicians, press and preachers precipitated the constmction of a 
moral alarm that assumed aU the fervour of an evangelical and 
cadiartic enterprise. 
In its wake, a complex series of processes, relying upon the co-
operation of the State poUce and public health officials, the Australian 
and United States military authorities stationed in Brisbane and 
TownsviUe, were set in train to contain what was essentiaUy a 
medical problem. Queensland was to witness the most intmsive and 
extensive state intervention into the contested area of public health. 
State and Commonwealtii, civil and military co-operated to an 
extraordinary degree ostensibly in order to ensure a highly efficient 
healdiy fighting force which was to be launched from Queensland to 
die Pacific war zones. Yet, it was never the mere presence of the 
troops or the State's strategic location that was paramount: rather, the 
moral and administrative coUusion of Ned Hardon, secretary for 
Healdi and Home Affairs and Raphael Cilento, the director general of 
Healdi and Medical Services ensured that, not ordy would the debate 
publicly express itself in moral terms but the functions of the police 
would enlarge and the institutionalisation of those deemed deviant 
would continue. 
Three distinct but interrelated phases can be discemed. In each 
stage, a particular group of women who had supposedly transgressed 
and contaminated the conventional moral order became the focus of 
die cmsade. Furthermore, die moral arbiters, having identified their 
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particular target, pronounced judgement and demanded 'appropriate' 
chastisement. To accompUsh tiiis, tiie fuU weight of tiie state's 
apparatus was mobUised in order to stigmatise, to affix blame and to 
accord a punishment which was to vary according to a woman's class 
and social status. These dual processes of apprehension and 
mobUisation, occurring at tiie ideological and bureaucratic levels in 
both civiUan and military spheres, were rendered more visible and, 
indeed magnified, by die upheaval and dismption m a society 
undergoing the unfamiliar experience of total war. Thus, die 
fabrication of tiiis panic aUows scmtiny of those complex ideological, 
stmctural and bureaucratic processes which extended peace-time 
measures in the area of public health. The constmction of moral 
alarm, and more significantiy, the wider stmctural consequences of its 
resolution, reveal the irmer logic of administrative processes at a time 
of prolonged emergency, challenge, and subsequent reorganisation. 
Under the guise of patriotism, Queensland public officials and 
politicians were able to implement poUcies which ensured the contiol 
of women's sexuality by the intmsion of rigorous policing measures. 
The provisions of the Public Health Act of 1937, which aUowed for 
the continuance of a "lock hospital" for women suffering from 
sexuaUy transmitted diseases, were extended by the use of die 
Commonwealth national security (venereal diseases and contraceptives) 
regulation of September 1942. 
In the fragile moment of consensus engendered in early 1942, die 
general national security regulations were expanded m order to cope 
witii tills 'emergency' of total war. When tiie sense of national 
danger was most acute in those initial montiis of 1942, tiie Australian 
people revealed a virtuaUy unanimous and unequivocal wiUingness to 
accept tills unprecedented regimentation, restriction and restiaint. As 
the extent and comprehensiveness of die various state apparatus were 
mcreased to meet the exigencies of 'total war', so too, were die 
processes involved rendered more visible. Nowhere were these more 
readily discemible tiian the marmer in which the problem of sexually 
transmitted disease was consttxicted, contamed and managed. State 
intervention was regarded as botii desirable and necessary in areas 
which previously had been defined as private for most citizens. 
The war-time emergency aUowed for an extension of surveiUance 
and apprehension procedures tiiat exceeded those of peace-time which 
sought to identify only one group in the community, tiiose deemed by 
tiie poUce as "common prostimtes". State and Commonweallb 
measures increased the defiiution of the deviant who could be 
incarcerated. Patriarchal ideology determined tiiat tiiis new group 
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were again women. The issue was moreover constmcted largely in 
terais of a moral crisis rather than a medical question, tiiereby 
legitimating the widespread use of state intervention into tiie private 
sphere. 
The parameters of the campaign were initiaUy set at a conference 
on "tiie pubUc healtii aspect of venereal disease in Queensland" held 
on 30 July 1942 in Brisbane. Haition stated that: 
There is a rise in tiie figures showing [venereal disease] in our 
State...Everybody reaUses that V.D. infection is just as much a 
casualty in the Army as someone who may be injured by enemy 
action and possibly causes a greater worry and drain upon medical 
services than wounded cases would. 
In complete agreement, Cilento added that "[i]t looks as tiiough it 
[venereal disease] is a major tiireat not only to the efficiency of our 
fighting forces but a very grave social danger as weU".' 
The means to confront this supposed crisis were, in Hanlon's 
view, readily at hand. He reminded the delegates, who represented 
die medical corps of aU branches of the AustraUan and AlUed armed 
services, die State and Commonwealth departments of Health and 
conservative women's orgarusations like the National Council of 
Women, tiiat Queensland "already had regulations [under the Public 
Health Act of 1937] to exercise strict control" over sexuaUy 
transmitted diseases. It was ortiy a matter of "exercis[ing] strongly" 
diese powers in order to curb further its dissemination and proscribe 
the activities of those attributed as its purveyors. 
In the Australian colonies tiiere was a highly developed tradition 
of restiicting tiie civU liberties of tiiose deemed deviant. In die 
nineteentii century, Queensland and Tasmania introduced highly 
punitive, contagious diseases acts in 1868 and 1879 respectively which 
provided for the incarceration of prostitutes suffering from venereal 
infection. Unlike the British act, colonial legislation did not solely 
apply to prostitutes in garrison towns but to those in the general 
community. Queensland's Health Act Amendment Act of 1911 
replaced die contagious diseases' legislation, but at die same time it 
maintained its most saUent punitive feature - the "lock hospital" 
system. This was an enclosed hospital modeUed upon prison 
regulations and conditions in which prostitutes suffering from sexuaUy 
transmitted diseases were compulsorUy detained. This new act also 
provided for the compulsory notification of aU cases of syphilis and 
gonorthoea, anonymity of treattnent, and free medication in any 
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general (i.e. state fimded) hospital or dispensary. Only tiiose women 
categorised by die police as "common prostittites" were not accorded 
tiiis anonymity. Women so labeUed continued to be mcarcerated in 
tiie "lock hospital" which was transferted in 1913 out of tiie grounds 
of tiie Brisbane General Hospital to tiie main prison complex on Paik 
Road, Dutton Park.^  The location and spatial an^gement of the 
Female Venereal Disease Isolation Hospital, as it was officially caUed, 
behind tiie centt-al dormitory for male prisoners, starkly symboUsed its 
punitive and segregative character. By tiie 1940s Queeiisland alone in 
die Conunonwealtii maintained tiiis type of institution. As die 
Queensland director general of Healtii and Medical Services wrote in 
his annual report in Jime 1943: 
Queensland prides itself on having taken for many years a more 
r«aUstic view of die venereal control problem tiian other Australian 
States. It alone in the Commonwealth possessed a lock hospital in 
active operation prior to tiie war and made an effort to check on 
people reputed to be prostittites... Consequentiy, at tiie outbreak of 
tiie war with Japan and tiie consequent heavy flow of ttoops, it 
was able to meet tiie sittiation much more expeditiously and 
effectively tiian would otherwise have been tiie case.' 
The period after the outbreak of the war in the Pacific was to 
witness in Queensland an expansion of procedures whereby other 
groups of women, who were not designated "common prostitutes", 
were incarcerated in tiie Female Venereal Disease Isolation Hospital. 
This process occurted directly as a result of two factors: first, the 
creation of an atmosphere of moral alarm and morbid preoccupation 
with the supposed pervasiveness of venereal infections. Secondly, on 
a more general level, in response to die increase in the intensity and 
new focus of targets of poUcing procedures. This apprehension 
demanded the identification, humiUation and public punishment of 
women who transgressed conventional sexual mores. Later sections of 
the argument wiU demonstrate how this procedure was dependent 
upon class perceptions, for only working class women were treated in 
the traditional manner. The question of police discretion in deciding 
what were the key areas in which to divert scarce resources was 
paramount. Certairdy too tiie use of the national security regulations 
in 1942 to achieve these ends was a salient feature of the extended 
functions of the state apparatus. Again, this complex issue 
demonstrates the marmer in which the State govemment could 
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increase its powers by implementing Commonwealtii policy and 
directives. 
In die Australian context, as chapter one reveals, this was an 
uneven process because of the constitutional problems involved in the 
delegation of powers between Conunonwealth and the States; between 
civil and military jurisdiction and between Australian and US 
jurisdiction. The area of public health in Queensland demonstrates 
how an unusuaUy high degree of unanimity of purpose and action 
could be accomplished when addressmg a specific issue. This process 
was achieved at the expense of women's autonomy especially in the 
area of sexuality. The marmer in which this was achieved was 
complex and uneven, relymg upon ideological premises, negotiations 
between various agent of tiie state at both the State and 
Commonwealth level and the increase of police functions. 
Gordon L. Clark and Michael Dean, following Therbom's analysis, 
conclude tiiat there exists a "revolutionary dynamic of the apparatus as 
it confronts a changing social reality". This emerges from the 
variance that persists between state power and the state apparatus as 
diey express the class relations of that society.* Modem war-time 
witnesses the expansion of both state power (in order to engage in 
prolonged mass combat and to mobilise the human and national 
resources) and state apparatus ui order to achieve these ends 
administratively. 
With die mobiUsation of moral arbiters - the first step in the 
process - the public constmction of moral alarm was initiated. 
InitiaUy, censure was directed towards a relatively amorphous group 
of women who were sexuaUy active outside the proscribed bounds of 
lawful marriage. Only in the foUowing two stages of the alarm in 
1943 and 1944 were specific sub-groups identified, targeted and 
chastised. In early July 1942 the Manpower Board, the central federal 
body which organised, directed and deployed the civilian labour force, 
requested the National Council of Women in Queensland to arrange 
suitable lectures on "sex hygiene" for women and girls. Several days 
after die request was made, a committee was established under the 
guidance of two prominent Queensland medical specialists. Lady 
Cilento and Dr Joyce Stobbo.' Other groups in Queensland such as 
the Mothercraft Association, the YWCA and the Catholic Youth 
Association not only echoed but fuelled anxiety about "this grave 
social and moral problem".* 
The initial constmction of moral alarm coincided with the release 
of die annual parliamentary statistics in July 1942. Though tiiey did 
not indicate a vast increase in venereal infections, they were however 
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widely debated. Ema Keighley, die Australian president of one of the 
more progressive women's organisations, tiie United Associations of 
Women, reminded Prime Minister Curtm on 31 July 1942, tiiat given 
tiie recent mcreasing reference to venereal diseases and the openly 
debated suggestion in tiie press tiiat tiie federal govemment mtended 
introducing "suitable legislation to deal witii tills matter", tiien sound 
and fair policies were necessary. She contmued tiiat, whilst it might 
prove advantageous to inttoduce legislation that had federal 
appUcabiUty and which did not sunply rely upon differing, conflicting, 
and piecemeal State regulations, tiiis should not be the means by 
which there was "a setting aside of any woman or women as a 
vehicle for die so-caUed sex appetites of men". Keighley furdier 
stated that: 
Venereal disease is not confmed to die Army or to the girls who 
may infect them. It is a very widespread disease among the 
whole community and is responsible for much iUness and 
morbidity.' 
Her observations should have highlighted the need for a thorough-
going medical solution to a communal problem rather than one which 
was primarily moral in nature and partial in terms of gender and 
class. The implications were increasingly overlooked as societal 
apprehension expanded throughout July and August 1942. 
The concem of the state and the nature and direction of its 
mtervention were obvious from the outset. John Dedman, writing on 
behalf to the prime minister on 19 August 1942 to tiie premier of 
New South Wales, stated tiiat tiie Commonwealtii govemment was 
"dismrbed by reports in respect of tiie incidence of venereal disease". 
He noted tiiat this "is not yet alarmmg"; but two factors, he 
suggested, required furdier scmtiny and continued monitoring. First, it 
was apparent that "normal social and moral standards are being 
seriously affected by war conditions". Secondly, most State 
legislation, "where it exists, lacks die power to detain and examine 
persons suspected of bemg the source of uifection". Both unfortunate 
deficiencies would require immediate attention and subsequent 
remedial measures. 
The annual Queensland figures do suggest tiiat normal peace time 
pattems were being changed by die exigencies of a society engaged in 
total war. But whetiier a declme m moral standards could be gauged 
from such sets of figures was open to question. What is most 
apparent in these tables is die decrease in the male rate from 1941 to 
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Table 10: Incidence of Notified Cases of Venereal Disease Among Australian Civilian and 
Military Population in Queensland, 1940-46 
1940-41 1941-42 1942-43 1943-44* 1944-45 1945-46 
Male 
Female 
Total 
967 
367 
1334 
782 
395 
1177 
1918 
1178 
3096 
Not Stated 
Not Stated 
2780 
1775 
566 
2341 
2507 
408 
2915 
• Only the incidence of gonorrhoea and syphilis was recorded, not the male-female ratio. 
Sources: Queensland Parliamentary Reports, 1940-46; Memoranda of the Incidence of VD in the 
AMF submitted by Director General of Australia Army Medical Service, 1944. 
Table 11: Incidence of Male and Female Civilian and Australian Military Notified Cases of 
Venereal Disease in Queensland, 1940-46: Percentages 
1940-41 194M2 1942^3 1943-44* 194445 1945-46 
Male 
Female 
72.5% 
27.5% 
66.5% 
33.5% 
62% 
38% 
Not Stated 
Not Stated 
76% 
24% 
* Only the incidence of gonorrhoea and syphilis was recorded not its male-female ratio. 
Table 12: Incidence of Notified Cases of SyphiUs and Gonorrhoea in Queensland, 1942-43 
Male Female Total 
CiviUan 412 1148 1560 
Civilian and Australian 
Military 1918 1178 3096 
Civilian and Total Military 
(includes American 
Armed Forces) 3115 1178 4293 
Table 13: Percentage of Male and Female Notified Cases of Venereal Disease in Queensland, 
1942-43 
Male Female 
Civilian 26 74 
Civilian and Australian 
Military 62 38 
Civilian and Total military 
(includes American 
Armed Forces) 73 27 
Sources: Queensland Parliamentary Papers, 1943-44; [Military] VD Survey in Queensland - 1943; 
US Surgeon Generals Reports: SWPA. 
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1945, most notably in the incidence of gonorrhoea and the wide 
variation in the niunber of female syphilis cases. At tiie official level 
die reasons for the changes ui the male rate were easy to detect - the 
vast majority of men of military age, who also constituted the age 
groups with the peak incidence of this type of mfection, were on 
active miUtary or naval service. They were therefore not included in 
die armual civilian figures. A carefiil examination of tiie unrefmed 
figures referring to the incidence of syphilis reveals that the total 
combined number of tertiary cases (i.e. near terminal), decreased from 
eighty in 1940-41 to fifty one in 1941-42. Nevertheless concem was 
expressed by the director general that there was a notable increase in 
"early syphiUs from 90 to 102 cases" in that year. Cilento's assertion 
diat "The actual increase in the incidence of syphilis in a numericaUy 
depleted population is a significant and somewhat disquieting 
circumstance"' demonstrates an apparent and perplexing confusion of 
terminology. 
Scmtiny of the complete figures clearly reveals a decrease in the 
overaU number of cases of syphilis m die civiUan population. In 
particular, there was a marked decrease in the number of female cases 
(from 124 to 85 from tiie single years of 1940-41 and 1941-42) - a 
point which Cilento converuentiy overlooked. This alarm over the 
increasing number of new cases of primary syphiUs was thus 
misconstmed to give the ertoneous impression that this much feared 
and devastating disease was rapidly escalating. As a consequence, 
public attention was directed towards the change in the ratio of 
civUian male to female notified incidences of venereal disease rather 
dian an investigation of the accuracy of medical pronouncements by 
pursuing a thorough and exhaustive examination of categories within 
die annual statistics presented to parliament. Though, quite clearly, 
the overaU number of female cases did not rise substantiaUy, the ratio 
of male to female notifications had begun to alter discemibly. The 
obvious point that the civiUan male rate was not representative of the 
tme male rate, when service men's rates were excluded, was not a 
salient point in the constmction of alarm or the attribution of blame 
or retiibution. But in this initial stage, tiie response was a relatively 
undifferentiated and pervasive one. Clearly, censure was to be 
reserved for wonien who transgressed traditional moral precepts. In 
die later phases of the moral panic by which time extended poUcing 
procedures had been refmed, women were divided into particular 
categories in order to be identified, targeted and punished. 
At die outset of the alarm, moral arbiters reiterated tiaditional 
sexual values. As Captain W. Scott-Young, a medical practitioner. 
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informed members of tiie Women's Services m his lecture on "Sex 
Hygiene" delivered in 1942: 
Remember tiiat you are tiie motiiers of tiie next generation. You 
owe U to your chUdren to avoid tiiese risks and dangers... 
Remember, too, that moral standards are set by die women of tiie 
community, NOT the men.' 
This simple dictum concerning die foundations and proper 
custodianship of moraUty, especiaUy in the sexual sphere, recurted 
tiiroughout the public and official debate which accelerated as 1942 
progressed. 
Throughout August die federal govemment re-avowed its intention 
to pass regulations. These, it was argued, would not orUy assuage 
public alarm about venereal diseases - an alarm which had aU die 
force of uninformed prejudice, bigotry and punitive indignation as its 
foimdations - but tiiese regulations would also estabUsh bureaucratic 
procedures to remedy, or at least contain, the cause of this moral 
outrage. Concem was primarily moral rather than medical in nature. 
Some dimensions of the proposed sanctions against recalcitrants were 
being mooted in August 1942 when federal ministers canvassed die 
opinion of their State coUeagues. On 19 August 1942 Dedman sought 
the opinion of the premier of New South Wales concerning die 
wisdom of vesting unprecedented powers in each State's chief health 
officer.'" Hardon, fulsomely recommended to the prime minister fliat 
the Commonwealth incorporate the provisions the Queensland Public 
Health Act of 1937 (which aUowed for the incarceration of women 
with sexuaUy transmitted diseases)." One week later tiie Acting 
Premier, Frank Cooper informed Curtin that he was pleased to leam 
the federal national security regulations would incorporate many of 
Queensland's stamtes.'^ Nevertheless, "the question of tiie extent to 
which arbitrary powers over the liberty of citizens should be vested in 
different individuals" which had concemed the Commonwealtii's chief 
medical officer, Dr J.H.L. Cumpston when he had assisted in drafting 
tiie regulations, was resolved to his satisfaction. As he later confided 
to Prime Minister Curtin, it had been wise to vest authority to each 
State's chief medical officer ratiier tiian in tiie commissioner of 
police." The latter had been tiie practice m Queensland and also in 
Victoria under die Venereal Diseases Act of 1928 where police had 
autiiority to detain "persons under tt-eatment who continue tiieir 
irregular practices". 
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In September 1942, the national security regulations (venereal 
diseases and contraceptives) were proclaimed. They also harmed the 
advertising of contiaceptives. Since tiie 'mle creators' were to be 
concemed primarily with moral rather than medical solutions in the 
civUian population, the whole question of the use of contraceptives as 
prophylactics against sexuaUy transmitted diseases was overlooked. 
The new regulations empowered each State's chief healtii officer to 
compel any person whom he had "reasonable grounds" to suspect was 
suffering from a notifiable venereal infection to undergo a medical 
examination. If the suspect did not comply, the police would issue a 
wartant to enforce it. If foimd to be infected, the person could be 
detained in a stipulated hospital or "suitable place". No citizen 
wrongfuUy detained or examined could take action against the 
Commonwealth." What is clear is that although men suffering from a 
notifiable venereal disease could technicaUy be compulsorily confined, 
in practice this did not occur. Men continued to be treated as 
outpatients, except when they reached tiie tertiary stage of syphilis. 
Yet women could be detained and confined for the less serious 
disease, gonorthoea. 
During the minimal preceding period of debate, certain women's 
organisations expressed their misgivings about the intentions and 
consequences of the proposed regulations. Ada Bronham, of the 
Women's Christian Temperance Uiuon (WCTU) expressed her 
determined opposition to the proposals. These, she argued, would not 
only drive the problem imdergroimd and specificaUy pimish women 
but would tolerate state regulated prostitution which existed already in 
Queensland and Westem AustraUa. Pointing out the inequities 
inherent in such a system, Bronham continued: 
Although tiiere are many more infected men than women in every 
state - yet it is the women who are reported by men who have 
been their partners in nusconduct - the women who are artested 
on suspicion by the police and compulsorily examined, the women, 
if found to be suffering from the disease who are detained in 
prison hospitals, cleaned up and sent out again for the use of 
debauched men. 
Finally, Bronham asked: "Is tiiere a lock hospital for men"?'' The 
WCTU, perceptively articulated the very core of official intention - to 
stigmatise and punish some sexually active women tiiereby reinforcuig 
a double standard of moraUty. The Canadian historian, Ruth Roach 
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Pierson, terms tiiis whole process tiie "double bmd of die double 
standard".'* 
The validity of sociaUy condoned, indeed often encouraged, active 
male sexuality was to be in no way chaUenged by die constmction of 
moral alarm or the provision of tiie national security regulations. 
Witiiin tiie heightened emotional fervour engendered by die war, die 
doctrine of nos morituri was to reign supreme. Women were to 
comfort the young warriors, but yet tiiey were to be punished if tiiey 
radicaUy violated the traditional moral precepts of feminine chastity 
and monogamy. It was within die alarm over venereal infections that 
these contradictory moral directives can be most clearly discemed. 
Given the duaUty of female stereotypes expressed m Austtalia as 
"God's poUce" and "damned whore"," it was an easy process for die 
moral arbiters to identify and castigate those deemed deviant. 
In consequence, some women were frequently depicted as sexual 
predators. As Herbert Lazzarini naively iiiformed his federal 
parliamentary coUeagues earlier in the war, "There are, to use a 
common expression, female camp followers, who set out to waylay 
young fellows and many of them succumb to the temptation"." 
Edward HoUoway, the federal minister for Health and Social 
Services was to express alarm that "visitors and men on leave would 
be confronted with certain types of women and girls"." While Dr J 
H L Cumpston, replying to Curtin's enquiry of January 1943 on the 
actual operation of the regulations, categoricaUy stated that: 
The greatest difficulty of aU, die control of the irresponsible 
promiscuous girl, is provided for...with obvious limitations in a 
free community.^ 
It was to be in Queensland specificaUy that few limitations were 
observed. Here the lock hospital's capacity and function was to 
expand considerably by late 1942. Certainly too the healtii and 
fitting capacity of servicemen was a paramount concem to botii the 
AUied and Australian nuUtary authorities. The average duration in 
hospital at that time for gonorrhoea was thirty-two days and syphilis 
fifty-two. At tiiat time there was no certainty of ultimate cure. Not 
untU tiie manufacture of peniciUin in 1944 could sexuaUy transmitted 
diseases be easily cured. Even witiiin tiie miUtary sphere the 
parameters could be and were extended to include otiier social 
dilemmas. In August 1942, tiie secretaries of tiie Society of Retiiraed 
Medical Officers of Queensland expressed tiieir concem tiiat excessive 
alcohol consumption would lead to a high incidence of venereal 
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infection and crime.^' Yet tiie primary focus of concem was to 
remain firrnly on tiie outbreak and control of venereal infection. 
The raison d'etre of the national security (venereal diseases and 
contraceptives) regulations had been ostensibly to protect die healtii of 
troops by eliminatmg sources of possible venereal infection. Yet, 
cotenninous witii tiieir enacttnent, tiie Standing Committee of tiie 
Services' medical Directors in Melboume held a conference on 
venereal infections which in no way concurred with officiaUy 
sanctioned and disseminated opinions. Women, it stressed, were not 
the primary agents transmitting these diseases which were "common in 
all grades of society and do not respect any particular class or 
creed".^  However, this recogiution was not to be translated into 
either poUcy priorities or bureaucratic procedures. Rather, the 
contiadictory attitudes towards male and female sexuality prevalent in 
the wider society were to be enshrined and vaUdated in a complex 
series of bureaucratic and medical procedures which were instigated 
ostensibly to ensure the health of the troops. 
Close coordination between the AustraUan and AUied mUitary 
forces and civilian health and police departments was established to 
achieve tiiis goal. Their agents were specificaUy required to detect 
and detain women suspected or accused of infecting soldiers. Charles 
Comer, tiien a young constable attached to the police "VD Unit" in 
TownsviUe recalls in his memoirs that: 
... I worked with an American Colonel, who in civilian life was a 
medical practitioner... the American serviceman treated venereal 
disease as one would treat a cold, but the Australian was very 
secretive... when a woman was located and it was proven she was 
suffering from venereal disease she was compeUed to enter die 
Lock Ward of the TownsviUe General Hospital where she 
remained tiU she was free of tiie disease.^ 
Wifli regard to specificaUy intemal procedures, the services 
maintained an essentially pragmatic medical view of the control and 
treatinent of sexuaUy transmitted diseases. Yet the process whereby 
service and civiUan agencies co-operated in order to detect female 
contacts ensured that a medical problem was constmcted as moral in 
the civiUan population. These women were regarded as contaminators 
who had to be contained and punished. The bureaucratic procedures 
which aUowed this to occur were thus validated by invoking the dual 
code of sexual ethics. They in tum remforced the double standard by 
facilitating the translation of these ideological premises into concrete 
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bureaucratic procedures which required close co-operation between 
Conunonwealth and State agencies and die Austt-alian and American 
services. 
UitemaUy in tiie services, a series of educational, religious, 
prophylactic, diagnostic and remedial measures were implemented. 
InitiaUy, witiim the sphere of preventive education, lectures were 
given by service medical officers without reference to moraUty. Later 
this was supplemented by tiie introduction of talks by die chaplains 
on the "Christian ideal of sex relationships".^ These clergymen 
acknowledged ortiy one code of sexual ethics which stressed chastity 
and restramt for tiie single and monogamy for the married. Chaplain 
P. Wakely attached to die Anti-VD campaign m Brisbane, initiated the 
distribution of a series of pamphlets from the AUiance of Honour 
("Facts for Men"), YMCA ("Forces for Healtii") and tiie White Cross 
League ("Tme Maitiiness"). Over 25,000 copies of "Forces for 
Health" were distributed in Queensland alone in 1944." Some insight 
into the effectiveness of these talks can be gauged by the remarks of 
a service medical officer, when he reminisced that "our first padre... 
considered that no such thing as sex existed and also, I fancy, 
beUeved in Santa Claus".^ Withm die AustraUan armed forces, as in 
the wider society, two apparent codes of ethics were in operation • 
die Christian ideal which acknowledged and upheld single standard of 
conduct for men and women and, on the other hand, the widespread 
system which aUowed men freedom and experience but which divided 
women into categories of "good" and "bad" on the basis of their 
sexual behaviour. Clearly it was to the latter system of belief and 
practice that both armies gave most credence. 
"Appropriate" medical films, cartoons and lectures were 
compulsorily attended by all enlisted men," a procedure which 
required extensive coordination and deployment of scarce medical 
persormel. Troops were continuaUy reminded tiiat no harm would 
accme from chastity because "every promiscuous intercourse is an 
ahnost certain source of infection".^ American GIs in Queensland 
were shown fihns such as the "Damaged Goods" whose titie blatandy 
suggests a highly derogative depiction of tiieir casual sexual parmers.^  
On the other hand, within tiie women's services ortiy one code of 
etiiics was officiaUy permitted. Australian servicewomen were 
strongly encouraged to remain celibate. Dr Scott-Young concluded 
his lecture on "Sex Hygiene" by reinforcing conventional moral 
precepts: 
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Marriage offers opporttmities of sexual satisfaction, of 
companionship, and emotional security. It provides a family unit 
in which the new generation can shelter during their years of 
immaturity... On the other hand to yield to one's impulses towards 
sex fulfilment outside die married state, inevitably in the case of 
die woman, wiU bring disaster and imhappiness in its wake; both 
in the form of venereal infection and/or illegitimate pregnancy. 
He ertoneously informed servicewomen tiiat contraceptive devices 
were completely ineffective.^ " 
A "Memoranda on the mcidence of venereal disease in the AMF 
[Australian Military Forces]" submitted by the director general of 
Austi"alian Army Medical Services in March 1943 commented that its 
incidence in the women's services was "low", ranging between two to 
eight per 1(X)0 from 1941 to 1943. During the same period 
Australian servicemen's rates ranged from a high point of seventy-five 
per 1000 in January 1941 to a more controlled nineteen per 1000 two 
years later. The low female incidence was due, he concluded, to "the 
sense of responsibUity and respect of Women (sic) in the services".^' 
It should be noted that in Queensland ortiy one WAAAF contracted 
gonorthoea in 1943.^ ^ Servicewomen infected with gonorrhoea could 
be dishonourably discharged but servicemen had to contract the more 
serious infection of syphUis in order to be discharged.'^ In NSW ortiy 
diose male Army persormel with syphilis were located in a speciaUy 
constmcted prison camp at Puckapunyal trainmg reserve.'" This 
appears to be the ortiy occasion when treatment for male and female 
'medical prisoners' was commensurate. A comparison between 
procedures implemented in the men's and women's services suggests 
that die operation of the Christian derived moral code was successful 
witiiin the women's services in a way that would be judged as both 
naive and totaUy unobtauiable in die men's. 
Since a realistic assessment that lectures by chaplains on ethics 
and the distribution of films and literature of either a pmrient or fear-
inspiring nature would not prove effective in deterring servicemen 
from engaging in casual sexual encounters, the Services' directors' 
general estabUshed extensive prophylactic programmes. As early as 
July 1942 the Queensland conference on venereal diseases discussed 
the most advantageous locations of accessible prophylactic stations in 
Brisbane. Delegates recommended that lists of the locations should 
be widely distributed; that the commissioner of poUce should artange 
for police officers in the large towns to be able to "discretely convey" 
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this information to any serviceman who might enquire; thirdly, that all 
brotiiels have the Ust prominently displayed." 
A sub-committee of the standing conunittee of Services' directors' 
general conference on venereal disease held in Melboume two mondis 
later reconunended tiiat tiie chemical "blue light" kits be distiibuted to 
aU servicemen on furlough. Botii AustraUan and American enlisted 
persormel were routinely issued with condoms, specifically for 
prophylactic rather tiian contraceptive purposes and a "blue light" kit. 
A network of Prophylactic Ablution Centres (PACs) were established 
by both Australian and American authorities also to supply diese 
goods and give furdier remedial treatment when necessary. There 
were four Australian and eight American centres conveniently located 
in Brisbane and a furdier six in provincial towns with large troop 
concentrations. The Americans established three PACs specifically for 
Black GIs who were spatiaUy, sociaUy and medicaUy segregated. 
AUied and Australian mUitary authorities made more tiian ample 
provision for their servicemen to engage in casual sexual encounters 
without the risk of contracting venereal disease. Their emphasis upon 
prophylactic and remedial procedures rather than ethical considerations 
can be judged from the supply Ust from one smaU AustraUan PAC in 
Brisbane. In the months from April to June 1943, 5679 condoms, 
594 "blue light" kits and 314 other prophylactics were issued. This 
distribution supplemented intemal divisional distribution of 
preventatives. AU PACs were open twenty-four hours per day.^ ' 
Given the dual code of ethics, these were strictiy out of bounds for 
servicewomen. 
In order to ensure the optimum healthiness of troops, die armed 
services established a series of routine medical checks as weU as a 
complex network of surveillance and control procedures to deal with 
that section of the civilian population who might jeopardise tiiis 
objective. Australian servicemen were checked each month for 
venereal mfection, though in the AUied forces, individuals were left to 
approach medical officers. This may account for SWPA higher 
incidence of infection." CiviUan health authorities were more tiian 
willing to assist tiie armed services m tiieir endeavours. The Brisbane 
conference of July 1942 resolved tiiat: 
There should be cooperative interchange of information to die 
fullest extent possible between tiie Department of Healtii, die 
miUtary autiiorities and poUce, in respect of [infected] women who 
were migrating from their known place of residence to otiier towns 
and who had disappeared from such areas.'* 
DEMOCRACY IS IN DANGER 
Fascism Comes to Queensland 
THE PUBLIC SAFETY ACT 
• Dat'iug Ilia KitilruHh tn M«.>rtli}'r 
electors hv^t' weuk, I'roiiiior Korgnii 
Siiiith made i:ufuruiicti lo n ." iiuw 
lYorld oi'Jur " ihiit wan tu bu f.itnb-
lUlieJ Kftui- lliu WKI' Uti witH 1)11-
commuiiiciilivu reHpuuliii;; tlie 'J^pu f>f 
nevr world uidur he viHimliHed : bul 
if we are to lie guided by tlm |>n>-
viHioiiB of *' Tlu> I'lililfc Sufoty Act," 
we CHii only uuiicludu Lliiit il wna ii 
KasciNt world order Smith Imd iu 
mind vrheu ho npuku at MorLhyr.. 
. "The Public SiLfety A c t " in said 
to bo iiecesHury ** 'I'u Muko Proviyion 
fur the Welfare, Order and Publiu 
Safety of the Slate of QueenHbiiul 
during the preaeut state of War." 
If that i» the rual purpose of tliu 
Act, then the (jovumntent stand uou-
dodined fur their own nef^iect and in-
cuiuputoncy. Kouilemi (14) tiionilib 
have elapsed since war wau dcolanul; 
and four iiiunths huvo pasHed niiico 
Hitler obtained cuinplule control of 
Kurope. Yet we aru expt'Cted to 
believe that it is only now that it lias 
beoofne neceaaary to tuake provision 
fur the safety of Queensland; and 
that in order lo iiiaku such [irovisiun, 
a preliminary requironienl is the 
establishment of mauhinery for ilie 
aoltirijT up uf Fascism iu this State. 
Forgan S m i t h , A g r e e s W i t h 
- Hitler and Mutsolini . 
For more than twulve montha the 
Gorernmeiit have buen fcrying^ to 
perfect a whisfle ur siren lo warn 
people when " t o d u c k " from air 
raiders. They liavaii't been able to 
obtain a satisfactory alarm yet. 
When they do—if ever—there will 
be no shelters for the people " t o 
duck" into! Hecause the Qoveru-
ment have not provided them! So 
much for the State Government's 
concern about the safely and wolfnro 
of the people uf QueonHland.'a'nd its 
capacity to provide for llieir safety 
and welfare. 
Surely il does not require the es-
tablishment of Fascism before such 
flftfoty measures can be provided for 
the people of QueensUnd. To ang-
^ost it dues, in to say that under 
OcDiocracy the intereNls of the people 
and the nmiun cannot be protected 
properly in K lime uf wai-. Only 
L<'HauistM think that wiiy. Hitler and 
Mussolini any tiiitt Now Koif^an 
Smith endorses tliuir views. 
We do not a>;rue with Hitler, Mua-
Holini or Smith. We say that under 
DomociAoy the people's interests can 
be protecti'd. 
There iu auHiciont provision in ex-
isting State Ic^islution to provide for 
all the tluii;i;H mentioned in the pre-
amble of this Art That mass of 
Itif^islation bus \urvu built up in the 
cotirce of our til years of self-f^overn-
muul and oni of our expurience of 
the reqiiiiuntuiilN uf the State in the 
spheiOH'uf ' public 'lirdeV and ' public 
welfare. SuppluinunLtit); that hiaas 
of Statu legislation is a muaa of 
Federal lei^inhttion, including such 
mcHsureH as the ;CriiiiUH Act and ttie 
National Security Act. Yet we are 
told—and expectinl to he l ieve^ lha t 
the requirements uf pnldiu or'der and 
the peuple'a v^-plfaie dumiind nnothur 
piece of legiHlation that ernhudies 
power and authority far in excess of 
that created by thu Critnes Act. and 
the National Security Act. 
" T h e Public Safety A c t " in not 
necessary to aafugnard the people of 
Queenslanil. 'i'hat in not its pur-
pose. Jt is merely another uf tlioae 
pieces of snppreesive and penal legis* 
laeiun that have found their way on 
tu our Statute Books in recent years, 
as the economic structure of i;a[>-
italism becomes more unstable. The 
purpose of i.ti-aa of all such other 
legislation—is to e.ttnblisli machinery 
for the preservation of the eziHtiu<; 
econumic aystepi, and to.suppress all 
forces chat wou Id try tu alter or 
reform that system. 
^ It is the bust proof—if proof is 
required—that our leaders believu 
that this war t,hreHtena the coutinnod 
existence of the present (economic 
system;,and that in an endeavour to 
save that system they are preparing 
to oNtablish Fascism in this country 
i;nn)ediately they see the lirst rti^ rn uf 
(lunger to Capitelisni arising either 
from its own contradictiuna oV. from 
action by any section of tlieicom^ 
Til unity to alter it ^ .. -' 
Socialitm or Faicitm 7 
This Act, in'ihe hands of aSocial-
iHt Council uf Public Safety, cuuld be 
used to establish Socialism, so wide 
are the powers conferred b y i t . " Itut 
tiiose'who will administer it are hot 
Socialists, Thby are opposed to 
Socialism. They believe in (/apilal-
i.im. They do not say that the pnr-
])ose of thu Act is to^Jntrodoce 
Socialism Therefore, it .is safe to 
asf^uiue'thal-'.the purpose of thifi'Act 
in to safognard Capitalism ; and a'urcts 
the position may be reached, as a 
result of Ihb pruaeut war, that to 
safeguiird Cupitalisni the establiah-
IIIent of Fascism will be necessary,' 
tlien il is equally safe tu assume that 
I'Vscism is the ultimate objective of 
lliis legislation. If il was thought for 
one moment thai the purpose of the 
.Act was to assist in the establish-
ment of Socialism, it would not have 
received the benediction of such 
newspapers as " T h e Courier-Mail" 
and " The Telegraph " ; nor would it 
have been introduced for that par-
pose by the Smith Goverhmeat. 
Labor Surpastci Tories. 
There is no reason of public safety 
for the Act. Mr.'-ilanlon said in 
Parliament that ihere was no danger 
of this country being invaded. He 
described the Act as being necessary 
to 'eliminate " dead spots " between 
(/Ommoiiwealth and State. In other 
words, this Act is intended lo sup* 
plem'e'nt the provisions of the Nat-
ional Security Act.'^' If -you. are in-
genious enough to escape the dragnet 
penal provisions of the Crimes Act 
and the National Security Act, yo^ d* 
will be caught by this State legis-
lation ! Mr. Hanlon said this legi^-
Democracy: Unionists fears of rule by the executive. (Source: QS A File 1268m on Public ^o/eryAcr (1941)) 
Women castigated as pollutants. (Source: Imperial War Museum, London) 
Dormitory in the Female Venereal Disease Isolation Hospital, Brisbane Gaol. (Source: Queensland Parlia-
mentary Papers, 1943-44) 
Treatment booths for Women at William Street Venereal Disease Clinic. (Source: Queensland Parliamentaiy 
Papers, 1943-44) 
A Shot In The Back 
The striker as traitor, (Source: Courier-Mail 15 May 1940) 
A reassessment of the communist threat. (Source: Courier-Mail 16 September 1942) 
it CAN hopp«n here- sy Jock Lusby 
(Source: Courier-Mail) 
Fred Paterson's arrest at 
the St Patrick's Day 
March. (Source: 
Courier-Mail 17 March 
1948) 
Violence on the picket line. (Source: Courier-Mail 17 March 1948) 
Police clash with railway workers. (Source: Courier-Mail 17 March 1948) 
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Moreover, all civilian and military agencies cooperated in the 
apprehension of women suspected of infecting any serviceman. The 
venereal disease control report of 1943 for SWPA revealed that 
throughout 1942 the venereal disease control officers of the US and 
Australian forces in Queensland had monthly conferences with State 
Health and Home Affairs and Police department officials whose duty 
it was to locate and detain certain designated female sexual contacts. 
For, "by means of close liaison with civilian vice squads... there had 
been a continued improvement in contact information". After the 
implementation of the national security (venereal diseases and 
contraceptives) regulations "an average of 60% of contacts (with US 
servicemen) reported have been apprehended and placed under 
treatment".^ ' The aimual report by the Surgeon General for SWPA in 
1944 detailed increased efficiency of these methods.''" One year later 
Major Arthur Nightingale, a US medical officer, specifically referring 
to Brisbane, reported that 105 suspects named in 157 questionnaires 
submitted by infected GIs were "contacted and disposed of and 
nearly 80% of those examined were found to be infected."' 
The aimual report of the Queensland director general of Health 
and Medical Services for 1943-44 proudly declared that "very efficient 
methods here" accounted for this "lower rate of venereal disease 
among troops".''^  This policy was in line with general Allied 
procedures; for the joint British and Canadian conference on venereal 
disease held in London in March 1944 stressed the urgency of 
"rendering infected women non-contagious".*^ Nowhere in Australia 
was this recommendation pursued more efficiently or resolutely than 
in Queensland. These procedures and the consequences which 
accmed from them need more careful scrutiny. 
After the initial alarm was expressed in mid-1942, coinciding with 
the release of the aimual statistics and the increasmg presence of 
Allied servicemen in Queensland, pubUc attention was then directed 
into an examination of the merits or limitations of the national 
security (venereal diseases and contraceptives) regulations. Six 
months later, apprehension and feminist criticism gave way to almost 
hysterical panic. The so-caUed "VD Menace" was portrayed by 
Queensland's premier as "a threat to Australia second only to 
Japanese".'*'' This second stage in the expression of the moral crisis in 
the civiUan population began in the early months of 1943. To the 
dismay of the Commonwealth and Queensland Health minsters, figures 
released at the end of the first six months' operation of the national 
security (venereal diseases and contraceptives) regulations revealed 
that the civilian incidence of venereal infection had risen dramatically 
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in Queensland although it had sunultaneously declmed elsewhere in 
Australia and among service personnel, hi a debate in the House of 
Representatives on 1 April 1943 Holloway reminded his colleagues 
that although the successful collaboration of the director general of 
Health and the central medical co-ordinating committee of the 
Australian armed services had substantially decreased the problem 
nation-wide. Queensland was however proving to be the exception; 
for in the six months endmg 28 February 1943 there had ah^ady been 
1026 civilian notifications."' It should not have been ahogether 
surprising that Queensland statistics differed so markedly from those 
of the other States, given the concentration of American troops and 
the consequent rise in the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases 
among sections of Queensland's female population. 
Many political and women's organisations expressed concem 
which assumed varied characteristics. The Women's Union of 
Service, writing to the prime mmister on 8 febmary 1943, stressed the 
need for publicity and widespread debate, whilst expressing regret that 
male and female sufferers were accorded such different treatments. 
They were dismayed that civilian male patients were allowed their 
liberty whilst their female partners were frequently gaoled."' The 
Australian Natives' Association at a meetuig on 3 May 1943 "viewed 
with alarm the spread of the disease"."^ 
A week later the Australian Society for the Eradication of 
Venereal Disease was launched m Sydney. This body declared that it 
earnestly desired prompt and mtensive educational and remedial 
action."* In a more reasoned assessment later that month die National 
Health and Medical Research Council emphasised that the statements 
giving the impression that a "serious proportion" of the population 
was venereally mfected were "gravely misleadmg" and could be 
refuted "by reliable statistical evidence"."' Tables 8 and 9 confirm the 
veracity of this statement. It is apparent that, though the incidence of 
sexually transmitted diseases in Queensland was increasmg, it was 
never solely due to the actions of women adversely described by the 
NSW director general of Social Hygiene, Dr Booth Cooper, as 
"reservoirs of venereal disease in the community".'" Sander L 
Gihnan, referring specifically to the iconography of AIDS and syphilis 
comments in 1987 that: 
Icons of disease appear to have an extensive mdependence of the 
reality of the disease. This "free-floating" iconography of disease 
attaches itself to various illnesses (real or imagined) in different 
societies and at different moments m history. Disease is thus 
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restricted to a specific set of images, thereby forming a visual 
boundary, a lunit to the idea (or fear) of disease." 
The imagery of pollution and contammation by identifiable agents 
who must be isolated from the healthy body of the community runs 
like a motif through the discourse on STDs in westem civilisation. 
When nations are at risk, externally from attack, these icons become 
powerful instruments to nullify the perceived agents of morbidity. 
Michael Sturma has recently argued that this whole agitated 
campaign can only be understood in the light of anxiety conceming 
women's changing role in AustraUan society generaUy and 
apprehension about sexuaUty and moral precepts specifically." It is 
evident too that the foundations of Australia's conventional moral 
code were being severely chaUenged and tested by the exigencies of 
total war. The presence of nearly a million American troops 
profoundly exacerbated this dislocation. 
Certainly too the target group that was specifically under scrutiny 
during the second stage of moral alarm were the young women and 
adolescent girls who were seen in the company of servicemen. In the 
earUer phase of the crisis, alarm was generaUy expressed about aU 
sexuaUy active single women. By early 1943 however one particular 
subgroup had been isolated for specific condemnation. As Brisbane's 
Roman Catholic Archbishop Duhig lamented: 
I have heard that it is said that the cheapest thing m Australia is 
the girls... Girls have scarcely left school when they find 
themselves m a web of temptations for which they are iU-
prepared." 
Gregory Forster, the president of the Society for the Eradication of 
Venereal Disease, categoricaUy laid blame in May 1943 with those 
"young girls mnnmg around the town... attracted by the glamour of a 
uniform".'" 
A careful exammation of statistics shows that the public and press 
continued to confuse the civilian ratio of male to female incidences 
with the more accurately combined civilian and Australian military 
figures which gave the native Australian trends (see tables 10 and 11). 
In the years from 1941-42 to 1942-43 when American miUtary forces 
were at their optunum strength in Queensland, the gross female 
civUian incidences mcreased three times. The tme male/female ratio 
in the Australian population in Queensland clearly shows that the rates 
rose only marginaUy from 33.5 per cent female cases in 1941-42 to 
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38 per cent a year later. If resident or transit American militaiy 
incidences of venereal infection were also included m the Queensland 
figures, it is indisputable that m this peak year only 27 per cent of 
notified mcidences of aU forms of notifiable venereal disease involved 
females (see Tables 12 and 13). 
Official and public response was not guided by the implication 
accming from careful consideration of this evidence. Rather, the 
various AUied and Australian military forces, public health, 
parliamentary and police agencies, most notably m Queensland, 
pressed for an mcreasingly efficient system of identification and 
punishment of those deviant "contaminating" women. Differing 
procedures were applied according to a woman's social status and 
class position. As the Victorian acting commissioner of police wrote 
to Gavm Long, (later the editor of the prestigious official war 
history): 
With the arrival of overseas troops, many young girls from good 
homes became caught up in the excitement and vied with 
wayward, irresponsible girls m seeking a good time at aU costs." 
The variation in the official response to this situation was 
substantial. It was never simply a matter of degree - workmg class 
women and girls were subjected to scrutmy, vigilance and calculated 
retribution through state harassment, segregation and punishment. Dr 
Booth Cooper, one sociaUy accredited expert, admitted in December 
1942 that "80% of aU reported cases came from quite nice girls who 
have been indiscreet"." Middle class women and girls could obtain 
anonymous discreet treatment from their local medical practitioner or 
could attend as an outpatient at the WiUiam Street clinic for Women. 
Ned Hanlon remmded the delegates of the July 1942 conference that 
he wished this class distmction in treatment to be rigidly enforced. 
Many females, who had been reported as a "contact" by a serviceman, 
were very young, often only between thirteen and seventeen years of 
age." If girls from "good homes" became mdiscreet "good time girls" 
who constantly "frequented the streets looking for excitement", loitered 
in bars and hotels where Americans congregated or "often slept with a 
different man every night and could be found living in rooms and city 
hotels kept by their latest attachments"," they had to face 
mvestigation by the vice squad and the department of Health and 
Home Affairs. But if the girl m question was under seventeen, the 
age of consent, the police would act. 
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Officials from the Health and Home Affairs department, with 
advice from the poUce, employed a class dichotomy when they 
decided who would enter the Female Venereal Disease Isolation 
Hospital in the compound of the men's prison, or, attend Wattlebrae 
hospital for Infectious diseases located in the grounds of the Brisbane 
General Hospital. The category of "common prostitute", the only 
peacetime clientele for the "lock hospital" underwent serious 
modifications when confronted by the unprecedented exigencies of 
war. Informed sources all agreed that "enthusiastic amateurs" rather 
than the professional prostitute were most likely to transmit venereal 
infection to troops. Sir Raphael Cilento cited this category, 
specifically identifymg the working class women at the munitions 
factory at Wynnum." Yet, it was surely beyond the bounds of the 
most enthusiastic dedication and stamina for so few women to infect 
so many men. In the aimual report of the director general of Health 
and Medical Services for 1942-43 and various conferences held 
intemaUy withm the armed services, the sources of infections were 
apportioned 5 per cent from professional prostitutes, 85 per cent from 
amateurs and 10 per cent from wives.* 
Prostitutes themselves were not simply an undifferentiated 
category, for they were divided upon class lines as well. Gavin Long 
observed, and ttiis was verified from his conversations with top 
ranking AUied officers, that caU girls operated m Brisbane's leading 
hotels such as Lennons (where General MacArthur had his 
headquarters), the Bellevue, across the road from the exclusive 
Queensland Club and Parhament House, as weU as in private 
residences m eUte suburbs like Hamilton.*' These women did not fmd 
themselves incarcerated in the "lock hospital" - the adjective 
"common" was never appUed to this category of expensive prostitute. 
In contrast, m TownsviUe, catermg for the rank and file men, the 
showground had a series of tents grouped in a circle and clients 
would queue and march m line for their very brief session. It was 
commonly termed "the buU ring"." The evidence suggests that 
professional street and brothel prostitutes continued to cater for tiieir 
noraial cUentele - AustraUan middle-aged married men. This accounts 
for the low mcidence of professionals cited by troops as their source 
of infection. It was clearly the category of "entiiusiastic amateur" tiiat 
was predominantly placed under vice squad surveillance." 
The Healtii department and die police faced difficulties in 
determining procedures to be employed in categorising "entiiusiastic 
amateurs"; for, on tiie one hand, tiie Australian and AUied military 
authorities kept constant pressure to bear at the highest levels to 
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secure tiie restraint of women and giris accused of mfecting troops. 
On tiie otiier hand, it was recognized tiiat tiiese sexuaUy active 
women did not constitute a suigle and undifferentiated group. 
Discernment and discretion were needed. Not only were police 
resources severely overextended but various social control agencies 
might find tiiemselves tiie subject of bitter public criticism if more 
privileged women were treated like tiiose from tiie workmg class. 
In March 1943 Hanlon received a deputation from the WCTU and 
tiie Society for Racial Hygiene, concemuig the problem of young girls 
suffering from sexuaUy transmitted diseases. Hanlon gave his 
assurances tiiat tiiese 'respectable' giris would not be incarcerated at 
tiie Female Venereal Disease Isolation Hospital witii "seasoned 
offenders" but would be sent uistead to Wattlebrae Hospital for 
Infectious Diseases," which for tiie duration of the war became a 
venereal disease hospital for middle class women and girls. This 
statement carefiiUy disguised tiie actual policy which had been placed 
in operation by eariy 1942. The director general of Healtii and 
Medical Services' annual report for 1941-42 stated that: 
A number of girls mfecting soldiers has been found to be both 
unco-operative and unreliable in respect of regular treatment and 
abstention from promiscuous sexual intercourse. As a result of the 
stringent necessity to control the sources of infection, many 
women have been transferred from the Infectious Diseases Hospital 
to tiie VD Hospital at Park Road [tiie lock hospital]." 
His next annual report admitted tiiat the facilities to accommodate 
around fifty prostitutes at tiie "lock hospital" had been substantially 
increased to detain certain "promiscuous amateurs". There were now 
90 women residents there.^ By November 1943 there were 105 
women under detention m tiie "lock hospital". They constituted 
several different categories - the traditional clientele of prostitutes, 
"delinquent giris with VD" and secondarily, "any woman found to 
have infected personnel of the fightmg forces". Clearly, class 
distinctions decided who was designated "delinquent" or merely 
"mdiscreet". Upon this basis, females were assigned to either the 
"lock hospital" or to Wattiebrae. 
The rationale to send a woman to Wattlebrae or the lock hospital 
can be starkly represented by the procedures enlisted for botii. At 
Wattlebrae, a woman was mdisputably a 'patient' in a hospital; at the 
Female Venereal Disease Isolation Hospital she was arrested by the 
police, escorted by them to the "lock hospital" and there compulsorily 
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detained and confmed as a 'prisoner'. Moreover, a married woman 
who contracted syphiUs from her husband would be treated m a 
general ward of a public hospital witii no stigma attached to her. 
Both class perception and the degree to which a woman adhered to 
conventional sexual mores ultimately determined to which institution 
she would be sent and whetiier she was labeUed a 'patient' or a 
'prisoner'. The Queensland govemment in the year 1944-45 
continued to pride itself on its possession of the "only hospital of its 
type" (i.e. a "lock hospital") in AustraUa*^  and deplored the less 
restrictive operation of other States where infected women and girls 
were mostly aUowed liberty on a parole system. The exigencies of 
the war had aUowed Queensland to race to the forefront of the 
Australian States for the efficiency, diligence and sheer single-
mindedness with which poUcies were implemented to contain and 
segregate aU manner of deviants, whether they were Aborigines on the 
reserves, the insane and incapacitated in institutions or sexuaUy 
promiscuous working class women and girls in "lock hospitals". 
A third phase m the constmction of this moral alarm became 
apparent by mid-1944. In January the conservative Smith's Weekly 
ran a highly emotive article entitled "Guilty Women" which focused 
attention upon the latest target group. Concem was redirected from 
the overt sexuality of young single women and girls towards married 
women who had husbands on active service and who contracted 
venereal disease. The article claimed that "Later generations trying to 
repair tiie damage wiU be justified m judgmg the women responsible 
as 'guilty'".** 
Yet there was no marked increase generaUy in cases of venereal 
infection tiiroughout the Commonwealth. The severe alarm of the 
first two phases now gave way to panic. The key motif which ran 
through tiie pronouncements in this year was the increasing incidence 
of infection among married women with husbands on active service. 
In May 1944 Dr J H L Cumpston and Dr R E Richard m a report of 
the National Healtii and Medical Research Council expressed their 
regret when tiiey noted tiiis uicrease.*' Further, the report of a survey 
of venereal disease in the AMF, detecting an mcreasing proportion of 
wives infecting soldier husbands, demanded "more punitive legislation 
against women".™ 
Once again, tiie operation of an mstitutionalised double standard 
was evident. The July 1942 conference openly discussed the arniy 
surveiUance and regulation of brothels in Syria where members of tiie 
Second ADF had been stationed the previous year. This had not been 
altogetiier successful for "many soldiers retumed from the Middle East 
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and infected their wives". At tiie conclusion of tiieir deliberations the 
delegates stressed tiie urgent necessity for the department of Health 
and Home Affairs to provide a suitable place for "a respectable 
woman who had innocently enough incurred venereal ^ disease"." 
Cleariy these women would not be sent to a "lock hospital" and even 
treatment at Wattlebrae might cast aspersions on tiieir chastity and 
honour. 
Several explanations may be proffered for tiiis change of focus 
towards infected married women. By late 1943 tiie federal 
government's attention was directed away from organismg for total 
war into post-war reconstmction, tiirough which tiie welfare state, 
unprecedented immigration, increasing industrialisation and economic 
diversity were to be implemented. Cmcial to tiie whole process was 
tiie family. As tiie report of tiie committee of enquiry into the 
medical aspect of tiie decline of tiie birth rate remarked in 1948: 
When tiie immediate urgency of protectmg Australia from invasion 
had passed and when long-range plans for reconstmction and 
development of this country were being inaugurated, tiie problem 
of a population policy arose once more." 
In May 1944 the federal govemment originally had sought the 
"opinion and advice of the Council on tiie whole question of the 
decline in tiie Australian birth rate". In a society which regarded 
itself as an underpopulated British bastion of civilisation which could 
have been destroyed by the invading Japanese, more weight was 
directed towards increasing the birth rate as well as attracting suitable 
migrants from Great Britain and Westem Europe. In 1947, William 
Morris Hughes, the former prime minister during World War One 
coined the phrase which encapsulated this fear - "populate or perish". 
It was within this atmosphere in 1944 that the third stage of moral 
alarm was orchestrated and given its first and extended public 
performance. 
Though this target group m the tiiird phase was clearly identified, 
it was never to suffer the same degree of harassment or punitive 
incarceration. Police discretionary powers could not challenge the 
operation of the dominant ideology. Botii the federal and State 
governments were reluctant to adopt a policy which would necessitate 
tiie restraint of any married women in the lock hospital. All those 
ideological inconsistencies inherent in the application of the double 
standard would be revealed for public scmtiny and perhaps 
challenged. Married women especially those with children could not 
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be so easily and publicly labeUed as deviant. They were tiie motiiers 
and future mothers of AustraUa. Sentiments such as tiiose expressed 
by tiie Association for Moral and Social Hygiene in May 1944 ran 
contrary to the cherished beUef that women were the contaminating 
agents: 
Men and women were equaUy responsible for the irresponsible and 
promiscuous relations ui which VD is spread. Any legislation 
which either aims or in actual operation encourages in the pubUc 
the belief that women are mainly or solely responsible for the 
spread of VD wiU not solve this moral problem and will m the 
long mn aggravate it. '^ 
When alarm about sexuaUy transmitted diseases began to abate 
later in 1944, it was never due to a reassessment of moral priorities 
or civU liberties. What was at hand m late 1944 was a medical 
remedy. PeniciUin, first introduced in the armed services in 1943 and 
into the civilian population later in tiie foUowmg year, could cure 
some venereal mfections m eight hours.^ " In the case of syphilis, 
arsenic injections over a minimum period of twelve months were no 
longer necessary." Despite this medical breakthrough which 
potentiaUy could have altered the entire concepmalisation and 
treatinent of this disease, h was aU too apparent that conventional 
morality contmued to stress chastity, repression and, m its wake, 
blame and retribution. The aimual report of the department of Healtii 
and Home Affairs for 1946 did not abandon moral preoccupations: 
... modem scientific medicine can now cure VD very rapidly and 
effectively once it has been contracted. However, the eradication 
of VD requires the eradication of promiscuity, and to this end, we 
need tiie help of all those agencies fostering idealism, culture, 
refinement and a love for the decencies of Ufe.'* 
In the constmction of moral alarm no chaUenge to the operation of 
the double standard could be countenanced. But beyond tiiis, what is 
now even more revealing are the defmed parameters of the debate -
those questions that were permitted, those which remamed unasked 
and tiiose which, when mentioned, were not pursued. Two cmcial 
aspects which fall witiiin the latter categories require exammation and 
appraisal. The first question that was not explored involved male 
homosexuality. This is not altogetiier surprising for Australians 
generally held male homosexuals m contempt and the taboo on pubUc 
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discussion ensured silence. Current medical research indicates that 
rectal and penile gonorrhoea is far more common among gay men. 
They are moreover ten times more likely to suffer from syphilis than 
heterosexual men." Despite a significant debate on the extent of 
rectal gonorrhoea at the July 1942 conference m Brisbane, remarks 
were directed primarily to its presence in female patients.^ * 
In the annual statistics presented to the Queensland pariiament in 
tiie years from 1944 to 1947 only one man indicated tiiat he had 
contracted venereal infection through a homosexual encounter. This 
reticence is understandable given the long prison terms awaiting those 
men convicted of homosexual offenses. Possibly, many gay contacts 
were filed under "unknown or unstated" - there were exactly 2000 
such entries in those years, by far the largest category.™ 
The second question that was not permitted concemed the higher 
incidence of sexually transmitted diseases among Black American 
troops stationed in Austi-alia than among tiieir white compatriots. The 
respective rates were 56.7 per 1000 and 9.7 per 1000 for SWPA in 
1943 even after tiie initial mti-oduction of peniciUm.*" These rates 
were considerably lower than tiie peak of August 1942 in Queensland 
specifically, for GIs were later "moved out from large cities to tiie 
north where there are few contacts"." In a society obsessed witfi 
racial purity and miscegenation, it can only be concluded that tiie 
Queensland authorities had no idea of the extent of venereal disease 
among Black servicemen. Yet, as Graham Smitii shows in his 
detailed analysis, When Jim Crow met John Bull. Black American 
Soldiers in World War II in Britain (1987), m 1944 a highly 
orchestrated campaign was mounted to stop white British women from 
fraternising with Black GIs. In particular, tiie dangers of venereal 
disease and miscegenation were employed in highly sensationalised 
accounts m the newspapers. He concludes that "... there appears to 
have been some official sanction to this policy".'^ Undoubtedly in 
Queensland it was hoped that the interlockmg system of segregation 
(analysed in chapter 3) would prevent interracial sexual contact. The 
concem for the healtii of Aboriginal women did not loom large in 
official quarters. 
The specific question of sexuaUy transmitted diseases brought 
together a complex mterrelated series of ideological and stmctiiral 
processes - tiie changing status of women m wartune; tiie role of tiie 
family; apprehension about tiie birtii rate; aherations in sexual mores; 
fears about Australia's security and vuhierability; tiie effectiveness of 
Austi-alian and AUied armies. In tiie period of Reconstmction after 
1943, traditional moral precepts, tiiough chaUenged, were ultimately 
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reinforced. A constricting role for women who were to be primarily 
located in the family was envisaged and indeed ensured. Social 
control agents refused to relmquish the cherished tenet that they had 
acted pmdendy and witiiin the national mterest by detectmg, detammg 
and, in Queensland, incarcerating some women who chaUenged 
traditional moral precepts. In the war-time period of emergency, 
adjustment and reorganisation, the orchestrated constmction of moral 
alarm appealed primarily to uninformed prejudice and mismformation 
and demanded punitive retribution. But tiie implications of this moral 
outcry went far deeper than mere indignation and censure. Most 
specifically the procedures, whereby civiUan and military agencies 
coordinated their activities m order to detect and punish some women 
accused of infecting soldiers, highlights not only aU those 
misperceptions about women as "contammators" but also exemplifies 
those cmcial processes whereby the apparatus of the state was 
expanded and strengthened. 
"Red Baiting is an AWU Habit"': 
Surveillance and Prosecution of Communists 
1939-45 
On 17 June 1940 tiie Communist Party of Australia (CPA) was 
declared an illegal organisation under tiie provision of the national 
security (subversive organisations) regulations promulgated two days 
previously. Dawn raids by tiie police, the indiscriminate confiscation 
of literamre and documents, surveillance, dismissal from employment 
and, in some cases, intemment foUowed inexorably from this 
administrative disavowal of a group critical, and in many mstances, 
openly antagonistic to Australia's involvement m die war in tiie 
Middle East. These actions m 1940 must be understood and artanged 
in the wider context of political and ideological suspicion and 
rejection of radicals. With tiie establishment of tiie Commonwealtii 
police and military intelligence in tiie Great War, elaborate networks 
between Commonwealth and the States were established to monitor 
and curtail tiie activities of tiiese political dissidents. In particular 
times of crisis, such as war and depression, the full weight of tiie 
state's apparatus could be applied, in contrast to peacetime, when 
systematic surveiUance, but limited mtervention, was more frequent. 
Yet these processes were never uniform and again reflected deep-
seated xenophobia. In the first instance, the attention of the civil 
police, foUowmg standard procedure whereby they monitored radicals 
and identified candidates for intensive scmtuiy by the Commonwealth 
Investigation Bureau in the Attomey General's department, and later 
in wartime, for military inteUigence, remamed resolutely upon Anglo-
Celtic radicals and their supporters. The diverse activities of tiie 
ItaUan communists, socialists, anarchists and their sympathisers in 
nortii Queensland were not regarded as politicaUy relevant in 1940 -
ratiier it was tiieir status as enemy aliens that was paramount. Hence, 
tiie raids on supposed communists in June 1940 was confined 
exclusively within tiie Anglo-Celtic community and devolved around 
longstanding intra-union conflicts and those stmctural and ide.nlneical 
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stmggles between the parUamentary wmg of the ALP and some 
miUtant unions. 
Nowhere in AustraUa were these antagonisms towards communism, 
its adherents and sympathisers more deeply expressed tiian m 
Queensland. From its mception m 1920, tiie Communist Party of 
AustiraUa was set m tiie patti of conflict and confrontation witii tiie 
mainstream labour movement.^ Successive Queensland Labor 
governments were dommated by Roman Catiiolics and former trade 
unionists with key AustraUan Worker's Union (AWU) affiliations. 
Moreover these moderate and cautious reformers eschewed the 
imaginative and decisive reforms of the Ryan and Theodore 
administrations of 1915 to 1922. Whilst membership of the ALP and 
the CPA was mutuaUy mcompatible from 1925 elsewhere in Australia, 
this issue was not officiaUy resolved in Queensland until the following 
year. K.H. Kennedy argues that the "Anti-Communism Pledge" which 
members of the ALP were obUged to take from 1925 onwards 
brought to the surface deep intemal conflicts between the conservative 
AWU and those unions in sympathy with radical mitiatives lUce One 
Big Union (OBU).^  Most notably the powerful Australian Railway 
Union (ARU) adopted a radical ideology and affiliations. 
The Queensland railway strikes of 1925 and 1927 became the 
industrial arenas where these ideological conflicts became explicit and 
contested. Although the ARU was influenced by the defunct 
Industiial Workers of the World and tiie unpotent OBU, tiie 
McCormack Labor admmistration incortectly attributed its aUegiances 
to communism. Botii Margaret Bridson Cribb and K.H. Kennedy 
argue tiiat the South Johnstone strike of 1927 became tiie first major 
industrial dispute m the State where communism and its supposed 
threat to the labour movement was articulated and acted upon 
decisively." Certainly, the actions of the govemment were far more 
aggressive than two years before. Premier WiUiam McCormack, a 
former organiser for the AWU, took the vmprecedented move of 
unilateraUy dismissing railway workers and effecting a lock out. On 
the otiier hand, Raymond Evans, m his attempts to trace the rejection 
and repudiation of radicals by mamstream Labor, does not confine his 
attentions to particular mdustrial disputes; rather, he seeks to 
determine those ideological antagonisms and xenophobic anxieties 
arising out of 1916, cuhnmatmg m tiie Red Rag riots of 1919 and 
continuing tivough mto tiie 1920s.' 
Throughout the 1930s the cabinet continued to be dominated by 
men with long service and current affiliations with the AWU. 
William Forgan Smitii jomed the AWU m 1913, becommg tiie Labor 
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member for Mackay two years later and deputy premier in 1925. 
Jack Dash, mmister for Transport, had been vice president of die 
AWU, whilst "Mossy" Hynes, mmister for Labour and hidustry had 
seen service as a senior vice president.* Ned Hanlon, along with 
Forgan Smitii, dominated die party tiu-oughout tiie 1930s and 1940s. 
His fervent disavowal of communism earned him tiie nickname of 
"Anti-Red Ned",'' presumably a pun on the absurdly maccurate epitiiet 
for former Premier E.G. Theodore, "Red Ted." 
Witii tiie exception of tiie mglorious Moore coalition 
administration, which had tiie misfortune to govem during tiie worst 
years of tiie depression, Queensland politics m these decades was 
dominated by tiiis brand of moderate Labor. In tiie mmds of tiie 
pariiamentarians witii contmumg strong affiliation witii tiie AWU, 
many trade unionists and Labor members, tiieir tme opposition, and 
indeed tiieir real enemy, was not tiie lacklustre members of the 
Country Party and the Nationalists (later tiie United Australia Party) 
but the communists. In his retirement speech, long-servuig Attomey 
General, John MuUan declared: 
[The AWU]...has been tiie backbone of tiie Labor movement in 
Australia, and it has been particularly helpful m Queensland 
because it has a sane and uncompromising policy in respect of...its 
opposition to communism.* 
Expressing the most overt hostility, party president, C.G. FaUon in his 
address to the 1941 Labor-in-Politics convention in Soutiiport 
maintamed that: 
The chief enemy of the Party was not "the straight out Tory", but 
the Communist who would try to obtain trade imion leadership 
positions by attacking the ALP.' 
In the federal sphere, antagonism to the communists went far 
further tiian denunciation and victimisation. Whilst the ScuUin 
administration was prepared to go no further than banning Communist 
publications like Red Leader under the provisions of the postal 
regulations, the Lyons government acted swiftiy agamst communists, 
Harold Jones, tiie director of the Commonwealth Investigation Branch 
recommended amendments to the Crimes Act m order to declare the 
CPA an unlawful association and further extend postal regulations to 
prohibit tiie transmission of "undesirable" or subversive material 
tiirough the post.'° In May 1932 the Crimes Act was so amended. 
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Three montiis later the Lyons admmistration, with its zealous anti-
communist renegade Labor men, moved resolutely to disband tiie CPA 
altogetiier. These attempts were thwarted m the High Court. 
Suggestions were subsequentiy made diat the various States frame 
legislation that would effectively nuUify an organised Communist 
Party." 
Li many respects these manoeuvres seem inappropriate considering 
the smaU membership and meffectiveness of the communists at this 
particular time. As Diane Menghetti iUustrates, with reference to 
nortii Queensland, during the early 1930s at the height of moves to 
curtaU or ban the party, the CPA and hs anciUary sorority, the 
Women's Progressive Club, was anythmg but a significant or indeed, 
revolutionary force. Rather, its members were far more prominent m 
assisting the unemployed with relief and Christmas gifts as well as 
providing members and sympathisers with an active social Ufe. 
Discussion groups, though an ideologicaUy important medium through 
which Marxist-Leninist theory could be debated and disseminated, 
took second place to these more directly practical aspects.'^ 
With the establishment of the Movement agamst War and Fascism 
and n Gmppo ItaUano contro la Guerra e il Fascismo m 1933, and 
the commitment to tiie Popular Front after 1936, tiie wider political 
agenda and discourse irrevocably altered.'^  The Spanish Relief 
Conunittee, established under the auspices of the Movement agamst 
War and Fascism, argued that the Spanish Civil War was "a fight 
between democracy and fascism."'" Though only fifty-nme 
Austi-aUans fought m Spam, this precursor to global war in 1939," 
marked a change m AustraUan communist policies and mitiatives, 
signaUing a commitment to broader based concems lUce defeating 
fascism m tiie years from 1936 to 1939. 
When tiie USSR signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany 
on 23 August 1939 commimists had to perform an extraorduiary 
ideological volte-face in order to accommodate tiiis seemingly 
inexpUcable event. The most unmediate and direct consequences m 
Austi-alia were that the CPA denounced tiie hostiUties as "..a war 
between two conflictuig groups of unperialist powers for world 
supremacy."'* The fulsome rhetoric about tiie valient fight against 
fascism disappeared, publicly subsumed m subservient adherence to 
Moscow directives.'^ Privately, m ^ y of tiie communist rank and file 
felt uneasy and confused, as their mail mtercepted by tiie mtemal 
postal and telegraphic censor m the Post-Master General's department 
reveals. An organiser in north Queensland, George Day, bemoaned 
the difficulties of trymg to convmce members to foUow impUcitiy 
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tiiese new and often unpalatable party directives. In tiie end, he 
lamented, "[I] have had to keep quiet."" 
Direct conflict between communists and tiie Queensland State 
govemment was mevitable from 1939 for two reasons. First, tiie CPA 
gamed members and mcreased popular support m tiie central and 
northem coastal districts. hi 1939 tiie communist barrister, F.W. 
Paterson, was elected an alderman on tiie TownsviUe City Council." 
Secondly, some unions, whose activities would be cmcial to die 
mobUisation for total war production, were controUed by CPA leaders. 
At tiie outset of hostilities tiie CPA argued tiiat "militant trade unions 
should go onto tiie defensive and mitiate a stmggle in tiie mdustrial 
field."^ Federal Labor leader John Curtm informed tiie Advisory War 
Council in Febmary 1940 tiiat "a good deal of tiie mdustrial problems 
we are now facuig were caused by Communists."^' This disavowal 
hardly augured weU for unions led by conununist officials. The 
Waterside Workers Federation, tiie Storeman and Packers Union, tiie 
Australian Federation of Locomotive Engmeers, tiie Queensland 
CoUier Employees Union, tiie Hospital Workers Union, the Brisbane 
branch of tiie ARU and tiie AMIEU were all controUed by conununist 
officials.^ Suspicions that communists might sabotage or nuUify tiie 
aUied war effort were heightened when the Mackay branch of tiie 
Waterside Workers Federation m November 1939 refused to load food 
bound for England. As Premier Forgan Smith informed parliament: 
It must be recognised that Australia is at war against Germany. 
To hold up Australian food ships in Australian waters would be 
just as effective as if they were sunk by German U-boats.^ 
Even when the CPA totaUy altered its policy after the USSR was 
attacked m June 1941, and ferventiy supported the aUied war effort, 
deep hostiUty and suspicion continued to be entertained about the 
loyalty and commitment of communists. Paul Hasluck comments tiiat 
"...[w]ith the Labour organisation, too, the new situation made it more 
difficult for party supporters to see the issues of war sunply and 
clearly". He concludes that tiie strong representation of Roman 
Catholics among Labor ranks contributed to this deep-seated and 
continued rejection.^ 
Commentmg upon tiie mdustrial sphere, US military inteUigence 
officers m their reports to tiie Office of Strategic Services in 
Washington constantly referted to tiie presence of communists in key 
unions like tiie WWF.^ These reports aU too frequentiy reflected the 
mtelUgence officers' total aversion to aU forms of socialist ideology 
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and practice, even in its most mild expression. Moderate Labor 
parliamentarians were often portrayed by tiiem as militants when an 
assessment based upon a more tiiorough and mformed knowledge of 
die AustraUan labour movement and its traditions would have 
modified tiiese views. But it was not sunply these conservative aUies 
who regarded radical unionists witii suspicion. 
To counteract any potential dismptions on die wharves tiiat might 
impede the transport of food, military equipment and troops, die 
Australian Army deployed its own transportation crews. In 
TownsviUe, for mstance, a port committee was established in early 
1942 which consisted of representatives from the shipping company. 
Bums Philp, tiie port controller, and the WWF. Moreover, over 1000 
soldiers were available at any time for essential work on the railways 
and wharves in the event of a strike or stoppage. Colonel North, the 
commander of the 7th and 11th Brigades, later stated "wharfies often 
stmck or threatened to strike over trivial issues...However, the Army 
went straight ahead and would not leave ships unloaded."^ 
TownsviUe was a particularly cmcial centre during tiie war, with large 
deployments of aUied resident and transit troops. Given tiie socialist 
conti-ol tiie TownsviUe City Council in 1939 and the presence of 
diverse militant unions,^' potential conflict was translated into direct 
confrontation during the first two years of tiie war. 
Early in 1940 the intelligence sections of aU branches of the 
armed services, fearful that communists would engage in acts of 
sabotage, requested the War Cabinet to implement the provisions of 
the national security (general) regulations 25 and 26 in order to 
restrict their freedom of movement, and in some cases ensure 
detention. They also recommended invoking regulation 79 which 
aUowed for and authorised thorough searches of premises in the hope 
of detectmg subversive Uterature and propaganda. Hasluck argues that 
initiaUy tiie War Cabinet and Menzies specificaUy were reluctant to 
declare illegal any party or organisation. On tiie otiier hand, David 
Garment suggests that Menzies, far from bemg reluctant, bowed to 
pressure exerted by the Country Party who, after mitiaUy refusing to 
serve with hun, entered die coalition on 14 April 1940.^ * Menzies's 
original stance may be fmitfuUy compared to tiie British method of 
dealing with the same problem. Neil Stammers argues that, up to tiie 
end of March 1940, "on tiie level of pubhc policy, the govemment 
maintained a liberal stance" by their repeated statements implying a 
commitment to the basic democratic freedom of expression even 
during wartune. Yet secretly tiie police were independently interfering 
witii tiiose opposed to the war. '^ 
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The Australian War Cabuiet caUed for a top level conference on 
29 January 1940 which was attended by die inteUigence sections of 
tiie services, tiie Commonwealtii Investigation Branch of tiie Attomey 
General's department. State poUce commissioners and senior officials 
from tiie department of Infonnation. The conference recommended 
tiiat active measures should proceed in order to detect "subversion." 
This loose inflammatory term denoted botii acts and anti-war 
sentunent. Furthermore, die delegates proposed that tiie department of 
Information produce and distribute counter-propaganda m order to 
negate the communists' arguments tiiat Australia's mvolvement in 
Malaya and die Middle East constituted a mere repetition of tiie 
imperial exercise of World War One. Lastiy, more vigilance should 
be undertaken to detect communists m die armed forces and die 
public service. Frank Cam comments that Prune Mmster Menzies 
was "displeased" witii tihese recommendations and demanded 
clarification. The subsequent report was equaUy disappointmg.^" 
Hasluck, on the other hand, mamtams that Menzies was unwiUing 
to order a general approval to declare the Communist Party an 
unlawful association. He quotes Menzies: 
...in view of the dangers of uifringement of the rights and 
privileges of mnocent persons should approval be given to 
principles widiout regard to the details and methods of 
implementing them and the provisions of safeguards to prevent 
their abuse?" 
Never a committed or convincing advocate of civil liberties for 
dissidents, Menzies's statement must be understood in die light of his 
adherence to a "busmess as usual" poUcy. On 6 Febmary 1940 tiie 
War Cabmet, havmg reconsidered the conference's extended 
recommendations, decided that no further action be taken at tiiat 
tune.^ ^ Possibly fearing that open action agamst communists could 
ensure their status as martyrs to authoritarianism, as the Industrial 
Workers of die World had been in 1916, the Menzies' govemment 
mstead preferred to bide its time. 
Events began to move swiftiy in the comuig months and provided 
Menzies with a tangible issue around which communists' activities 
could be curtailed. A major strike empted in NSW on 11 March 
1940 over attempts to overtum the decision of Mr Justice Drake-
Brockman to grant a 40 hour week m die minmg industry. This 
dispute was not resolved until 15 May." Altiiough tiie CPA was not 
directiy involved, any major mdustrial dispute could be laid at its 
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door.^ " Westem AustraUan Senator Herbert CoUett, tiien mmister for 
Repatiiation and War Service Homes, told his parliamentary 
colleagues that: 
The cancerous growtiis sappmg die vitals of our established and 
democratic mstitutions must be cut from die body of die people, 
and die very germ extermmated. The exotic growtii of 
communism must not be permitted to spread and give off 
poisonous propaganda, nor should strikes for which tiiere is no 
justification be tolerated." 
The chief of die General Staff, Sir BmdeneU White, erroneously 
aUeged tiiat the communists had mstigated die miners' strike. In even 
more alarmist terms he mamtained that the strikers would destroy the 
mines, vital to war production, if non-union labour was used. Cain 
asserts tiiat it was this particular report that prompted the War Cabmet 
to ban die Communist Party on 27 May.'* 
Secondly, after the initial shock of havmg to readjust tiieir 
arguments m Ime with Moscow policy in 1939, the communists had 
become the most organised and consistent opponent of Australia's 
involvement m anotiier "imperialistic" war. Retaliation m the 
conservative press was relentiess. The Sydney Bulletin of die 20 
March 1940 criticised these "lawless and impatriotic proceedmgs" and 
urged the federal govemment to act swiftly agamst this intemal 
political enemy. In line with British policy bemg formulated on this 
issue, on 8 April the War Cabinet decided on a general policy of 
censorship and confiscation of all communist publications." TTiese 
procedures had, however, commenced from the outbreak of war but 
had not been fuUy implemented. The controUer of the postal and 
telegraphic censorship section of die Post Master General's department 
wrote in November 1939 that: 
The dissemmation of Communist propaganda throughout Australia 
would appear to have mcreased as a result of the war, the 
Communists being ever ready to take advantage of abnormal 
conditions. 
Consequentiy, die PMG's department m Queensland alone had seized 
5,000 copies of the "Non-aggression pact" pamphlet and 51,000 copies 
of a general manifesto, aU of which had been posted.'* Sir Henry 
GuUett, now the mmister for Infonnation, stressed that previous 
measures to lunit the party's publications had failed and this more 
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decisive action was to control "an enemy m our midst openly working 
for die defeat of die aUied cause and the destmction of our Australian 
overseas troops."'' Communists were prohibited on 19 April from 
commentmg on the war, recmitment policy, Russia, any strike in die 
British Commonwealtii or fermenting or advocating mdustrial unrest."" 
Five days later even more decisive action was instigated to prevent 
communist agitation and criticism. Nine papers were banned 
ahogether - Tribune, Soviets Today, Communist Review, Wharfie, 
World Peace, Militant, Guardian, Workers' Star, and the North 
Queensland Guardian. Several other newspapers. Railway Advocate, 
Building Workers' Journal and Voice of the Jobless would be 
submitted for inspection by the censors. Furthermore, provision was 
made to seize and destroy "offendmg" presses."' Craig Johnston 
points out tiiat a roneod pamphlet version of Tribune appeared within 
a week but does not suggest how effectively this makeshift procedure 
continued to operate."^ 
Concerted action was bemg spearheaded against communists and 
not simply their publications. This would reinforce Garment's 
mterpretation, for die most beUigerent action occurred after die 
Country Party jomed the coalition."' On 17 April tiie governor 
general's address to parliament aUuded specificaUy to die unpalatable 
activities of the communists. Mmdful that freedom of speech and 
Uberty were essential elements to preserve in "the war against 
fascism", nevertheless, he mamtained that the lunits of democracy had 
been reached when: 
...men profess an aUegiance to a coimtry other than tiieir own; 
when they plan to overthrow constitutional govemment; when tiiey 
direct their activities to the defeat of their own country in a war 
to which tiieir country is committed. ...No gentle consideration 
can be extended to tiiose whose real desire is that we lost it."" 
The acting minster for Information, Sir Henry GuUett, told pariiament 
on 24 May that: 
In brief die Communists are in every form and guise enemies of 
Australia, and they should be treated as such. Every loyal 
Australian who wishes to keep his country and die British Empire 
from disaster, should repudiate Communists of any degree, and 
look upon tiiem as enemies as tiiey would enemies m arms."' 
Red Baiting 115 
Only a few voices were raised m defence of civil liberties generaUy 
and CPA specificaUy. George Martens, die Labor member for 
Herbert, guardedly declared m the House of Representative's debate 
on 1 May 1940 tiiat: 
No govemment has the right arbitrarily to suppress whole 
organisations. Such action is as impolitic as forcing strikers to go 
back to work. If there is a subversive element in the community 
it becomes infinitely more dangerous when it is driven 
underground."* 
In Britain moves were sunUarly afoot in May 1940 to suppress aU 
political dissidents and pacifists. Stammers argues that this arose 
directiy out of the invasion crisis and the govemment regarded both 
fascists and communists as potential military threats. ChurchiU 
proposed that "protective or preventive intemment" might be necessary 
if die Germans invaded."' Yet AustraUa at this time, was not 
threatened by imminent destmction or invasion and the War Cabinet's 
decision to unplement similar procedures appears a distinct 
overreaction. In a secret telegram to the Victorian Premier, A.A. 
Dunstan on 6 June 1940, Menzies stated that he was: 
...considering the use of retumed servicemen and considerable 
bodies of other loyal citizens anxious to assist in combating fifth 
column and subversive activities in Australia. We feel such 
bodies would render useful assistance. 
These paramilitary loyalists were to be co-ordinated by State police. 
Menzies concluded tiiat he fuUy appreciated that the maintenance of 
law and order was primarily a State matter."* Presumably die 
Queensland premier was sent a similar communique. 
On 27 May Menzies secretiy authorised die regulation bannmg tiie 
CPA. State premiers were informed tiiat the order would be 
promulgated on 15 June. This would aUow tune to organise a 
Commonwealth-wide series of raids, arrests and seizures of presses. 
Stan Moran later recaUed tiiat tiie security forces severely damaged 
household fumiture like mattresses in tiie search for subversive 
literature."' The Courier Mail of 17 June 1940 confirmed tiiat "tiiese 
raids were a carefuUy planned drive agamst possible fifth columnists." 
Party activist, W.J. Brown rather dramaticaUy describes them as a 
"rampage conducted by Hitier's SS men."'" Headlinmg an article, 
"PoUce Seize Rifles from Communists", a move calculated to instil 
116 War on the Homefront 
fear and suspicion in the public, the Courier Mail reported tiiat 
midnight raids had occurred at Caims, Stratford, Gordonvale, Mareeba, 
TuUy and Brisbane. Mackay was not mentioned, though it was in 
tills town that the police's actions were publicly criticised. The 
Worker, the official organ of the AWU, was predictably silent on tiiis 
entire issue. 
Indeed, in Queensland a series of blunders surrounded these raids. 
Instead of consulting closely with the Investigation Branch of die 
Attomey General's department, the body which was to co-ordinate die 
national manoeuvre, Premier Forgan Smith constmcted his own list" 
and specificaUy targeted leading trade unionists from his hometown of 
Mackay, despite a lack of any evidence that Mackay was a prominent 
centre for radicalism and disloyalty. 
The secretary of die Mackay branch of the ARU, B. Heckson, 
wrote to Forgan Smitii five days after the raid that his house had 
been searched altiiough he was not a member of die CPA. In furdier 
correspondence witii tiie federal Attomey General, W.M. Hughes, 
Heckson continued his protest that ARU joumals had been seized and 
tiiat private letters and CathoUc literamre belonging to his family had 
been confiscated. T.C. Lock of die Mackay Trades and Labour 
Council and P. Linsky, president of the Mackay branch of the 
Waterside Workers Federation, neitiier of whom were Communists, 
had also been raided.'^  
Attemptmg to counter criticism, Forgan Smith, apologeticaUy stated 
to Hughes, tiiat: 
The only desire of the Queensland Govemment is to aid the 
Commonwealth in unearthmg subversive activities; but we are of 
tiie opinion tiiat the exclusion of any mstimtion or mdividual from 
examination, unless specificaUy good grounds exist, would defeat 
the purpose of die regulation. ...We have no desire, of course, to 
mterfere witii normal union activities witiim tiie law; but it would 
be absurd not to recognise diat certain union officials, if not 
tiiemselves Communists, are at least wiUmg tools." 
It is no comcidence tiiat tiie two union officials selected by Forgan 
Smidi, m consultation witii senior police officers m die special branch, 
were from tiie ARU and die WWF. Given tiie long-standing 
suspicion of mamstream labour, especiaUy members of the 
pariiamentary Labor Party, towards these radical unions, his targets 
were predictable. In a sense such a move was calculated, particularly 
m die case of Heckson, to settle old grievances against the ARU 
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extending back to the 1927 Soutii Johnstone railway strike. These 
pattems contmued after die war as chapter six wiU demonstrate; for, 
in 1948, one of die most major mdustrial disputes ever wimessed in 
Queensland, empted agaui m the railways, leadmg Premier Hanlon to 
declare a state of emergency. As Margaret Bridson Cribb 
demonstrates, this strike coincided with the USSR's take over of 
Czechoslovakia which "added to the atmosphere of intense hatred and 
suspicion of Communists."'" 
Under pressure to explain the Queensland blunder in June 1940 to 
Hanlon, then secretary for Health and Home Affairs, Police 
Commissioner CarroU stated that the problem lay with the unprecise 
wording of mles (5(2) of national security [subversive organisation] 
regulation, statutory mle, 1940, number 109). On the evening of the 
promulgation of the regulation, the police "went out to search for, and 
seized, literature relating to a body which had been declared 
unlawful." The point at issue was what constituted "relating to" and 
could sympathisers or coUeagues of communists be subsumed under 
this vague term?" Five days after the 15 June raid Police 
Commissioner CarroU wrote to Colonel Jones of the Commonwealth 
police for further clarification and suggestions for the destination of 
the huge quantity of seized documents, books and pamphlets. With 
barrister Fred Paterson, later communist member for Bowen, 
attempting to file a civil action agamst these seizures, clarification 
was urgently needed.'* In response to this legal vaguery, the 
Commonwealth govemment altered the offending term "relating to" to 
"belonging to" or "used on behalf of or "a body which had been 
declared unlawful." 
Six montiiis later Forgan Smitii wrote to Menzies expressing his 
dissatisfaction with the amended regulation, stating that "from an 
administrative pomt of view these regulations are regarded as highly 
unsatisfactory as far as the Queensland police are concemed." Under 
the national security regulations the State police could not initiate a 
prosecution except when it had been authorised by the responsible 
minister of the Commonwealth, such as the Attomey General. The 
essential conflict lay not so much in the delegation of powers but, in 
the Queensland poUce commisioner's perception, die Commonwealtii's 
reluctance to prosecute. Several mcidents were provided to 
substantiate tiiis aUegation. First, m the case of WiUiam Gibson who 
had been caught, according to the police report, "red handed" 
distributing "communist literature of a subversive namre" to the 
employees of Hancock and Gore in Brisbane, the Commonwealth 
Crown Solicitor did not recommend a prosecution. On another 
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occasion, after extensive tune consumuig surveiUance, a "large amount 
of subversive literamre" was confiscated from Donald Dickie who was 
distributing this anti-war material around many mdustrial centres in 
Brisbane. Agaui, after a tiiorough exammation by die Commonwealth 
Attomey-General's department no charges were laid as it determined 
that there was "insufficient evidence of the commission of any 
offence." 
Forgan Smitii contmued that his senior police officers "regard 
[these]...decision[s] [not to prosecute] as most astonishmg under the 
circumstances." In only two cases of the many under surveiUance by 
die State police did die Commonwealtii proceed with a prosecution. 
The State govemment, believing that its thorough monitoring of the 
activities of communists, socialists and other radicals gave it an 
unparaUeled insight into local activities, baulked at the bureaucratic 
restrictions laid down by a distant admmistration. Forgan Smith 
petulantly continued: 
Consequentiy, however anxious the State authorities might be to 
see the law m this connection is vindicated, tiiey are powerless in 
the absence of the authority referred to.'' 
Under the initial promulgation of the national security (subversive 
organisations) regulation of 15 June 1940 only die Communist Party, 
the Communist League of Australia, die Mmority Movement, the 
Revolutionary Worker's League, Australian League for Peace and 
Democracy and die Australian Youtii Council were banned.'* The 
Communist Party m Queensland changed its name to the Queensland 
Political Rights Committee m order to avoid prosecution and 
harassment. Under die regulations, "unlawful doctrines" were defined 
as: 
...any doctrines or principles which are advocated by a body which 
has been declared unlawful, and any doctrmes or principles 
whatsoever which are prejudicial to die defence of the 
Commonwealth or die effective prosecution of die war. 
This particular clause tiierefore aUowed police and mteUigence 
agencies wide discretion in tiie monitoring and prosecution of fonner 
communists, reasonmg tiiat mere changes in tiie title of organisations 
m no way nuUified tiieir pemicious beliefs. The definition of what 
might reasonably constimte an "unlawful doctrme", given its legal 
imprecision and vagueness, aUowed a considerable degree of latitude 
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in interpretation. Throughout Australia, fifty communists or 
sympathisers were arrested m mid 1940, witii prominent activists 
Horace RatcUff and Max Thomas bemg intemed." 
The otiier issues which arose m June 1940 which possessed 
potential ramifications for Queensland, ahnost as significant as 
imminent mvasion m May 1940 had been in Britaui, was the entry of 
Italy into die war. Only five days elapsed between Italy's declaration 
of war on 10 June and the banning of the Communist Party m 
Austi-aUa. The Queensland poUce in their security reports described 
individual Italians m die sugar belt ahnost mterchangeably as eitiier 
'fascist' or 'communist'. This seemingly offered both the State and 
federal governments die perfect opportunity to mtem enemy alien 
dissidents without regard to the vexmg problem of interpreting the 
national security regulations given the unprecision in regulations 
conceming iUegal organisations. Yet their categorisation on the basis 
of national origms rather than ideology meant that most were intemed 
in March and April 1942 when a Japanese mvasion appeared 
inuninent (refer to chapter 2).*° Australian authorities were caught in 
a dilemma that involved their perceptions of who was potentiaUy 
more disloyal to the British Empire - fascists or communists -and 
whetiier Australian bom communists were more of a threat to security 
and morals than 'foreigners'. On 16 June 1940 four branches of tiie 
Fascist Union in Brisbane, Innisfail, Caims and Stanthorpe were 
raided, with "thousands of rifles", ammunition and gelignite 
confiscated. The Courier Mail of 17 June 1940, widiout 
understandmg or exploring these issues, merely informed readers that 
these police raids were a "drive against communists and fascists." 
Whetiier they were perceived as potential fifth columnists, as they 
were in Britam and therefore demanded immediate decisive action, 
was not explored. 
In his testimony in Febmary 1941 before the newly established 
Aliens' Tribunal, Colonel Sydney Whittington of military inteUigence 
Soutiiem Command declared that communist enemy aliens had been 
intemed in 1939 and 1940 only when their proselytmg activities, 
especiaUy m the unions "rendered them dangerous." This occurred 
infrequentiy.*' His question reveals the mefficiency and cross 
purposes involved m the delegation of powers ui security matters. 
The local police mitiaUy made all security assessments. A list 
prepared by die TownsviUe poUce district m April 1940 of those 
"considered should be interned in the event of hostilities with Italy" 
described Alfio C, a labourer residmg m Home HiU as a "strong 
Communist" with "fascist tendencies" as already discussed m chapter 
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2. Military inteUigence at Victoria Barracks m Brisbane decided 
agamst his initial uitemment m view of the ideologicaUy confused and 
naive police report.*^ Carmelo P. of Ayr described ui a police report 
of 6 June 1940 as a "very treacherous" conununist. He was not 
intemed untU March 1942. His miUtary inteUigence dossier 'noted' 
die civil police assessment but decided he was not a communist nor 
"disloyal to die British Empire."*' Generally, Queensland Italians even 
when socialists, anarchists or communists were mtemed as enemy 
aliens only in the crisis of tiie early months of 1942. 
In northem Queensland, particularly m tiiose areas where 
communists had been active, local police whose political sophistication 
was mdunentary and relied far more upon bigotry than mformed 
opinion, after June 1940 continued vigilance agamst what tiiey viewed 
as subversion and disloyalty. At Tully, Sergeant Qumn warned 
unionists tiiat m his estunation "anythmg Left came under die 
National Security Regulations"; whilst ui TownsviUe the pohce 
requested tiiat the TownsviUe Bulletin refram from pubUshing 
advertisements for the Left Book Club. Members of the ARU 
repeatedly complained to W.M. Hughes, that the TownsviUe pohce 
were "interfering with the Left Book Club." Pointing out that it was 
primarily an "anti-fascist education club", the ARU demanded tiiat 
"..until declared a subversive organisation it should be left alone by 
Premier Smith's Gestapo Squad."*" 
It is ironical to contemplate a radical union appealmg to Hughes 
to aid their members m an ideological and tactical stmggle witii a 
Labor govemment. Though m Britam, tiie Left Book Club operated 
primarily as an anti-fascist educational body, m AustraUa its main 
purpose was to distribute and popularise communist beliefs "suitably 
diluted to win popular support in a generaUy unpropitious climate of 
opinion."*' Yet, this should not m any way have given- the police an 
excuse to aimoy and monitor the activities of the club, for it was not 
proscribed organisation. 
The issue of the harassment of Left Book Club members in north 
Queensland extended mto the general discourse on civil liberties under 
war. The annual general meetmg of the Australian Council for Civil 
Liberties held in Melboume on 20 June 1941 debated die incident. 
On diis occasion, Hughes had not taken side with ARU members 
agamst die State govemment. He contmued to reiterate general poUcy 
antagonistic and beUigerent towards the radical left: 
The [Federal] govemment does not propose to permit a section of 
die Left Book Club supportmg the Communist (stop the war) 
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viewpomt, as opposed to die GoUanz-Laski (stop Hitier) viewpomt, 
to meet togetiier for the purpose of advocating unlawful doctrines, 
and the action of die police authorities in prohibiting any meeting 
for that purpose meets with my fuU approval.** 
Though the Queensland commissioner of police stated tiiat the 
police force "is carrymg out their (sic) duties with tact and discretion 
in difficuh and trying circumstances", die evidence suggests odierwise. 
Even CarroU's report to the chief secretary's office contradicted tiiis 
claim. First, he claimed that there was no recognised branch of the 
Left Book Club m TuUy, members being all communists and tiierefore 
the club was "a subsidiary of the CPA." This pronouncement defies 
logical scmtiny. Secondly, "the preponderance of residents m TuUy 
are of alien origins." Whether CarroU meant to imply tiiat therefore 
ipso facto foreigners would be attracted to radical or subversive 
doctiines or whetiier he believed diat tiiey did not read English is 
unclear. 
On 22 June 1941 German divisions mvaded die USSR. The CPA 
immediately changed its policy of total opposition to the war effort to 
fervent support. The official ban on the CPA was not lifted until 18 
December 1942 to coincide with the appointment of a minister to the 
Soviet Republic.*' Guarantees were sought and promises that 
communists would attempt, through their trade union leadership, to 
promote war production, prevent stoppages and curtail absenteeism.** 
The issue of support for the Soviet Union became a divisive issue 
witiiin mainstream Labor ranks. In October 1941 tiie ALP expeUed 
two parUamentarians, G.H. Marriott (Bulunba) and George Taylor 
(Enoggera) for their continued membership in organisations like die 
Austi-alian-Soviet Friendship League and the Aid-To-Russia 
Committee.*' These organisations, established and maintamed by 
communists, were regarded as anathema to solidly patriotic Labor 
ideologues. In 1942 divisions between die pro and anti Soviet 
elements witiiin the ALP in Queensland became wider and 
increasingly irreparable. Controversy over civilian aid to Russia led 
to a split in north Queensland with several branches in TownsviUe 
seceding from die ALP. They then formed die North Queensland 
Labor Party (Hermit Park Branch).™ It was no coincidence that 
TownsviUe witnessed die formation of this dissident movement witii 
its concentration of communist aldermen on the local govemment 
council and the presence of vocal militant trade unionists. 
Queensland was not alone m tiiese ideological wars withm the labour 
movement. Previously m April 1940 there had been a split m die 
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NSW branch of die ALP when former Premier, J.T. Lang led a 
breakaway faction to form die ALP (Non-Communist). Six federal 
representatives belonged to die Lang party." Despite the 1925 ban on 
communist aUegiance witiim die ALP, die issue defied srniple 
resolution. Confusion was compounded by the ambiguities 
engendered by die European war. 
This process of fragmentation m nortii Queensland reveals 
mamstream Labor's deep-seated antagonism towards communism. 
Whetiier tiie split would have occurred if die ban on tiie CPA had 
been lifted when die USSR jomed the aUies is problematical. 
Certainly, fierce hostility towards communists did not substantiaUy 
abate throughout die war and reached a crescendo m postwar 
industrial conflicts like die meatworkers strike of 1946, the railway 
strike two years later and attempts to ban the party federaUy by 
Menzies m 1951. Communists contmued to be under surveiUance 
after die ban was revoked in late 1942, diough suspicion no longer 
resulted ui raids, confiscation of property and arrests as it had done in 
1940. 
Attention m 1943 shifted to die trotskyites. This is hardly 
surprising; for die trotskyists "maintamed a revolutionary defeatist 
position throughout die war."'^  W.B. Sunpson, die director general of 
Security ui Canberra, wrote to the local deputy director in Brisbane in 
May requestmg mformation of tiiis group who were regarded as "die 
successors to tiie IWW from the last war." Admitting tiiat "tiieir 
ideologies...differ", Simpson furtiier contended that "their revolutionary 
activities have very much m common." SpecificaUy, he was keen to 
lay at the Trotskyites' door recent outbreaks of "sabotage and 
mdustrial unrest."" The deputy director m Brisbane, whilst 
acknowledgmg tiiat they were "like the extreme IWW m the last war", 
nevertheless, stated that there were less than a dozen in Queensland. 
He suggested that surveiUance attention be mmed to NSW "where 
they have considerable support from their American sources."'" The 
Queensland govemment felt m no way threatened by or even 
concemed witii the trotskyites. Unlike communists, the trotskyites 
held no union positions nor public office in the town councils and 
Legislative Assembly. 
The surveiUance, harassment and intemment of communists in the 
years from 1939 to 1942 represents a contmuation of major policy 
directives tiiat emerged in die First World War. The Labor party 
denounced communists, refusing them membership in the mainstream 
party after 1925. Throughout the 1920s successive conservative 
federal governments extended the powers of the 1926 Crimes Act and 
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postal regulations to tiiwart and contaui the activities of "subversives". 
Attempting to ban die party m 1932, federal politicians, witii tiie 
initiatives and encouragement of the various inteUigence agencies, 
sought to destroy forever an abhorrent ideology. The war provided 
the opportunity to put diis policy into effect witii few criticisms from 
civU libertarians and radical members of the ALP. In Queensland, in 
particular, the Labor Party, dominated by Catholics and members of 
the AWU, strove to outdo the conservatives in their hatred and 
opposition to communism. What is most ironical to contemplate is 
the admonishment of the Queensland govemment by Attomey General 
Hughes over its overzealous, misplaced raids upon supposed 
communists after the party was declared unlawful m June 1940. With 
the ban lifted in late 1942, direct confrontation abated, only to lie 
dormant until the intense anti-communist purges of the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. 
VI 
Who Really Governs This Country? 
State Intervention During the 1946 
Meat Workers' Strike and the 1948 
Railway Strike 
Since 1938 when specific provisions for the declaration of a state of 
emergency were incorporated into the State Transport Act, seven 
proclamations have been issued - during the 1946 meat workers' 
strike; die 1948 railway strike; tiie 1956 pastoral strUce; tiie 1965 
Mount Isa dispute; die 1973 tour of die Soutii African springbok 
mgby union team; the 1974 Brisbane and district floods and lastly the 
1985 power industry dispute. Premier Johannes BjeUce-Petersen also 
threatened publicly to declare a state of emergency during animated 
protest, conducted largely by Aborigines and their supporters, when 
the Commonwealth Games were staged in Brisbane in 1982. Clearly, 
only one occurrence was in response to a natural disaster, 
Queensland is hardly unique in the use of extreme measures to deal 
with industrial disputes; for instance the British Emergency Powers 
Act of 1920, which extended and enlarged the provisions of die 
Defence of the Realm Act, was passed specificaUy "to forestaU a 
general strike."' In the major strikes of the immediate post-war era in 
Queensland, war-time provisions of the national security regulations 
could no longer be employed. Rather, extreme peace-time measures 
not applicable in war were used. Ultimately Queensland trade 
unionists engaged in strikes were treated far more harshly and 
repressively under State legislation by a Labor govemment than would 
have been the case under the Commonwealth in war tune. 
In Queensland, however. Labor govemments have consistentiy 
displayed a penchant for employing a variety of measures, supposedly 
to counteract civil and mdustrial unrest. Concurrently witii the 
unplementation of highly repressive legislation, they aimed, not so 
much to destroy unionism, but to render militancy contamed and 
passive within the institutionalised framework of the mdustiial 
conciliation and arbitration system. In Australia generally 
govemments, regardless of whether tiiey are Labor or non-Labor, 
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have, moreover, displayed a willingness to use diverse methods, 
incorporatmg variable powers of persuasion, propaganda and overt 
coercion, to achieve industrial "peace". These procedures achieved 
their apotheosis m Queensland m the years 1946 to 1948. 
Indeed die metaphor of "peace" and "war" is not misplaced; m 
particular, in the post-war period, the war-time rhetoric of loyalty to a 
just cause and uncompromisingly fighting a determined enemy, in this 
case communists mstead of nazis and fascists, was reappraised, 
extended, and refabricated in order to defeat the agents of an insidious 
ideology. Charles RusseU, the Country Party member for Dalby, in a 
Legislative Assembly debate which occurred at the height of the 
railway workers strike on 9 March 1948, categoricaUy stated that: 
By die tune...[this strike] is over there will be no one left inside 
to fight, and the country wiU be mined. The country wiU be 
riddled witii fiftii coliunnists more effective than Hitler even 
tiiought of, and we wiU have a situation which has recently taken 
place in Czechoslovakia.^ 
On tiiis pomt, die AWU journal. The Worker concurred with its 
ostensible political opponents. The headline of 1 March 1948 issue 
declared "Soviet Jackboot Strikes through Czechoslovakia." The 
subsequent text warned: 
In addition. Communist agents are operating m every country, 
includmg those of the British Empire...msidious propaganda [is] 
bemg disseminated by the hoodlums who pretend to be 
democratic, but who are supportmg a Dictatorship of greater 
menace than those of Hitier or MussoUni. 
Tom Sheridan, writing in 1987 on the interrelationship between 
ti-ade unions and post-war reconstmction, charts some of the broad 
aspect of die territory uivolved m analysmg the perception tiiat 
communism, through its supposed control of the national tiade imion 
movement, was attemptmg to bring dowm die economy by engaging m 
complete industrial sabotage.' For any discussion of particular 
industrial disputes, m this case die 1946 meat workers' and 1948 
railway strikes, must be situated and imderstood withm die 
contemporary preoccupation, uideed obsession (culmmating with 
Menzies' attempts to ban the conununist party constitutionally in 1951 
and die spUts m the ALP from 1955 to 1957) witii tiie imagmed 
immmence of communist victory. 
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Several uiterlinked factors need exploration. First title disavowal 
throughout the Commonwealth by mainstream Labor, in both die 
industrial and political wings, of any radical mtentions or policies -
the "new order" was to be constmcted within the battered, if 
reformed, sheU of a society that had endured a traumatic depression 
and six years of war; secondly, the wiUmgness with which Labor 
govemments would use extreme measures, whether Hanlon's in 
Queensland using "state of emergency" declarations twice m the space 
of two years in circumstances that did not constitute severe "civil 
unrest" or Chifley's administration in 1949 deploymg the Army in die 
coal strike"; lastly, a full exammation of the range, complexity and 
consequences of the measures deployed: die manipulation of die 
conciliation and arbitration system; new amendments to the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Acts; the introduction of punitive 
legislation like tiie Industrial Law Amendment BiU hi March 1948; 
the propaganda campaigns launched hi the press to discredit and vilify 
union militancy; die use of police coercion, violence and surveiUance; 
arrest and detention of selected promment unionists or their legal 
advocates and finally, die declaration of a state of emergency. 
Sheridan states that: 
It is significant testament to the general turbulence of die second 
haU of die 1940s tiiat, altiiough tiiese disputes mcluded some of 
die largest, longest, and most bitter stoppages in Australian history, 
diey have hardly left any impression on die public consciousness. 
The most notable of tiiem for our present purpose were a tiiirteen-
week printmg trade dispute m NSW (1945), a fifteen week NSW 
Steel Strike (1945-46), and a 25 week Victorian metal trades 
dispute (1946-47) witii which were associated several shorter 
transport, power and foundry disputes m the south eastern 
mamland states.' 
Leavmg aside die nebulous concept of "public consciousness", police 
action in die St Patrick Day's March 1948 during die Queensland 
railway strike is frequently mvoked to diis day by elderiy fomier 
unionists, many of whom were never communists nor vaguely 
sympathetic to its doctrines or tactics, as an example of the misuse 
and mcreasmg power of poUcmg practices. Frank Nolan, die 
moderate secretary of die ARU, recaUed bitteriy in 1974: 
ff ever tiiere was a weak coUection of salary-chasmg opportunist 
humbugs devoid of even a semblance of workmg class prmciples, 
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it was die members of die Labor Party led by Hanlon. No Tory 
government could have been more vicious.* 
BjeUce-Petersen's politicisation of the police, in particular their 
deployment in order to suppress legitunate pubUc assembly and 
freedom of expression, may be regarded as a direct extension of 
Hanlon's processes, methods, and examples. This view does however 
obscure the manner m which govemments, whether the Liberal-
conservative coalition in 1891, the Liberal administration of Denman 
in the 1912 Brisbane general strike or Ryan's Labor admhiistration in 
die 1918 meat workers strike at Ross River, TownsviUe, used overt 
force to Umit industrial militancy.' Undoubtedly Bjelke-Petersen used 
Hanlon's actions as a precedent in the declaration of states of 
emergency, when no real emergency existed. As Otwin Marenin 
observes: 
PoUce practice during times of crisis...are "core events" which 
reveal what is hidden m normal times by consensus and apathy, 
namely that order and die state rest ultunately on force and that 
normal orders are fundamentally inequitable.* 
Lastly, die process of die marginalisation of the Queensland 
experience (mdeed aU AustraUan history outside of the southeast 
crescent) exempUfied by Sheridan's 1987 analysis, aUows die 
oversight of valuable data typifyuig the manner in which die state's 
apparatus can be mobiUsed against either dissident or militant 
unionists.' Ironically, CM. Croft, the senior Canadian trade 
commissioner m Austi-aUa wrote to Hanlon m Febmary 1947, 
requesting copies of Queensland's mdustrial legislation as "apparently 
Queensland is looked upon as a model in these matters."'" Indeed, in 
die unreserved use of coercion and propaganda, Queensland was a 
"model m these matters" reflecting par excellence the disharmony of 
post-war AustraUa. 
Queensland legislation might have been considered exemplary; but, 
as die Queensland Industrial Registrar, P.J. Wallace admitted later that 
montii that "...[w]itii reference to the extent tiiat arbitration has 
prevented mdustrial unrest, I must say tiiat this is very difficult to 
determme."" Since 1916, hi his estunation, Queensland had 
experienced seven major disputes, tiiough his Ust curiously omitted the 
1925 railway strike when Premier WiUiam MacCormack personaUy 
intervened, countermanded die mkiister for Railway's authority, and 
unilateraUy dismissed strUcmg State employees on die railways. 
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As Douglas Blackmur contends, the issues of communism in 
unions (which die CatiioUc Social Smdies Movement hoped 
irrevocably to nuUify) and Labor's declming electoral support m die 
immediate post war elections (attributed to heightened mdustrial 
unrest) form the background scenario for any understanding of tiie 
Hanlon admmistration's actions in 1946 and 1948.'^ Blackmur furtiier 
mamtams that tiie fragmentation represented by breakaway Labor 
groups m north Queensland (dealt with in chapter 5), the continued 
electoral success of former Labor radical pariiamentarians, Taylor and 
Marriott and the refusal of key imions to either jom or reaffiliate widi 
die ALP brought "anger and disiUusionment" to a "boiling point diat 
exploded mitiaUy m 1946."" 
Since die 1930s when die Communist Party had been primarily 
significant m die Unemployed Workers Movement and various popular 
front organisations (see chapter 5), a marked change m tactics, 
organisational and numerical strengtii and determination can be 
wimessed. Direct action hi key sectors of the economy was 
advocated in die post-war era as one of the significant means by 
which a revolutionary new order would be ushered into Australia.'" 
One of their most entrenched opponents who sought only to make 
minor, msignificant adjustments to an inequable and unjust society, 
was the right wing of the ALP. In Queensland this meant the AWU 
and its influence m die caucus of the parliamentary Labor Party." As 
Liberal lummary and later Prime Mmister, Harold Holt stated in a 
House of Representatives debate hi July 1947, it was the AWU tiiat 
had made "a real fight against Conununist infiltration into trade union 
affairs."'* Writing m March 1948, Hanlon categoricaUy stated tiiat: 
It is obvious that Trade Unionism must face up to die gravity of 
die tiireat that the Communist movement is makmg to tiie Labor 
Party in both mdustrial and political branches." 
Therefore a concerted campaign to obliterate diis grave direat was 
regarded as legitimate and life-depending. 
Indeed, as WiUiam Morris Hughes stated in the House of 
Representatives on 4 July 1946: 
The Premier of Queensland has pointed the way the Prime 
Mmister should go...he should insist tiiat, once and for aU, tiiere 
must be a showdown and diat we could see who reaUy governs 
diis country...Conimunism is at die back of tiiis [meat workers'] 
strike, as of every otiier strike. The Labor Party has repudiated 
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die Communist and outiawed them from die Labor 
Leagues...[Nevertiieless] Communism controls aU but one of the 
great mdustiial organisations of tiiis country.'* 
Hughes' involved analysis of contemporary events isolates several 
important issues: first, as the subsequent argument wUl demonstrate, 
Haidon's conservative Labor admmistration did not hesitate to use 
extreme measures to suppress mdustrial militancy, tactically but 
inaccurately equated with subversive communist agitation; secondly, 
fliat his unflmchmg action proved the benchmark of legitunate tactics 
which die rest of die Commonwealth could follow and lastly that 
Labor and communism, often conflated in the conservative mind, were 
distinct and antagonist entities. 
Generally, however, conservatives did not acknowledge that 
Hanlon's govemment m botiii 1946 and 1948 had used aU the weight 
of tiie state's apparatus to destroy imion militancy. In a debate on 
die introduction of the repressive Industrial Law Amendment Bill in 
March 1948, ostensibly to prevent picketmg and intimidation but 
which greatly extended police powers over private citizens, the 
Country Party member for Fassifem, Adolf MuUer proclaimed that: 
[The government's!... attitude during the meat strUce and during 
die last few weeks certahdy does not reflect credit on them... It 
[the strike] might end in revolution. Unless you control law-
breakers,you will eventuaUy reach the stage where you are unable 
to control them." 
RusseU went so far as to assert that: "PersonaUy, I thudc the 
Communists have been a God-send to the government. They were 
made die scapegoats. The govemment was behmd them and they did 
not get any of the blame tiiey should ready have mcurred."^" 
This line of argument totaUy obscured die deep antagonism 
mamtained by mamstream Labor for the communists and overlooks 
die extent and effects of state control during both die 1946 and 1948 
stiikes. 
Blackmur, m the most detailed analysis of these events to date, 
contends that the Amalgamated Meat Industry Employees' Union 
(AMIEU) "had a radical tradition. Its mdustrial objectives and 
strategies found mspiration in anarcho-syndicaUsm." '^ By the war 
years, as Terence Cutler argues, there was "growmg enthusiasm for, 
or at least tolerance of, Communism witii[m] tiie AMIEU."^ This 
process contmued throughout and after the war. The tactics of direct 
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action and confrontation were remforced in this period. The AMIEU 
regarded die 'new order' as a contest for supremacy between 
socialism and capitalism m botii Australia and on die mtemational 
level.^ Blackmur states tiiat tiie 1945 steel strUce was regarded as die 
first round m tiiis bitter and mevitable conflict.^ " 
On 4 March 1946 die management of die Queensland Co-operative 
Bacon Association at Murarrie on die outskirts of Brisbane dismissed 
four workers. A dispute ensued after a secret ballot of AMIEU voted 
overwhehningly for strUce action after Thomas Bodiwick dismissed 
workers widi long seniority at die Oxley meat preservmg works. By 
26 March die meat export companies instituted a lock-out. The 
dispute lasted until 10 July." Sheridan argues tiiat tiie smaUer scale 
bacon and meat preserving companies "moved closer togedier during 
die war years" and looked fearfully towards the assumption of peace 
when die government's automatic purchase of tiieir products would 
cease. Hence they began the season in a beUigerent and anxious 
mood.^ 
Claims tiiat the strike was communist led and mspired would not 
appear altogetiier correct; for the CPA was distinctiy uneasy about die 
conciliatory attimdes it perceived m die AMIEU executive. As The 
Guardian of 26 April 1946 clahned: 
The leaders and members alUce must overcome die present 
passivity and re-leam how to wage a ready weU-organised and 
determined stmggle. 
Underlying this scepticism over die handlmg of the strike lay a 
suspicion that anarcho-syndicalist fervour, which the communists 
viewed as undisciplined and counter-productive, would triumph among 
meat workers. Yet die cabmet persisted m the publicly held claim 
that the strike was caused by "the present anarchy of Communism." '^ 
Blackmur states however that the belief tiiat the 1946 meat mdustry 
strike was "communist controUed" was "firmly embedded in 
conservative political culture m the years after 1946."^ Sheridan 
fiindamentally agrees witii this analysis. He concludes tiiat this 
particular dispute witnessed the establishment of the Industrial 
Groups. '^ 
In the railway strike, which lasted from 3 Febmary to 6 April 
1948, the charge that it was led and orchestrated by communists was 
agaui paramount. Comparmg the situation m Queensland with die 
revolution occurring simultaneously in Czechoslovakia, a long article 
in die Courier Mail of 28 Febmary 1948 stated that: 
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And here at die seat of die Queensland Govemment communist-led 
stiikers were defymg a court of die land...[bringmg] die life of the 
State to tiiat chaotic condition m which Red mischief dirives...For 
tiie people of Czechoslovakia it has been armed police and violent 
suppression. The moral for Australians is: It can happen here. It 
has been happening. 
The Worker of 9 Febmary 1948, in more general terms commented: 
It remains for the rank and file of aU unions to treat the cancer of 
communism as it should be treated. They are die industry 
physicians and surgeons of their own welfare; they alone can rid 
tiiemselves of the "disease" which is just as dangerous to human 
society as the malignant tumours which have brought untold 
suffering to mankmd. 
Certain key players in the scenario lUce Theo Kissick of 
Amalgamated Federated Union of Locomotive Engineers (AFULE) 
were communists; the ARU had a long history of miUtancy and had 
clashed decisively with the McCormack administration in 1925 and 
1927 but had been primarily influenced by the One Big Union (OBU) 
principle.'" Blackmur concludes, and on tiiis point Margaret Bridson 
Cribb would concur, that, whilst the Communist Party "did play a 
vital role m the dispute", the bitter confrontation was m no way "a 
Communist party plot designed to overthrow constitutional 
government"." Moreover, organisers of sympathetic unions like 
Claude MerreU of the Amalgamated Enguieering Union (AEU) and 
supporters like Harry Harvey of the TLC were moderates within the 
ALP. 
Writmg on 28 November 1945, die minister for Labour and 
Employment, V.C. Gair outiined the proposals of a conference on 
"industrial unrest" which was to be held m Canberra on 10 December 
1945. In this important document which articulates the Hanlon 
government's rhetoric (though hardly the reality as events m 1946 and 
1948 revealed subsequentiy), detailed, if udierentiy contradictory, 
premises were proffered. On the one hand, at the outset, the 
document stated that "mdustrial unrest m the Commonwealtii is more 
intense now as compared to the unrest existmg in normal tunes". Yet 
in die next paragraph in an overview of the "last 20 or 30 years", 
Gair claimed that "if tiiere has been any change it has been in favour 
of improvmg mdustrial relations". This relative harmony m 
Queensland he attributed ahnost exclusively to: 
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The Uidustiial Court, hi its early Ufe, having to a large extent 
captured the confidence of employees and employers causmg both 
to look to it for justice when disputes arise.'^ 
This document iUummates several cmcial themes in any estunation 
of die Hanlon government's approach to mdustrial relations. First, it 
sU-essed tiiat it was the Industrial Court tiiat could only successfully 
arbitrate upon any areas of mdustrial conflict. The mdustrial registi-ar, 
writmg m Febmary 1947, was not so confident about the ability of 
the court to control conflict -
1 may say, without fear of contradiction, that aU major disputes 
that have taken place since this Court has been established have 
eventually been settied by die Court ... I thhik it can reasonably be 
contended that the establishment of an mdustrial tribunal has been 
a large factor in shortening the length of these disputes." 
Though not explicitly enunciated, the minister and the mdustiial 
registrar stressed quite separate pomts. Gair articulated the tenet tiiat 
the court was an independent body that arbitrated without govemment 
mterference. Further it was mamtained as govemment poUcy that: 
It is considered that legislative action is unnecessary to regulate 
industrial matters excepting where anomalies or evils beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Court exist.'" 
Hanlon, replying to die senior Canadian trade conunissioner in 
April 1947, stated categoricaUy: 
The Industrial Court is set up under the (ConciUation and 
Arbitration Acts) as an independent body which may speedily 
solve industrial disputes." 
The farcical notion that die courts operated mdependendy of 
govemment pressure and mtervention was mamtained, despite 
overwhehning evidence from 1946 to die contrary. 
WaUace, the mdustrial registrar, took die more accurate, if subtiy 
acrimonious view that the court only settled disputes "eventuaUy". hi 
his summation of die 1946 meat industry confrontation which he 
termed "a more or less general strike", die industrial registrar 
concluded that: 
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The dispute eventuaUy spread to the waterside workers and 
coahnmers, and was settied by an Order-in-CouncU issued by die 
Govemment, directing the men to return to work and submit their 
dispute either to the Industrial Magistrate or to the Court.'* 
Clearly, as events unfolded, the government did not preserve the 
autonomy of the industrial courts but rather over-rode their authority 
by issuing the extreme measure of an Order-in-Council. 
A second point that the November 1945 document stressed was 
the difficult reconcUiation of Commonwealth and State jurisdiction m 
industrial affairs. Gair beUeved relations were most poor in those 
industries, like coalmining, shipping and the waterfront which were 
govemed by awards determined by the Commonwealth Industrial 
Court. Queensland industrial relations "could be improved.,.if the 
Commonwealth Industrial Court canceUed the awards applying to them 
and permitted the Industrial Court of Queensland to prescribe wages 
and woikmg conditions..."." As chapter I demonstrated, successive 
Queensland govemments were both parochial and eager to maintam 
or, if circumstances presented themselves, extend State powers. In the 
meat woikers strike the federal government had made overtures to 
Hanlon enquhing whether he needed "Commonwealtii assistance". 
None was needed, Hanlon assured Chifley, as the issue was "covered 
by a State award of the State Industrial Council".'* 
The whole issue of jurisdiction was fraught with contradictory 
often antagonistic demands. Arthur Fadden, die federal leader of the 
Country Party, wanted the Commonwealtii to mtervene to protect 
graziers' livelihood and restore mdustrial harmony in 1946." Despite 
tills plea, the conservatives were invariably staunch advocates of the 
inviolabUity of States' rights and integrity. Chifley, somewhat 
facetiously mquired whether Fadden: 
...wants me to override the State Industrial Court, die State 
Govemment by die exercise of a power possessed by the 
Commonwealth... If the Commonwealth were to engage hi a fight 
not only with the strikers but also...with employers, the 
Queensland Govemment, die State Industrial and Arbitration Court, 
a state of affairs akin to hidustrial anarchy would be created."" 
Yet m some respects, the federal govemment may have doubted the 
abUity of the Queensland govemment to settie its industrial affairs 
judiciously. E.J. HoUoway, die federal minister for Labour and 
National Service, registered alarm m July 1946 tiiat: 
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The Queensland Govemment has taken action to deal drasticaUy 
with die men on strike. The union has already been deregistered 
which means that its members have been deprived of die 
protection of the Court. That is a most serious matter ...*' 
Interference and intervention in the operation of the Industiial 
Registry, and die Industrial ConcUiation and Arbitration Courts was 
inevitable, not just hi the extreme example of a general strike but in 
the comer-stone policy of wage determination. The basic wage was 
not determined by parliament but by the industrial court. This 
aUowed the basic wage ostensibly to be mdependentiy determined 
without the demands that election promises might make."^ When die 
issues of stagnant wage levels and increased cost of livmg moved 
outside the mstitutionalised framework and slow deliberations of die 
overworked courts"' mto die political arena, explosive conflict, which 
the government would seek to contain by various degrees of coercion 
and restramt, was inevitable. Blackmur asserts that: 
To a significant degree, die strikes that empted m the raUway 
workshops and runnmg sheds on 3 Febmary 1948 were die 
expression of years of fmstration with the application of tiiese 
principles, and were mtended to force the court to abandon tiiem 
altogether."" 
The Industrial Court established new rates for metal trade workers on 
8 September 1947. Ten days later, AEU and die Blacksmitii's 
Society applied to die mdustrial registrar for a flow-on of marginal 
rates. This was opposed by the commissioner of railways m early 
October. A hearing was delayed because die court had to adjust all 
Queensland awards to provide for die newly mtroduced forty hour 
week."' Blackmur states tiiat tiie action of the commissioner of 
railways, who failed to consuU die unions over die new State 
application to the court, "produced a violent reaction from die 
unions"."* 
^ The president of die Combmed Railway Union (CRU), Mick 
O'Brien, questioned die court's mediods and its manipulation by die 
Railway department: 
How can any union have respect for the hnpartial attimdes of die 
court when we find tiiat the Employers' representatives are able to 
use backdoor methods to have tiieir request granted by die court?... 
If die Commissioner is dissatisfied witii die Court - the Unions are 
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- he should foUow the same procedure as the unions are 
compeUed to foUow by law, and apply for a variation. This latest 
mstance does not enhance the prestige of die Court, or the 
Government's policy of arbitration."' 
Addressmg a large meeting of railway workers at the Brisbane 
Stadium on 18 November 1947, O'Brien pubUcly criticised the 
interference by the raUway commissioner in the court's activities and 
die extent to which its partisan attitudes favoured the employer, in 
tills case a Labor State government.*' Further resentment existed as 
die State Industrial Court took action agamst union officials who 
advocate a twenty-four hour stoppage on 17 November."' 
Unionists felt they needed to take direct action for two reasons; 
first, because die raUway commissioner had mterfered in the operation 
of the Industrial Court to the detriment of then- legitunate clahns. 
This was seen as outside of the law, for ostensibly, as Hanlon told 
Mick Healy, the president of the Trades and Labour Council, on 11 
December 1947: 
[Provisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Aci\ ... apply 
equaUy to employers as weU as employees ... The Government 
does not intend to mterfere m any way with die Industrial Court 
m die exercise of its functions and jurisdiction. ... The Court 
generally tries to suit the convenience of aU parties and if 
appUcation are made for hearings, I am sure the Court wiU deal 
with such application as speedily as possible.'" 
Hanlon continued to maintain the rhetoric and not the reaUty of 
govemment policy. The Industrial Court, m reviewing a previous 
minor raUway dispute on 30 June 1946, stated diat: 
... the Coiut is bound to take action when ... unions registered hi 
the Court appear likely to become involved in an iUegal strike by 
iUegal methods and at die dictation of die Strike Committee 
controUed, we beUeve, by Communists, whose policy is opposed 
to Arbitration ... This is not any way to fight for better conditions 
for the workers." 
This pronouncement reflected the realities of Queensland's hidustrial 
relations which Labor poUticians myopicaUy, at least pubUcly, ignored. 
Secondly, unionists were dismayed about the increashigly ptmitive 
provisions contamed m die 1946 amendments to the Industrial 
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Conciliation and Arbitration Act. The Industrial Court could, for 
mstance, deregister unions and control the intemal mechanisms of a 
union, like the scmtiny of the secret baUot and impose heavy fines 
upon mdividuals for breaches of the regulations. In particular, die 
amendment section 21A of the 1946 Act appeared only to require any 
industrial "disagreements" (as Gair euphemisticaUy dubbed them) to be 
reported to the industrial registrar or an industrial magistrate. As he 
stated ingenuously to H.L. Edmonds of the AFULE on 24 May 1948: 
This section has operated very successfuUy and has been the cause 
of preventing minor disagreements from becoming the causes of 
major industrial disputes.'^ 
The AFULE suggested that a liaison officer between the union and 
die railway commissioner "with die object of caUhig the Arbiti-ation 
Court togetiier m order to prevent direct action" might prove a more 
sensible practice." Conservative poUticians Uke RusseU Ukewise 
disputed the claims made by Gair concemmg the effectiveness of 
tiiese amendments, regardmg them as an essentiaUy element of 
compulsion directed agamst unions.'" 
Hanlon defended tiiese amendments, passed m December 1946, 
which could control union activities far more effectively, as measures 
to mmimise "die possibility of mdustrial stoppages m this State"." 
He further commented m April 1947 diat: 
... the Arbitration system does not envisage the elhnmation of 
strikes, or the abolition of industiial unrest, is borne out by die 
provisions of die Industrial Arbitration and Conciliation Act for 
legal strikes, die procedure to be foUowed, die takmg of a secret-
baUot.'* 
The £100 fine for any person advocatmg an iUegal stoppage or strike 
was also deeply resented. As Labor moderate, A. Neumann, secretary 
of tihe AMIEU, stated to Hanlon on 1 December 1947: 
Action against Union officials carrymg out the wishes of tiieh 
members, is damnable in the extreme and repulsive to aU 
unionists, and should be to aU Laborites, and, if carried out and 
extended ...then such action must surely totaUy destroy die 
workers' regard and aUegiance to die ParUamentary Labor Party in 
diis State. The whole thmg smacks far too strongly of die 
Who Really Governs This Country 137 
repressive acts seen m die past, of vicious anti-worker 
Govemments m this country and overseas." 
During die railway strike, Jun Healy of die WWF and Frank Nolan of 
die ARU were fmed under tiiese provisions and under the 1938 State 
Transport Act. 
The most repressive measures however were contamed in the 
Industrial Law Amendment Act initiated by Hanlon on 9 March 1948. 
He defended the need for such additional legislation on the grounds 
diat picketmg during an Ulegal strike needed to be dealt widi firmly. 
Provisions aUowed for stiff penalties for any person who compeUed or 
counseUed (or attempted to) any person "to disobey an order of die 
[industrial] court and take part m an illegal strike". Police were able 
to arrest without warrants and to enter private property without a 
warrant to remove persons who were suspected of intimidating 
workers who wished to continue tiieir employment.'* A fine of £100 
and/or six montiis imprisonment was aUowed. The leader of the 
Opposition, Frank Nicklm pertmentiy asked why new legislation was 
needed when vast emergency powers were available imder the State 
Transport Act of 1938. Moreover, even the 1899 Criminal code 
provision for a term of three months imprisonment for "intimidation" 
and "molestmg" workers for the purpose of compeUing a worker to 
leave his employment or preventing hun from acceptmg employment 
had been repealed by the Ryan govemment in 1915." Blackmur 
believes that: 
... tiie need to suppress mass picketing was becommg urgent [m 
early March] since it was threatening to dismpt the preparation 
and distribution of fuel supplies essential for the operation of die 
emergency road transport system.*" 
What makes the provisions and tuning of this Act even more 
extraordinary are the unmediate circumstances that preceded its 
inaiuguration. A state of emergency had already been proclahned on 
Friday 27 Febmary. An Order-hi-CouncU, specifically banning mass 
picketmg and otibier activities designed to promote and prolong the 
railway strike, was gazetted that day.*' As Walter Sparkes, die 
Country Party MLA for Aubigny sardonicaUy commented during the 
debate on die first readmg of die Industirial Law Amendment BiU: 
What is die use of givmg furtiier power to a Govemment who are 
not game enough to exercise the powers tiiey have today?*^ 
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Cribb, Blackmur, Knight, Sheridan and Shearman aU suggest reasons. 
The strike, radier tiian abating, escalated when die Waterside Workers 
Federation, die Seamen's Union and tiie mmers jomed die raUway 
workers.*' This move tiu-eatened to dismpt aU forms of transport. 
Furthermore, as tiie Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia occuned 
almost simultaneously, comparisons were made in die press, die pulpit 
and pariiament tiiat Queensland was to suffer die same fate.*" hi an 
alarmist broadcast to die State on Sunday evenmg of 29 Febmary, 
Hanlon clahned tiiat Queensland was "on die brink of a civU war" 
witii a communist-led takeover through control of die dispute's 
committee of die railway stiike.*' Blackmur correctiy assesses die 
broadcast, die press campaign and die declaration as "a dismal 
failure"** for die strike base broadened and its participants' resolve 
firmed under such adversity and coercion. 
Doubtiessly, tiie Hanlon govemment predicted victory over miUtant 
and defiant unionists given die events m 1946. Agahi, a barrage of 
hostility from press, pulpit and parliament was conducted m order to 
discredit unionists on strike. Archbishop Duhig denounced those who 
promoted "rebeUion" agamst lawful autiiority, whether govemment, 
court or employer.*' In an attempt to alarm tiie pubUc, tiie Courier 
Mail's headUne for Wednesday 26 June 1946 read "Drastic Cuts at 
Midnight: 100,000 face loss of jobs". Later provocative titles 
claimed diat "Meat Strikers Bash Volunteers. 50 Attack 12 witii boot, 
iron and wood".** Agam, reference was clearly made between die 
Australian democratic tradition, that was seen m perilous danger, and 
totalitarian communism. The Courier Mail of a 9 July 1946 clahned 
that die communist mspired and led strUcers were "... out to destioy, if 
they can, everythuig that mamtams democracy m this land - its laws, 
die right to the baUot, free speech, trade unionism ...". 
A state of emergency had been declared on 28 June 1946, 
ordering a fuU resumption of meat production by 12 July along widi 
"restrictive regulations" that were subsequently repealed on 9 July. 
The AMIEU was ordered to take a postal baUot of aU its members.*' 
Blackmur pertmentiy comments that Hanlon used a military metaphor, 
demandmg diat the meatworkers "... take a sane view of die position 
and cease making war on the community".'" The war against 
miUtancy and communism needed firm handluig and drastic measures. 
The strike did not end hnmediately; for, after a mass meeting 
which rejected the government's ulthnatum, a deputation caUed upon 
the premier who refused a plea for a resumption on pre-strike 
conditions with aU remstatements guaranteed. Haidon did schedule a 
conference between employees and unions for late July." This proved 
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a faUure for unionists refused to relmquish rights won during the 
war.'^  The meat strike ended ignommiously in defeat. Blackmur 
comments that: 
IronicaUy, m die 1946 Queensland meat dispute it had finally been 
die government, not the Queensland mdustrial court, despite the 
govemments constant assertions tiiat it would have to be settied m 
accordance widi die processes of arbitration." 
The unplementation of die state of emergency m both cases under 
discussion did not produce the desired results. In parliamentary 
debate in 1948, on die repeal of the Industrial Law Amendment Act, 
Hanlon clahned diat: 
... m dealmg with an emergency you must have the widest 
possible freedom of action. No one can say how an emergency 
situation is likely to develop. You cannot generalise about it. No 
one can say exactiy what action should be taken m some future 
disturbance. The Govemment are (sic) preserving that right to 
deal witii any emergency that might arise and to deal with it m 
tiie way tiiat the Government might think proper.'" 
This admission tihat the govemment should possess undefined, open-
ended powers under unspecified circumstances demonstrates 
conclusively the manner m which the state could intervene and 
conti-ol. Unfortunately, die file entitied "state of emergency" held the 
in premier's office in the executive building could not be located, 
hence vital mformation on die plannmg, rationale and strategy behmd 
die declarations in 1946 and 1948 could not be included. PubUc 
statements and other more accessible archival material have constituted 
die sources on this cmcial issue. 
Yet m 1948 circumstances did not sunply mirror those two years 
previously. On the one hand die union movement was far more 
united and organised, though the Toowoomba branch of the AFULE 
refused to join die strike." Sheridan believes that the mamtenance of 
a skeleton service from Toowoomba weakened the effectiveness of 
concerted action.'* On die other hand, m diis instance the employer 
was the State govemment, the very instrument that could effect a 
lock-out (which occurred on 7 Febmary), mtroduce punitive legislation 
which destroyed the very concept of habeas corpus (by aUowing 
arrest without a warrant and poUce powers to enter private property) 
and declare a "state of emergency"; and as die Sydney Morning 
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Herald of 1 March 1948 clahned, total censorship was imposed on 
the press and radio by the Premier's department." Despite die 
provisions of the Industrial Law Amendment Act, picketmg became far 
more organised and extensive. In early March, Mick Healy, E.G. 
Englart (WWF) C. Graham, B.B. Bennett and T, Esler were arrested 
and sentenced under the new law, '* defended by Max Julius (who 
was later to be arrested and gaoled for contempt of court) and 
communist MLA, Fred Paterson. 
The energy of the strikers, m particular the central disputes 
committee, was however diverted mto attackuig the so-caUed "anti-
picket law". Marchers in a peaceful procession conducted on 15 
March from Trades HaU in Upper Edward Street were baton-charged 
by die police. The [Brisbane] Telegraph of that evening claimed die 
"Communist factions" had "provoked the police", who had no 
alternative but to defend themselves. The most serious confrontation 
occurred on the "St Patrick day's march" of 17 March when around 
200 imionists and their supporters, mostly members of the CPA, 
proceeded mto central Brisbane. Over one hundred police met them 
m Roma street where a serious fracas ensued. Paterson, actmg as a 
legal observer, was stmck by a baton-wielding police officer, an event 
from which he never fuUy recovered." 
The Courier Mail of 18 March 1948 headlined the previous day's 
events as "Police Clash with Reds' City March", esthnatmg that die 
"clash" lasted for "45 second(s)". The foUowing day die headlme was 
even more alarmist: "Reds Try to Force National Unrest but State 
gets more Trains". The communists were accused of attemptmg "to 
stampede Australia wide mdustrial unrest over the Queensland rail 
strike". From the opposing ideological perspective, The Guardian of 
19 March 1948 declared tiiat tiie assauU on Paterson was a 
premeditated and deliberate murder attempt by "Hanlon's tiiugs" (tiie 
police). 
The next move, foUowing from this unambiguous use of tiie 
state's power of coercion, were protests, cuhnmathig m an iUegal raUy 
on 19 March tiirough Brisbane. This tune nearly 2000 marchers 
attended die proceedings, led by 1500 members of die WWF. On 
this occasion police activity was low-key, though their presence was 
visible.*" The otiier mam issue concemed die sheriff's attempts to 
retrieve union papers after Federal AEU official, E.J. Rowe was found 
guilty of contempt in die mdustrial court hearing.*' The strike fmaUy 
ended on 5 April when Hanlon conceded marginal increases to all 
workshop employees retrospective to 18 September 1947.* 82 
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Subsequentiy a special bureau was formulated witiim die Crimmal 
Investigation Branch of the State pohce to gather systematicaUy 
intelUgence on union activity.*' Botii die State and federal 
govemments maintained co-ordinated inteUigence monitoring services 
which scmtmised the ideology, operation, persoimel and performance 
of radicals and dissidents (see chapters 2 and 5). Previously the State 
police did not usually keep union activities per se under surveiUance. 
The atmosphere of the later 1940s, with hs siege mentaUty, the 
pervasive obsession with a communist revolution and socid and 
industrial dislocation and conflicts were conclusive to the 
estabUshment of ASIO and shnUar local mteUigence services. 
In conclusion, the pattems of suspicion, disavowal and antagonism 
diat had characterised mamstream Labor's interaction widi radicals 
were heightened m the post-war period of social, economic and 
industrial dislocation. The Labor govemment m Queensland under the 
premiership of Ned Hanlon used a series of ideological tactics to 
discredit communists and militant tiade unions who were perceived as 
one and the same group of agitators ready to destioy democratic 
ti-aditions like the conciliation and arbitration system. While 
ostensibly allowmg the industrial courts autonomy and mdependence 
from direct govemment interference, events in the 1946 meat strike, in 
particular, revealed the hoUowness of the rhetoric. Moreover, punitive 
and restrictive amendments were mtroduced m 1946 mto the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act to aUow direct govemment 
involvement m union affairs. Legislation which acted as a weapon to 
bludgeon unions mto docUity was intiroduced. These measures vastiy 
increased pohce powers. The Hanlon government, in its deployment 
of die force m the St. Patrick day's march m 1948, die establishment 
of a counter-surveiUance unit m the Criminal Investigation Branch to 
monitor tiie activities of radical unions and particular union leaders, 
politicised die police. This legacy was bequeathed to the Bjelke-
Petersen govemment two decades later. Lastly, die proclamation of a 
state of emergency on two occasions during hidustrial disputes attests 
to die degree to which governments intervene, control and attempt to 
limit civU liberties. 
Conclusion 
Writing about the American Civil War, Brace Catton notes tiiat: 
A singular fact about modem war is that it takes charge. Once 
begun it has to be carried to its conclusion, and carrymg it there 
sets in motion events beyond men's control. Doing what has to 
be done to win, men perform acts tiiat alter the very soU m which 
society's roots are nourished. 
Total war m this century has presented the state m Westem poUtical 
systems with an unprecedented crisis that paradoxically both 
chaUenged its ability to mobUise and defend its own sovereign 
territory and, at the same time consolidated its functions, apparatus 
and powers. Antiiony Giddens m The Nation State arui Violence 
maintams that: 
One of the major characters of the modem state... is the vast 
expansion of the capabiUty of state admmistrators to influence 
even the most ultimate feature of daily activity. 
In war-time these processes of intmsion, surveiUance and control are 
more pronounced. The survival of die nation allows die State hugh 
extensions in the scope, power and thoroughness of hs operations. 
In the Second World War this process of consolidation and 
centralisation ensured mcreasmg and unscmtinised executive control. 
In openly totalitarian regimes lUce Germany and the USSR, tiiis did 
not present a poUtical crisis as U did in die liberal democracies like 
Great Britam, die USA or Australia which were ostensibly fighting for 
'liberty', botii at an individual and national level. Yet, as CUnton L. 
Rossiter in his classic smdy. Constitutional Dictatorships. Crisis 
Government in the Modern Democracies averred in 1948, the very 
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mediods necessary to fight extemal totalitarian regimes ensured tiieir 
emergence m the parliamentary democracies. Rossiter also mamtamed 
diat, m order to mobUise for total war, States' rights had to become 
secondary to the overriding supremacy of any central federal 
govemment. 
In Australia this process was by no means uniformly or easily 
achieved. The States clung tenaciously to tiieir traditional rights 
enshrined m the federal Constitution, reiteratmg that the 
Commonwealth's prhnary arena of responsibility and power lay ahnost 
solely m defence. Indeed, a Uteral readmg of the Constitution could 
render such an mterpretation valid, if unrealistic and uhhnately 
dangerous, given the extraorduiary demands and challenges presented 
by a total war extendmg over six years. The fundamental 
constitiitional and administrative problem lay in the Constitution itself 
which gave the Commonwealth defence powers, albeit elastic and 
open-ended ones, but allowed aU other emergency powers to remain 
with die States. 
Total war demands centraUsed co-ordination of aU decision-
making, a factor at variance with the political and constitutional 
realities of Australia in 1939. Ultimately, by the provisions of the 
National Security Act of 1939-40 and The High Court's upholding of 
die Uniform Income Tax Act of 1942, control was vested m the 
Commonwealth. The States did not relinquish their basic or residual 
powers without protracted negotiation, conflict and resistance to 
federal mcursion. An examination of Queensland's practices during 
die war however does reveal a complexity and unevermess of both 
policy and procedure that is not at first apparent. 
TTiis arose out of the basic constitutional stmcture. Emergency 
powers to deal with specific crises such as natural disasters or general 
stiikes rest fimdy witiiin the jurisdiction of the States. In Queensland, 
in particular, governments generally smce 1891 have readily resorted 
to tiie use of extraordinary emergency powers to nuUify the activities 
of militant trade unionists engaged in a strike. Labor administrations 
since 1918 have not hesitated to employ stringent and repressive 
measures to deal widi mdustrial miUtancy, despite their supposed 
aUegiance to working class soUdarity. 
IronicaUy, although die period of Reconstmction after 1943 
wimessed numerous hidustrial disputes, stoppages and strikes, 
extraordinary emergency powers were not employed despite the 
manpower strictures contamed in die national security regulations 
pertammg to die conthiuity of the labour force. In tiiis regard. 
Commonwealth jurisdiction meant far less aggressive and severe 
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measures agamst strikers, even diough mdustrial stoppages m wartune 
were porti-ayed as acts underminmg die war effort. The most 
extensive use of repressive legislation, arrests, curtaihnent of 
fundamental civil liberties such as freedom of assembly and speech, 
and die declaration of a state of emergency was confined to peace-
tune post-war strikes. Mostiy notably, as chapter six demonsttates, 
diese measures were deployed to nuUify die refurbished 'enemy of die 
state', die mUitant Communist organiser. During die war Uself, such 
measures had not been deemed appropriate. Given the overridmg 
autiiority of tiie Commonwealtii to deal witii security matters, die 
Menzies' govemment had to reprimand die Forgan Smitii 
administration for its arbitrary targeting of supposed Communists m 
1940. 
In other areas such as intemment, the delegation of spheres of 
mfluence was not clear cut. The State pohce acted mitiaUy as 
mteUigence gatiierers, tiiiough often tiieir estunation of an enemy 
alien's political beliefs reveals an astonishmg degree of ignorance and 
political naivety. After a detention order was issued by die Army, the 
candidate for intemment was apprehended (though not technicaUy 
arrested) and taken mto custody by die police. Intemees could be 
lodged m the State prisons whUst awaiting transit to die central 
uitemment camps admhiistered by the Army. 
The question of die mtroduction of Black American service 
personnel into Australia m December 1941 presented yet another 
dUenuna. The bipartisan adherence of Labor and conservatives to the 
"White Australia" policy ensured tiiis move by the AUies would be 
staunchly opposed. Yet here again another series of contradictions 
presented themselves. Was fighting for "liberty and democracy" 
solely for and by those with white skuis? If tiiis was tiie case, tiien 
how could the AUies present a public rhetoric opposing Nazi doctrines 
when they simultaneously held similar white supremacist views and 
policies? In Australia the implications of this contradiction did not 
enter into public discourse. What was deemed cmcial was whetiier 
the Commonwealtii should temporarily suspend a fundamental tenet of 
policy m order to accommodate the practices of the US Army. 
Bowuig inevitably to the might of tiieir AUies, the Australian 
govemment aUowed Black GIs to enter Australian soil. Yet, given 
die segregative practices existmg in die US armed forces, this meant 
tiiat tiie unwanted contmgent would be base troops. As Queensland 
was a primary stagmg camp for the entire Pacific campaign hi 1942 
and 1943 in particular, these troops would be located m the State 
which most rigidly maintamed its own segregation system for many of 
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its Aborigmal hdiabitants. Complex pattems of co-operation between 
Commonwealth and State civU and miUtary pohce and between die 
Austi-aUan and American Armies were needed m order to mahitam 
and ensure a highly inefficient system of zonal segregation. 
Agam m the area of sexuality, shnilar contradictions were 
manifested. Australian women were expected to be hospitable 
towards American service personnel. Yet any woman who contracted 
a sexually transmitted disease was seen as a contaminator destroying 
die fightmg capacity of the AUies. Queensland already possessed its 
own solution in the form of a "lock hospital" which in peace-time 
incarcerated prostitutes with syphUis. The national security 
regulations, pertaming to venereal diseases and contraceptives, passed 
in September 1942, aUowed for detention of persons suffering or 
suspected of suffering from a STD. Yet "persons" essentiaUy meant 
only women, given the operation of a double standard of sexual 
moraUty. Mirroring the pattems of co-operation and designation of 
die delegation of powers employed with reference to Black service 
persoimel, mfected women would be targeted by the State police on 
die advice of a US Uaison committee and, on the basis of their class, 
could be incarcerated in either the "lock hospital" or a special 
infectious diseases ward of the public General Hospitals. 
In aU these procedures which involved the containment of those 
who were perceived as threats to the AUied war effort, (defined in the 
broadest terms), complex pattems of co-operation and demarcation 
needed to be established between the States and the Commonwealth, 
and between the AustraUan and American armed forces. The 
Queensland govemment, espousing a parochial commitment to the 
supremacy of State sovereignty and autonomy, did not easily 
relinquish its ovm powers and was often in conflict with both the 
Menzies and Curtin federal government. 
Ultunately, however, war measures planned and executed centraUy 
aUowed some sections of die Queensland state apparatus, for instance, 
die police to expand its functions and powers. The police monitored 
and took mto custody, when it was deemed appropriate, security risks 
like enemy aliens and political dissidents like communists and fascists, 
as weU as those who threatened the physical and moral weU-being of 
die community, namely unmly Black American GIs and some women 
with STDs. By enthusiasticaUy admmistering the various provisions 
of the national security regulations, especiaUy those m tiiese cmcial 
and sensitive domams, policing practices were enlarged and 
consolidated. Ultunately this process strengtiiened the autonomy and 
power of the Queensland govemment. 
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This is not to suggest tiiat tiie process was even and uniform. Up 
until December 1941 no serious reaUgnment between die 
Commonwealtii and die States is visible. The war, conducted on 
distant battie zones m die aid of the British war effort, essentiaUy 
aUowed for die continued appearance of a "busmess as usual" policy. 
The Commonwealtii assumed most of die powers it needed m die 
period from September 1939 to December 1941 under Section 51 of 
die Constitution witii little reference to die aU-encompassing 
dunensions of die national security regulations. It is in diis period 
tiiat Queensland and Victoria passed Public Safety biUs to ensure 
State supremacy in the advent of an mvasion. 
Yet die eariy mondis of 1942, when mvasion appeared imminent, 
wimessed the conclusive supremacy of the Commonwealtii's 
jurisdiction, a pattem tiiat extended mto and mcreased m the post-war 
era. Contermhiously, diough die High Court ultunately upheld die 
Commonwealtii's enlarged spheres of control, die actual enforcement 
of federal policy relied upon the mcreasing use and power of die 
States' civil police. In no otiier area of tiie Commonwealth can tiiis 
complex pattem be more clearly observed tiian m Queensland which 
contained die highest proportion of enemy aliens in strategicaUy 
vulnerable areas as weU as active and powerful communist ti-ade 
unionists. Moreover, witii tiie deployment of die South West Pacific 
Area campaign from Queensland, and die obsession with a racial and 
sexual purity which manifested itself m attempts to segregate 
variously Black GIs and Australian women witii STDs, civil poUce 
and officials withm the Health department also enlarged the scope and 
extent of dieir activities and powers. 
Whether these processes were uniform throughout Australia has 
not yet been researched in depth. Given its ethnic and ideological 
composition along with its political economy, furtiier research wiU 
probably reveal that Queensland, as in the First World War, provides 
the most clear-cut and extreme examples of the national situation. 
This prolonged "State of Emergency" may however, on the contrary, 
reveal both a persistent state of mind and a process whereby any 
deviation or dissention has been curtailed and nullified. Certainly die 
roots of the Bjelke-Petersen style of govemment, characterised by a 
paranoid suspicion and suppression of foreigners, radicals, Blacks and 
women who transgress the traditional codes of behaviour, may also be 
identified m die Forgan Smith and Hanlon years. The war simply 
brought to the surface and helped resolve those contradictions withm 
the publicly proclaimed commitment and adherence to democratic 
forms and the visible and blatant disregard of fundamental civU 
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liberties and those checks and balances witiim the Westtnuister 
system. War emergencies dierefore can reveal diose underlying 
processes that lie dormant in peace-time. 
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